MOZAMBIQUE’S 2009 ELECTIONS
Framing Democratic Consolidation In Context

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ABSTRACT
Mozambique’s fourth post-conflict elections, held in October 2009, accorded citizens and the political elite an opportunity to assess their democratic experiences over two decades of transition from one-party to multiparty democracy. Dominated by the two oldest political parties, the incumbent Frelimo and the opposition Renamo, the election tested the degree to which Mozambicans were able to consolidate their democratic gains and exposed the extent of the political elite’s capacity to play by the rules of the democratic game. Despite robust electioneering, heated debate and the exclusion of some presidential and party candidates from standing, the election was conducted in relative peace, attesting, by and large, to the elite’s ability to combine political competition, cooperation and a few selfless compromises in pursuit of safeguarding hard-won democratic gains, peaceful co-existence, political stability and a modicum of economic growth. This article analyses Mozambique’s 2009 elections with specific reference to: the major issues which dominated the elections; the framing and salient features of post-conflict democratic consolidation or the lack of it; and the role of the new political parties in the party alignment. By addressing these issues, we hope to shed light on the implications of the elections for post-liberation politics and democratic consolidation.
INTRODUCTION

The background to Mozambique’s fourth competitive multiparty democratic elections since the country acquired its independence from Portuguese colonial rule on 25 June 1975 invites comment. The Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) has dominated Mozambique’s political history both as a liberation movement, since its establishment in 1962, and its transformation of the country into a one-party Marxist state in 1977 and the formation of the first national government under self-rule. Frelimo also dominated political life in post-conflict Mozambique during the civil war and post-Rome General Peace Accord in 1992. Likewise, Resistência Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo) has spent most of its political life as a liberation movement and an opposition to Frelimo.

Generally, it was expected that the fourth multiparty election would reveal signs of political consolidation or, rather, a greater comprehension of the normative and pragmatic rules of party politics. The adherence of Mozambicans since 1994 to the principle of holding regular and periodic elections and former President Joaquim Alberto Chissano’s compliance with the Constitution in stepping down at the end of his second term, in 2004, could be considered glimpses of a semblance of political maturity.

Other positive aspects include the call for a second round in Nacala in the third local elections and the recognition by the National Electoral Commission (CNE), which is perceived as biased in favour of Frelimo, of the landslide victory of Daviz Simango, an independent candidate, in Beira (Ruigrok 2005). Although some political parties were not excluded from the general election they conformed with a Constitutional Council ruling that excluded them from fielding presidential candidates. None of the smaller and new political parties resorted to unconstitutional means such as violence.

Political parties in Mozambique have gained experience and knowledge of party politics in a multiparty democracy. Both Frelimo and Renamo have, to some extent, been transformed from highly militarised centralised liberation and guerrilla movements into civil political organisations operated increasingly by a combination of educated civilians, political cadres and party functionaries. They have also established offices throughout Mozambique to galvanise the support of their members.

However, Frelimo is better organised than all the other political parties because of its proximity to power and the opportunities brought about by its control of the financial resources and personnel of government. Incumbency offers Frelimo considerable advantages in acquiring better skills, education and social mobility for its cadres, particularly loyal middle-range politicians and civil servants.
With this in mind, we analyse Mozambique’s 2009 election and highlight on party politics, factions, alignments and major issues that dominated the elections; the framing and salient features of post-conflict democratic consolidation or the lack of it; and the role of the new political parties in party alignment and electoral outcomes. By addressing these issues we hope to shed light on the implications of the elections for post-liberation politics and democratic consolidation.

PARTY POLITICS, FRICTIONS AND ALIGNMENTS

Party politics

Party politics in Mozambique is dominated by the centrality of Frelimo in the country’s polity and society and its ability to maintain an integrated power structure, ensuring a close relationship between the party, the presidency, the political executive and the state apparatus. On the other hand, despite an impressive showing in the elections, Renamo has maintained its position as the main opposition party but has not, as yet, posed a serious challenge to Frelimo.

Because of the existence of opposing trajectories, with one party forming a perpetual government (Frelimo), the other a perpetual opposition (Renamo) the relationship between the two is barely cordial and not commensurate with the democratic norms prevalent in mature democracies. For example, from 1992 to 2004 the two parties maintained a degree of political collaboration and accommodation, including direct dialogue between then incumbent President Joaquim Chissano and opposition leader Afonso Dhlakama. Unfortunately, this situation changed in 2005, to the extent that Dhlakama and Armando Emílio Guebuza, Chissano’s successor, have not met in the past five years.

The strained Frelimo-Renamo relationship has had at least two negative implications for party politics and the democratic norms governing the relationship between government and opposition: firstly it weakens the party system and jeopardises the institutionalisation of stable inter-party competition, with the effect that democracy is not sufficiently embedded in society. Although elections are accepted as the only legitimate institution through which citizens’ preferences are weighed, they are often marred by squabbles and scattered electoral violence (see, eg, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 3, 14 September 2009).

With few exceptions the opposition parties lack basic organisational structures, operating as fiefdoms of one or two leaders seeking state electoral support only to disappear from the political scene once they receive their share of the windfall and, at times, without campaigning for the popular vote. Such
greedy politicians often hibernate and emerge only with the onset of registration for the next elections, to receive their share of election funds.

The only difference between Renamo and the ‘briefcase’ parties is that it has a constituency and sizeable electoral support. But as an organisation it lacks the basic elements of a political party – there is no communication between the national, provincial and district levels and it has organised few proper conventions since its transformation from guerrilla movement to political party. It has retained much of its military style and, while its president has exchanged his military fatigues for civilian clothes, he still behaves like a military commander. He silences intellectual voices, stifles genuine debate within the party and quickly eliminates those who disagree with him. In a recent interview Dlhakama admitted that he is authoritarian and believes he should continue to lead the party because that is the only way to halt Frelimo’s dominance.

In a rare show of bi-partisan agreement the first provincial assembly elections were postponed from 21 January 2008, the date specified in the Constitution, to October 2009, to coincide with the national and presidential elections. The change of date required a constitutional amendment and thus the collaboration of government and opposition was critical. Frelimo mellowed its rhetoric and was able to persuade Renamo to accept the amendment. Despite the use of harsh language by parliamentarians across the party divide a consensus was reached and the amendment was accepted, thus saving the country considerable expense and the risk of electoral violence. While Frelimo was able to secure a peaceful leadership succession from President Chissano to Guebuza in 2004 and the current president has already pledged that he will not try to have the Constitution changed to permit him a third term (AIM 4 October), the succession debate in Renamo is taboo and can only be whispered about for fear of reprisals. Since 1992 Dlhakama had organised only two congresses, at which he presented fictitious candidates for the party presidency only to satisfy externally driven demands (by regional and transnational democracy promotion activists) for Renamo to adopt internal party democracy measures (Lalá & Ostheimer 2003).

Mozambique may either be defined as an electoral democracy, where an election signifies peaceful transition, or as a process of renewing and legitimising Frelimo’s mandate to govern. Once in power Frelimo uses the machinery of government as an extension of party influence over the state apparatus. In the circumstances, democracy is equated with elections and after elections the country returns to ‘business as usual’ or rule by the party faithful and the exclusion of the opposition and government critics. In addition, Frelimo’s control of key government institutions (the police and the army), including the electoral institutions, has strengthened its grip on power, creating uncertainty and doubt even about whether the elections are free and fair.
After 20 years of relative internal cohesion, factions and internal schisms began to beset Renamo in 2008, almost a year before the 28 October 2009 elections. Fearful of being challenged by the charismatic style and leadership qualities of Daviz Simano, the Mayor of Beira (the largest city in Mozambique), Renamo withdrew its support for his candidacy for re-election in 2008. For his part, Simano decided to defy the party’s ruling and contest the municipal elections as an independent candidate. He won 62 per cent of the vote, defeating the two candidates endorsed by Renamo and Frelimo, and had his position as mayor reconfirmed. The results attested to his popularity as well as to the lack of support at grassroots level for the conventional parties.

In preparation for the 2009 elections Simano founded the Movimento Democrático de Moçambique or Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM, a Renamo offshoot) in order to oppose the dominance of Frelimo and Renamo. There are similarities among the three parties in relation to their support for peace, political stability, democracy and development. But there are also considerable differences. Politically, the MDM stands for Mozambique for all, democratic leadership, inclusive, plural and participatory democracy, freedom, equitable distribution of wealth, wellbeing for all, solidarity and moralisation of society, and the abolition of Frelimo party branches in state institutions such as schools, hospitals, ministries and others. With social policies oriented towards the youth, which it claims to be its key social base, the MDM leans towards social democracy.

Frelimo claims to stand for consolidating national unity, peace and democracy; a school for promoting and consolidating democracy; combating poverty; promoting the culture of work; good governance and accountability and the promotion of friendship, solidarity and cooperation. Frelimo also claims that its programme is mindful of the need to combat corruption, though the so-called ‘war against corruption’ was played down in the 2009 electioneering rhetoric compared with that in 2004. Frelimo’s manifesto also advocates continuity in the path of development and poverty reduction under a social democratic dispensation.

Like the MDM Renamo advocates the abolition of Frelimo party branches in state institutions. It promises to promote tolerance and guarantee citizen freedoms in a plural polity that allows access to the media and promotes the concept of the inviolability of the right to life. It promises the right to differ, to elevate the dignity of traditional authority, to promote the defence of human rights, and to reform and depoliticise the judiciary. Like Frelimo, Renamo promises to combat corruption, crime and drugs, and to decentralise public administration.
The MDM experienced a taste of real politik in late September 2009 when the CNE rejected its lists of candidates in nine of the 13 parliamentary constituencies. According to the CNE the decision was made on the grounds that the MDM had not submitted the legally required documents. This partial exclusion of the MDM resulted in an unprecedented outcry from moderate voices and civil society organisations.

The following headlines from key independent newspapers in 2009 illustrate the argument: ‘Unlawful decisions by CNE may provoke bloodshed’ (Magazine Independente, 9 September), ‘CNE is transformed into a Frelimo political cell’ (Zambeze Independente, 10 September), ‘Political earthquake in Mozambique’ (Savana, 11 September), ‘A high tension week in Maputo between CNE and parties’ (Magazine Independente, 16 September), ‘Signs of danger from CNE’ (Magazine Independente, 16 September), ‘CNE jumped important steps of the law’ (Diario Independente, 17 September) and ‘Fraudulent and Technological Stalinism at CNE’ (Zambeze Independente, 17 September).

Multilateral and bilateral international development agencies active in Mozambique1 criticised the CNE for its failure to release information about the real grounds on which it excluded some political actors. The tight grip of the CNE on information relating to this matter ‘gives an impression of lack of transparency’, said the Finnish Ambassador to Mozambique. He and others argued that it was not clear whether the procedures had been followed correctly or the electoral calendar had been respected. The credibility of the electoral process would be placed in question if the issues were not resolved quickly. After reading the statement, the ambassador added that he had the impression that excluded political parties had not been given the opportunity to make corrections, as set out in the law (Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 5, 19 September 2009).

In September 2009 the MDM complained to the Constitutional Council (CC) about the CNE ruling that the documents presented in support of some its candidates to contest the elections were not complete and in some cases were not even submitted. The CC’s decision in favour of the CNE decision is in sharp contradiction with the CNE’s notification to the MDM, which set out the procedural problems the party had to solve before its lists could be accepted. The CC based its ruling on an internal (confidential) CNE document, the mapa de controlo, which is the register of all decisions taken with respect to candidate lists. The issue revolves around the requirement that political parties submit not only the name of a candidate but also a file, known as a processo individual, containing five supporting documents.

1 The G19 includes 16 bilateral budget support donors plus the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the European Commission. The United States and the United Nations are associate members.
According to the CNE if the list of candidates shows that the listed candidates do not possess *processos individuais* the list must automatically be rejected. There must be more candidates than constituency seats, plus three extra candidates, known as *suplentes*. An example of the weakness of the CC ruling can be found in Cabo Delgado constituency, where it says two candidates – Jerónimo Artur and Miguel António Suquia – did not have their voters’ cards and five – António Mendonça de Carvalho, Pissura Amade, Elias Gabriel Riquichi, Miguel António Suquia, and Dale Alfredo Alamo (*suplente*) – did not have *processos individuais*. But in a formal notification sent by the CNE to the MDM it said the first two candidates do not possess *processo individual*, the first three on the list (de Carvalho, Amade, and Riquichi) had failed to present a criminal record certificate and the other two (Suquia and Alamo) were not mentioned at all in the MDM’s submissions.

It is difficult, almost impossible, to work out whether the CNE ruling was correct and to what extent the deliberations and the CC’s decision were based on neutrality, because fundamental information was withheld. The CC and CNE were harshly criticised by the media and civil society. Headlines in a key independent newspaper illustrate the ferocity of the arguments and what was at stake: ‘FRenamo at the Constitutional Council’ (*Diario Independene*, 30 September 2009). FRENAMO is a name coined by the media to insinuate collusion between Frelimo and Renamo in the CC to exclude the MDM. ‘The CC ruling killed democracy’ (*Diario Independene*, 30 September 2009). Important civil society figures expressed disappointment with both the CNE and CC. ‘… I am ashamed of this country where important institutions are commandeered by political parties to the point that these institutions were ordered to shred or steal files of other parties,’ said Alice Mabote, president of the Mozambican Human Rights League.

The MDM and other excluded parties chose to abide by the CC ruling. The MDM contested the election in four national constituencies and the remaining parties aligned with the three larger parties, Frelimo, Renamo and the MDM. The Ecologist Party (PEC-MT), the Labor Party (PT), the Independent Party of Mozambique (PIMO), the Democratic Alliance of Veterans for Development (ADACD), the Mozambican National Party (PANAMO), the Social Liberal Party (SOL), the Union Party (PUP) and the Party for Freedom and Development (PLD) declared their *unconditional* support for Frelimo and its candidate, Armando Guebuza. ‘The Political Council of our party analyzed the manifestos of the three presidential candidates, and we are now announcing our unconditional support for Armando Guebuza,’ said João Massango, leader of PEC-MT. The United Congress of Democrats (CDU), the Social Broadening Party (PASOMO), the Party of Solidarity and Liberty (PAZS), the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Ecological Party of Mozambique (PEMO), the Party of Social and Democratic Reconciliation (PRDS), the Union for Change (UM) and other obscure small
parties supported the MDM. This support was more symbolic than statistical since these are tiny parties without a substantial share of the vote. For instance, in the 2004 general election, the PT won 0.47 per cent of the parliamentary vote, and the Ecologist Party did even worse, with 0.4 per cent.

There is no doubt that the position of new political parties has been greatly undermined by the dominance and, at times, intimidation of Frelimo and Renamo and, in some cases, a number of small parties supported Guebuza. There was also the emergence of the DMD as an offshoot of Renamo. Although the impact on the results of the new and smaller political parties was negligible, their very emergence could point to a long-term political development which may, in the distant future, reduce the dominance of Frelimo and Renamo over Mozambique’s politics.

THE 2009 ELECTORAL PROCESS

On 13 October 2009, 45 days before election day, the election campaign began in earnest. It ended on 25 October, 48 hours before voting started at the country’s 12,694 polling stations. The total number of registered voters was 9,871,949 – about half a million more than in the 2004 elections. A total of 19 parties were involved but only Frelimo and Renamo fielded candidates in all constituencies.

The election returned 250 MPs – the number of seats allocated to each party is based on the proportion of votes it receives. Following the electoral reforms of 2007 the five per cent threshold stipulated in the 2004 Election Law was abolished. A presidential candidate must win a majority of the valid votes cast to be elected. If no candidate obtains more than 50 per cent of the vote a run-off is held between the two strongest candidates and the candidate who wins the most votes is elected.

For the presidential elections the Constitutional Council accepted the nominations of three of nine nominated candidates: Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama (Renamo); Armando Emílio Guebuz (Frelimo); and Daviz Mbepo Simango (MDM). The other six, the CC ruled, had failed to secure the required 10,000 supporting signatures.2

Since the establishment of the precedent setting United Nations trust fund in the founding democratic elections in 1994 official government funding has

2 The candidates whose nominations were rejected were: José Ricardo Viana Agostinho (a coalition of União dos Democratas de Moçambique – Partido Popular, UDM-PT); Leonardo Francisco Cumbe Partido Unido de Moçambique e de Liberdade Democrática, PUMILD); Raul Manuel Domingos (Partido para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento, P PD); Artur Ricardo Jaquene (Coligação União Eleitoral); Jakob Neves Salomão Sibindy); Partido Independente de Moçambique, PIMO); and Khalid Husein Mahomed Sidat (Aliança Independente de Moçambique, ALIMO).
been provided to political parties. In the 2009 elections, the state made $1.85-
million available. One-quarter of the funds was divided equally among the three
presidential candidates and a quarter went to the two parliamentary parties, Frelimo and Renamo, divided according to the number of parliamentary seats held
by each party. The third quarter went to all parties contesting seats in the National
Assembly, divided in proportion to the number of constituencies each party was
registered to contest. The fourth quarter went to parties standing for provincial
assembly elections, also divided in proportion to the number of constituencies
being contested. Half the money was distributed immediately, the rest in two
tranches once the original amounts had been accounted for. Election funding may
be used for posters and other campaign expenses, but not for salaries, buildings,
or the purchase or rehabilitation of vehicles. Frelimo received the largest amount
($810 000).

Unlike in 1994, 1999 and 2004, in 2009 all presidential candidates and major
parties used the stipulated 45 days allocated for campaigning to debate publicly
their political manifestos and policy orientation on major social issues. Access to
public health, water, education and housing for the youth, among other social
issues, were raised and debated more persistently at party rallies than they had
been in previous elections. Nonetheless, party politics and campaigns were still
mass oriented, with huge conglomerations of people, many of them brought in
from outlying areas, listening to presidential candidates and other party leaders
rather than debating and arguing with them. Speeches were largely loaded with
jargon and with slurs and divisive accusations, with each of the three bigger
parties trying to disqualify its opponents.

There was less electoral violence in 2009 than in 1994, 1999 and 2004 but
this did not mean that there was no violence at all. The media reported various
minor incidents, tentatively identifying three lines of confrontation – Frelimo vs
the MDM; Frelimo vs Renamo and Renamo vs the MDM. Several MDM offices
were vandalised by Frelimo vigilante groups in Gaza and Maputo. With apparent
police connivance or apathy Frelimo vigilantes used loudspeakers and trumpets to
obstruct the MDM’s campaigns in several parts of the country. MDM supporters
and party members were reportedly harassed and beaten up. Although the
incidents were minor compared to those in previous elections, Frelimo vigilante
groups also sabotaged Renamo’s campaign by tearing down its propaganda
material, obstructing its members from reaching rally locations and beating up
opposition party leaders at district and community level. Renamo, for its part,
sabotaged the MDM campaign and there were several confrontations between
the two parties.

The emergence of the MDM as a third party and a serious contender in the
parliamentary election was illustrated by Frelimo’s unwelcoming reception of
its establishment. Frelimo pursued a covert strategy to undermine the MDM, including the use of violence against MDM supporters. The result was its landslide victory in the presidential race and a two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections, thus enabling it to reduce Renamo to a residual, although still important, political force.

Growing support for the MDM is reflected in the fact that it won the equivalent of half the votes of Renamo supporters nationally as well as provincially in its strongholds in Sofala and Manica. This success explains why it came under sustained pressure from both Frelimo and Renamo, which feared that its ascendancy would jeopardise the status quo.

According to the media Frelimo abused state assets – mainly vehicles, fuel, state facilities, personnel and campaigning in prohibited public places such as schools – throughout the campaign, placing in doubt the fairness of the elections. Frelimo also had more financial resources than all the other parties together and Guebuza had four helicopters at his disposal throughout the campaign. The Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 17 (21 October 2009) estimated that Frelimo had spent $1-million on helicopters alone – more than the total amount ($810,000) allocated to it by the state.

The Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) registered 1 082 journalists (1 017 nationals and 65 foreigners). The National Electoral Commission registered 2 689 national observers and 530 international observers to monitor the elections. However, some of these national observation missions were problematic. The largest private television station (STV) showed footage of 1 000 observers from the National Forum for Electoral Observation (FOMOE) being transported in state vehicles. The following day, the state vehicles were still used to transport the observers, this time with the state insignia removed from the vehicles. These ‘strange observers’ were members of the establishment, used not only to prevent real observers from monitoring certain areas but also to issue ‘free, fair and transparent’ statements about the election even before the count had started.

Following the pattern which had emerged since 1994 polling day was peaceful and voting was orderly, but there were several incidents. Some polling stations opened very late due to transport problems. According to the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 43 (17 November) in some places party submissions were misplaced and voters’ registers went missing, incidents which created confusion. The bulletin reports that several polling stations could not open in Maputo city (Escola Primaria Filipe Samuel Magaia); in Mucumbura in Tete province; in Gondola in Manica province; Meconta, Nicoadjuni and Namialo in Nampula province; Machanga and Maringue in Sofala province and Cuamba in Niassa province. In Caia in Sofala province, according to the bulletin, one registration
roll was in a polling station 3 km away. Some voters walked the extra distance, but others simply went home. In Mapolo Inhabando, Magoe and Tete there was no polling station at the registration location and 170 voters had to walk 10 km to the next village, Missão.

Two domestic observers were arrested and, after being released, disappeared. In Dombe, Sussendenga and Manica an observer was refused permission to stay overnight close to the polling station. When he returned to the station the following morning the presiding officer called the police to arrest him. He was handcuffed, beaten and told to leave town. In Changara, Tete, after presenting his credentials, he was told that observers were not officially recognised. Again the presiding officer called the police, who told the observer to leave Changara immediately. Similar problems had occurred in 2004, and without observers or opposition party delegates present, there was extensive ballot box stuffing (Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 28, 17 December 2004).

Ballot box stuffing was reported in the same places in 2004 – in Tete and in remote areas of Gaza. For example, the results recorded at several polling stations in the Chicualacuala district, in the southern province of Gaza, returned an extraordinary 100 per cent of the vote for the incumbent Guebuza. ‘When one candidate receives 100 per cent of the vote not in one, but in several polling stations, credibility is severely tainted. Gaza is certainly a Frelimo stronghold, and thus a heavy Guebuza vote would be expected in Chicualacuala. But it is incredible that not only was there not one vote for the opposition but that no voters made mistakes or put their cross in the wrong place because of such factors as illiteracy or poor eyesight.

The MDM gave the first evidence of election administration staff spoiling ballot papers. In polling station 0056 at EPC Esturro, Beira, there were 124 invalid ballot papers (nulos) of a total of 388 (ie, 32% compared to a normal 3%, which is considered an acceptable ratio of spoilt papers). The MDM distributed a video showing stacks of spoilt papers correctly marked, with the cross next to the name of Daviz Simango, its presidential candidate. Many ballot papers, including that of Simango himself, were tainted with ink in exactly the same place, indicating that this must have been a deliberate act to invalidate votes cast for the MDM (Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 43, 17 November 2009).

Although there was harsh criticism of the lack of transparency on part of the National Elections Commission, EISA and the Commonwealth and European Union (EU) observer missions both praised STAE on the administration of the election and the organisation of the voting. They also praised the political parties for their conduct during the election campaign and commended the press for balanced coverage. However, EU team head Fiona Hall, a member of the European Parliament, pointed to what she called a ‘fundamental problem’. The process
relating to the rejection of candidates lists ‘was confused and not transparent’. It was not clear which parts of which laws were being applied, and there was ‘a climate of confusion’. The EU’s preliminary statement indicates ‘a general lack of trust in the independence of the CNE, due in particular to insufficient measures to improve transparency’ (Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 28, 17 December 2004).

The head of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Tejan Kabbah, the former president of Sierra Leone, observed that

… the ruling party enjoys a predominant position. In order to deepen democracy in Mozambique it is important to ensure that for future elections the process enjoys a greater degree of transparency and the playing field is reasonably level for all aspirant participants, thereby increasing confidence and participation and helping to encourage consolidation of the country’s multiparty system.

The 2009 election resulted in a landslide victory for Guebuza, who won about 75.01 per cent of the vote, with 16.41 per cent for Dlhakama and 8.59% for Simango (see Table 1). With 191 seats out of 250, Frelimo secured a two-thirds majority, which allows it to change the Constitution without coalitions with or reliance on other political parties (see Table 2). Renamo won 51 seats and the MdM eight.

Dlhakama, who has contested the results of every election apart from that in 1994, which Aldo Ajello, the representative of the UN secretary-general declared the best ever held in Africa, threatened the use of force to gain political power. Similar threats were made by Renamo parliamentarian Jose Manteigas, who dismissed the election as fraudulent. He called for the current Parliament to be dissolved, the elections annulled and new elections organised. Manteigas claimed that many votes for Renamo had been deliberately invalidated by polling station staff, who had added ink marks to ballot papers to make it look as if the voters concerned had tried to vote for more than one candidate.

After reaching its peak in 1999, Dlhakama’s share of the vote has declined sharply as a result of his disastrous party management style and lack of organisational capacity. In 1994 he received 1 666 965 votes (33, 7%), in 1999, 2 133 655 (47%) and in 2004, 998 059 (31.74%).

In 1994 the percentage poll was 89 per cent and in 1999, 74 per cent. Voter turnout in 2009 was about 43 per cent, up from 36 per cent in 2004, when the voters’ register was chaotic, with many duplications. Names of people who had moved or died had not been removed. A total of 3.3-million people voted. Officially there were 9.1-million people on the register, giving an official turnout of 36%. However, it was estimated the real number of voters on the register was
only 8.1 million. A similar correction needs to be made to the totals for 2009. STAE estimated that there were 160 000 duplicated names on the register (Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 30, 27 August 2004). The mortality rate among registered voters is estimated at 1.5 per cent per year, which means that at least 250 000 voters would have died. So the actual number of potential voters is probably 9.4 million instead of 9.8 million. Thus, if the official percentage poll is 43%, the real figure would be 45 per cent. The election results of the four years are summarised in Table 2.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>1994 millions (percentage)</th>
<th>1999 millions (percentage)</th>
<th>2004 millions (percentage)</th>
<th>2009 millions (percentage)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chissano</td>
<td>2.6 (53%)</td>
<td>2.3 (52%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geubuza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0 (64%)</td>
<td>3.0 (75%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dahlakama</td>
<td>1.7 (34%)</td>
<td>2.1 (48%)</td>
<td>1.0 (32%)</td>
<td>0.6 (16%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domingos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simangos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.6 (13%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 43, 17 November 2009, from the official results announced by the Mozambique National Elections Commission

Table 2

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renamo</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8</td>
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</table>

Source: Compiled by Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 43, 17 November 2009 from the official results announced by Mozambique National Elections Commission
In general, the 2009 elections were logistically well organised and run, and less violent than the three previous elections. Comparatively this time around the election was relatively different because Frelimo did not appear complacent or regard the results as a foregone conclusion, an uncertainty illustrated by the party’s organised and combative campaign, which enabled it to reverse the electoral apathy which had marred the post-1999 elections.

The CNE’s poor handling of the issue of party exclusions and the ruling by the CC were divisive episodes which harmed the already meagre confidence in and credibility of the electoral institutions in the eyes of citizens and of the opposition and contributed to the atmosphere of mistrust amongst the political elites.

The electoral results confirm Frelimo’s ‘hegemonic’ dominance, although it received no more votes than it had in previous elections. This suggests that about half the registered voters voted with their feet in protest against the current state of affairs. Renamo’s fortunes have gone from bad to worse, with the party winning less than 50% of the votes it won in 1994.

FRAMING POST-CONFLICT DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

A question often raised is whether governments can be both liberatory and democratic, considering the tension between the two: liberation is radical and revolutionary while democracy is conservative, incremental and requires accommodation and cooperation between government and opposition as contending members of the governance process. In other words, can a democratic process led by two opposing former liberation movements be consolidated? We attempt to answer the question of the extent of democratic consolidation in Mozambique.

Using what Andreas Schedler (1997, p 11) describes as three operational indicators of democratic consolidation (peaceful transfer of power, the absence of ‘serious challenges’ to democracy, and the passage of time), we explore Mozambique’s fortunes in democratic consolidation. We add two imperatives: the quality of the electoral process through the ‘passage of time’ and government accommodation or opposition compromise instead of opposition for the sake of opposition, even in the face of issues of ‘national significance’ for the country.

Firstly, following the Rome General Peace Agreement, Frelimo won the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections with two distinct and rather different notions of the peaceful transfer of power: the transfer of power from Frelimo the liberation movement operating a one-party system to Frelimo the reformed political party under a multiparty system and the peaceful transfer of power from President Chissano, who won the 1994 and 1999 elections, to President Guebuza, who won the 2004 elections. Mozambique has experienced a peaceful transfer of power from
a one-party system to a dominant-party system where democratic institutions have been created in order to accommodate a nascent democracy.

Secondly, although there were challenges to democracy during the immediate post-Rome General Peace Agreement and prior to the demobilisation of combatants these challenges have receded tremendously over the years. Non-democratic practices such as Renamo MPs rioting in Parliament or verbal threats to return to the arms struggle have thus far fortunately not materialised, but there is a great deal of verbal violence among the former belligerents and this has increased since Chissano’s departure. Mazula (1995) posits that there were three stages in the relationship between the former belligerents from 1992 to the founding democratic elections of 1994. Stage one was characterised by radical distrust between the government and Renamo, stage two by structural distrust, with a significant change in the social relationship from ‘enemies’ to ‘compatriots’ and stage three by objective distrust, which gradually moved towards subjective trust and towards the formation of the CNE. This subjective trust opened the space for dialogue between the parties represented in the CNE, and, although they have different ideals, the Renamo representatives were recognised as co-authors, co-leaders, co-stakeholders and co-process administrators (AWEPA 1998).

Mazula (1995) characterised the post-election period as one of basic social trust (stage 4) during which the first multiparty Parliament would help build constructive opposition based on respect for differences. With time the basic social trust would give way to democratic trust, the stage at which equal citizens would participate freely in the rebuilding of the nation. Mazula’s teleology took hold until 2004 and started shrinking from 2005, the year that coincided with the hegemonic ascension of Frelimo to dominant-party status.

The spaces for liberal democracy (eg, local governments) were gradually marginalised in favour of participatory democracy (unelected district governments and their participatory councils along party lines) and democracy and more particularly elections were used as a weapon to thwart the opposition. This was epitomised by the 2009 elections, which appeared not to be a substantive instrument for political participation but rather one used to annihilate the opposition, mainly Renamo.

The political and electoral discourse from both Frelimo and Renamo was not consonant with multiparty politics. Although party leaders appealed for a non-violent election campaign the language used conformed more to stages 1 and 2 of Mazula’s scheme than to stage 5. Expressions like ‘getting a hundred per cent of the vote’, ‘destroy their dominance’, ‘get two-thirds majority’, ‘convincing victory’ were often heard on television and read in newspapers. Frelimo campaigners appeared to be asking the voters to help them get rid of Renamo while Renamo demonstrated a similar attitude towards Frelimo (AWEPA 2001).
The 15 years between 1994 and 2009 are brief relative to the democratic life of any country but can be treated as a pivotal period for transition from a one-party system to multiparty democracy and for the former liberation movements and the newly established political parties to experiment with the complexities and the making of democratic polity. Taken at face value democratic consolidation means that all political parties have accepted democracy as a system through which the transfer of power should occur and where the possibility of the governing party losing elections looms large (Przeworski 1991, p 10).

Democratic consolidation is continuous and context specific. Exploring improvements in the quality of elections and the electoral process through the ‘passage of time’, at least in our view, refers, among others, to two factors:

- Improvements in the legal and administrative frameworks governing the electoral system for: ensuring representation, making elections accessible, providing incentives for reconciliation, facilitating effective government, and promoting parliamentary opposition.
- The need for an effective and transparent election administration leading to ‘free and fair elections’.

IDEA 1997, pp 9-14

These factors can be tested only with reference to practice; with pressures in Mozambique to improve the quality of legal and administrative reform as well as electoral reform leading to free and fair elections. For example, with respect to the quality of the conduct of the elections it is worthwhile recalling Renamo’s decision to boycott the 1994 local elections and then to rejoin, an act which necessitated the extension of the elections from two to three days in order to compensate for lost time. Dhlakama’s decision to abandon the boycott was the result of considerable pressure exerted by the sponsors of the Rome General Peace Agreement (AWEPA 2001) and, more importantly, a donation of $15-million for the Renamo ‘Trust Fund’ (Nuvunga 2007).

Renamo did not repeat this tactic in 1999 and 2004, despite alleging that Frelimo was involved in mass election rigging in both elections (Lundin 2004; Ostheimer 2005; Salih 2007). There was also election violence in both cases, but not sufficient to threaten national peace or democracy. Alleging fraud, Renamo contested the 1999 election results and demanded a recount. When the Supreme Court rejected its appeal it threatened to divide the country by putting up a barrier at the Save River (which separates the south from the centre of the country).

‘Our first argument is that Renamo won 52% in the legislative votes and 60% of the presidential votes. Frelimo forged the results and Renamo recognises neither Chissano nor his government. If Chissano wants stability, he must satisfy
Renamo’s demands. Otherwise there will be more trouble,’ said David Alone, Dhlakama’s political adviser at the time of these events (Nuvunga 2005).

In order to resolve the impasse negotiations were held between the Frelimo government and Renamo. When the negotiations failed Renamo organised nationwide demonstrations intended to paralyse the country. Lives were lost in Montepuez, Cabo Delgado Province, as a result of confrontations with police and some who were arrested suffocated in crowded prisons.

Renamo members of Parliament took their seats but ignored the chamber’s business. During Chissano’s state of the nation speech in December 1999 and several times in the early days of the session in February Renamo MPs banged on their desks and played various instruments, making so much noise that it was impossible to hear what was being said. Members of the international community, including the United States, which had traditionally supported Renamo, told Dhlakama that this behaviour was unacceptable and that in a democracy it was necessary for people to talk to one another. As a result, Dhlakama ordered his party’s members to stop their disruptions (Nuvunga 2005).

Democratic consolidation can also be reflected in government accommodation and opposition compromise in the face of momentous national issues or fundamental social issues as well as the formation of parliamentary committees reflecting various political parties in Parliament (Ostheimer 1999; Ruigrok 2005; Alexander, Eatwell, Persaud & Reoch 2007).

Signs of accommodation have been in sharp decline since 2005 and there is no realistic possibility of compromise since dialogue has given way to the instrumental use of the law. If a parliamentary decision requires a substantial majority Frelimo is able to seek a compromise from the opposition, but if only a simple majority is required there is no dialogue and even good proposals from Renamo would be rejected merely because they came from the wrong side. Some examples, all related to the revision of electoral legislation, will help to substantiate this.

Since the peace agreement all electoral legislation has been the outcome of a bipartisan process and has been approved by consensus. Following the ruling of the CC, which validated the 2004 elections and pointed out several weaknesses in the electoral legislation, the electoral institutions and the electoral system itself and made clear the need for legislation revision, an ad-hoc parliamentary commission was set up in early 2005 with the mandate to improve the legislation.

In May 2006 the commission was abolished and the revision of the electoral legislation was transferred to the regular Commission on Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration and Local Authority. Decisions in a regular commission are made by a simple majority, whereas the ad hoc commission could only decide by consensus. This implied a radical break with the past. The amended
electoral legislation was approved by the regular commission and, against loud protests from Renamo, by Frelimo in Parliament in late 2006.

In June 2009 Renamo tabled detailed proposals for amendments to the electoral law in order to resolve some of the problems encountered in the 19 November 2008 local elections. The proposals dealt with spoilt ballot papers, ballot box stuffing, police presence, and the role and presence of party delegates. Some of Renamo’s proposals responded to fundamental issues of electoral irregularity such as the widespread practice of election officers deliberately tainting ballot papers with ink. Renamo proposed that ink should not be allowed into polling stations before and during counting. Although this is a sensible idea Frelimo discarded it as having no merit.

CONCLUSION

Sandbrook (1996, p 85) argues that ‘If multiparty elections in Africa institute a change in the form of government (from “authoritarian” to “democratic”), they cannot guarantee a transformation of the political regime (ie, in the operative rules of governance).’ Such statements are not obviously true throughout Africa. Mozambique’s fourth multiparty elections show that the prospects of consolidating democracy are not that bleak. The assumption that regime change and ‘operative governance’ can emerge over two or three decades is rather pessimistic and often contingent on the democratic context.

In this article we argue that there are indications (for example, Schedler 1997) that democratic consolidation is a long-term gradual process, often marred by setbacks and imperfections. Although Mozambique’s electoral processes have some deficiencies, the parties have gained considerable experience in managing democratic institutions and elections which minimise fraud and irregularities.

Likewise, the continuity of the old and emergence of new political parties which challenged the dominance of Frelimo and Renamo illustrate that the ‘operative rules of governance’ have not been comprehensively obliterated or overlooked. Rather it shows that some of the new parties, and even Renamo, have been able to use, albeit in a limited manner, the opening of the democratic political space and the relative tolerance of Frelimo compared with the three previous elections.

The major issues that dominated the elections, the framing and salient features of post-conflict democratic consolidation and the role of the new political parties in party alignment are pointers to vibrant political developments that cannot be written off as an unimportant part of democratic consolidation, increased political competition and political participation by diverse political and social forces. Equally true is the insistence of the parties on conducting regular
and periodic elections, the consolidation of peace and stability and respect for the rules of the democratic game even if and when there are serious differences of interpretation. Awareness of and respect for the operative rules of governance has not been translated into reality, which, in turn, has resulted in such governance deficits as the banning of presidential candidates, disappearance of candidate’s lists and non-transparency in candidates’ registration.

In the circumstances, we have attempted to highlight tangible events and experiences of an emergent electoral democratic polity and not to search for indications that the end game of democratic consolidation in Mozambique has been achieved. From this perspective we have been able to trace several elements of a continuing ‘political democracy’ which could contribute to democratic consolidation in the future.

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