DO ELECTIONS MATTER IN ZANZIBAR?¹

Bernadeta Killian

Bernadeta Killian is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

e-mail: bernadetak@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

Do multiparty elections facilitate or hinder the process of democratic consolidation in Zanzibar? Since Tanzania’s return to a multiparty system in 1992 three rounds of general elections have been held in Zanzibar, all of them marred by gross irregularities, fraud, violence, and insecurity. All three elections were also followed by a political stalemate, with a major opposition party rejecting defeat, refusing to recognise the elected government, and challenging the results. Consequentely, the legitimacy of the elected government has remained questionable for more than a decade. This puts in question the reliance on the ‘election-centric concept’ of the ‘consolidation’ phase, which tends to place a great deal of hope in the holding of periodic elections. This by no means suggests that elections do not matter in Zanzibar. They matter in terms of keeping the flame of democratic struggle alive. Also, as the findings in this article indicate, there is a need to pay attention not only to elections but, equally importantly, to other processes and institutions of governance that enhance the rule of law and individual rights.

INTRODUCTION

Do multiparty elections in Zanzibar facilitate or hinder the process of democratic consolidation? This is the key question this article attempts to address. In a way the arguments set out here bring to the fore the contentious relationship

¹ The United Republic of Tanzania, has, since 26 April 1964, comprised two former sovereign states, Tanganyika and the Zanzibar Islands off the East African coast. Tanzania is a unitary state with two separate governments, the Union government and the Zanzibar government, each with its own executive, judiciary and legislature. Whereas the Zanzibar government exercises sovereignty over all domestic and non-union matters, the Union government exercises jurisdiction over such matters as defence and security, foreign affairs, police, emergency powers, citizenship, external borrowing and trade, mineral oil resources, higher education, the court of appeal, and the registration of political parties, among others.
between elections and liberalism. That is to say, can elections enhance democratic consolidation in the absence of the rule of law and the protection of individual rights?

Since the return to a multiparty system in 1992 three general elections have been held in Zanzibar – in 1995, 2000 and 2005. Despite this, the prospects for democratic consolidation in the country appear bleak because all three elections were marred by gross irregularities, fraud, violence, insecurity and political stalemate, with the major opposition party rejecting defeat, refusing to recognise the elected government, and challenging the results. The two major political parties, the ruling ‘Chama cha Mapinduzi’ (CCM) and the opposition, the Civic United Front (CUF), are still in a tug-of-war over the fundamental rules of political competition and participation and the legitimacy of the elected government has remained in question for more than a decade.

Thus, whereas elections are widely regarded as being one of the key elements of liberal democracy, in Zanzibar they seem to be inimical to the very process of democratic consolidation. This is largely because it is during elections that mutually agreed rules of the game are breached, violent acts are committed, the rule of law is abrogated, voters are disenfranchised, insurrection is attempted, and human rights are violated. Indeed, rather than enhancing consensus, acquiescence and reconciliation, post-election periods are frequently dominated by mistrust, exclusivity, intolerance and deadlock.

However, although elections do not seem to be instrumental in consolidating democracy in Zanzibar they still matter in terms of keeping the flame of democratic struggle alive. Indeed, the holding of periodic multiparty elections should go hand in hand with strengthening the rule of law and protecting individual rights.

The next section presents the theoretical debate about elections and democratic consolidation, setting out the analytical framework of section three, which analyses the extent to which multiparty elections provide a conducive environment for democratic consolidation in Zanzibar.

ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: CONTINGENT RELATIONSHIPS

The adversarial, disruptive and violent nature of political development in Zanzibar has made the journey towards democracy a stormy one. Throughout their history of competitive politics voters have been divided almost equally between the two major political parties, the CCM and the CUF. Although a winner

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2 For a detailed discussion of this issue see Zakaria 2004; Carothers 2007.
was declared in each of the multiparty elections in 1995, 2000 and 2005 all three have resulted in disputes over which party actually received the majority of votes and should be entrusted with a mandate to rule. Thus, while elections are considered to be a key factor in democratic consolidation in Zanzibar they have not produced the desired effect.

This calls into question the tendency to rely on what Harbeson (1999, pp 42-43) terms the ‘election-centric conception’ of the ‘consolidation’ phase, which places considerable reliance on the holding of periodic elections. According to Harbeson this concept relies on certain implicit assumptions. These are:

- that democratic elections will produce a change of government from an incumbent authoritarian to a new democratically inclined regime;
- that initial multiparty elections will generate the momentum necessary to produce subsequent, broader patterns of democratisation and hence consolidation;
- that the polity itself will remain sufficiently stable to sustain the transition and subsequent consolidation phases of democratisation.

In reality, however, various circumstances have resulted in a relationship that has not been unilinear. Among these circumstances are the nature of the political system, the modality of political transition to a democratic regime, and what Snyder (2006, pp 292-310) calls ‘extra-electoral factors’.

In assessing the state of democratic consolidation in Zanzibar this article explores some of the conditions (or factors) that facilitate or hinder the process of democratic consolidation. In this context the work of Valenzuela (2000) becomes relevant, particularly to divided societies such as Zanzibar. Valenzuela has identified some key facilitative conditions that enhance democratic consolidation. The focus here is to assess the extent to which competitive elections in the country facilitate or hinder the attainment of these key conditions.

The first condition relates to the centrality of elections as a means of constituting a government. In this case all relevant political players must unambiguously view free elections as the only means through which it is possible to create a government.

The second condition is the role of historical memory and how it affects legitimacy. According to Valenzuela all transitions tend to stimulate collective memories of political symbols, institutions, leaders, parties and social organisations that might be a source of significant division among different segments of the population, thereby making democratic consolidation difficult. Thus, ‘a democratic consolidation is favoured by situations in which the evaluations
of the past by different sectors all lead, somehow, to attitudes favourable to an accommodation among political forces ... Accommodation also requires a search for unifying national symbols’ (Valenzuela 2000, p 22-23).

Management of social conflict is the third condition that affects the process of democratic consolidation, especially in divided societies. In this case, Valenzuela (2000, p 27) points out: ‘The consolidation of democracy is also favored by the creation of the proper frameworks for channeling and resolving social conflicts.’ This condition involves the creation of what Valenzuela calls ‘social demand processing settlements’, which include setting up new institutions (or restructuring old ones) that will receive and process social demands; the establishment or expansion of popular and other associations to voice demands; the development of mutually agreeable procedures that conflicting social groups can follow to settle their differences; and the existence of the proper links between social groups and the political class in Parliament and in the executive. This condition is also emphasised by Young (1999, p 75), who points out that ‘the democratic consolidation process should acknowledge rather than ignore cultural pluralism through arrangements that induce inclusionary politics and create incentives for intercommunal cooperation’.

Scholarly discourse on this matter raises yet another problem, this one relating to the attempt to separate democratic consolidation and the quality of the democracy that is being consolidated (Beetham 1999, p 71). What concept of democracy does one imply when discussing the question of democratic consolidation? Is it procedural or substantive? That is to say, is democracy a unique process of making collective and binding decisions or is it a system that ensures certain desirable results? (Dahl 1989, p 5). At times, as Dahl shows, the process of collective decision-making, no matter how ‘democratic’, cannot be justified unless it produces – or at least tends to produce – desirable results.3

This is particularly applicable to divided societies such as that of Zanzibar, where majoritarian democracy (democracy based on a winner-takes-all system) has not been a useful tool for political representation and participation. Yet, political parties and their supporters seem to have high expectations that competitive elections will resolve persistent political conflicts. It is in this context that democratic consolidation in Zanzibar should go beyond multiparty competitive elections to include other institutional arrangements that would improve the rule of law as well as take into account the diverse interests within the society.

As Rothchild (1999, p 322) correctly points out, ‘if majoritarian democracy does seem inappropriate, it will then become necessary to think in terms of

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3 Plattner (2005, p 77-81) sounds a cautionary note on the indicators of democracy.
rebuilding state institutions to establish a new, legitimate, and effective intrastate system of conflict management’. In so doing the dichotomy between elections and liberalism that seems to dominate politics in Zanzibar poses a threat to the very process of democratic consolidation. As Plattner (2007, p 5) asserts, ‘... we cannot allow either liberalism or free elections to be wholly sacrificed for the sake of the other’.

ELECTIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

The transfer of power from one government to another has been a problem throughout Zanzibar’s democratic history, with no major political party conceding defeat in any election since 1957 (Mushi 2006, p 13). Elections have been marked by violence, riots, killings, and protests and the subsequent struggles among parties over the outcome have led to a series of societal conflicts both during and after the elections.

Historically, governments in Zanzibar have not only been formed through multiparty and single-party elections but also through violence and bloody revolution, as demonstrated by the 1964 revolution; assassinations, as in the 1972 killing of the first president of the post-revolution government, Abeid Karume; and appointments, as was the case with Aboud Jumbe’s takeover after Karume’s death.

Pre-independence elections in January and June 1961 and July 1963 reflected deep political divisions between the pro-African-backed Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) on the one side and the Arab-backed Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP)/Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP) coalition on the other. In three elections held prior to the granting of independence in 1963 the ASP was able to secure a majority of votes, but failed to translate these into a legislative majority. This was largely due to inherent defects in the first-past-the-post electoral system. In the 1963 elections, for instance, the ZNP/ZPPP alliance, despite winning only 45.7 per cent of the vote to the ASP’s 54 per cent, gained 18 seats to the ASP’s 13 and was thus able to form the government.

Thus, independence was granted in December 1963 under the leadership of the ZNP/ZPPP alliance, with the Sultan as head of state, and the ASP never accepted the situation as legitimate. This led to the revolution on 12 January 1964, in which the Arab oligarchy was overthrown and an African-led government installed. It is estimated that more than 5 000 Arabs were killed and many more were detained and their property confiscated or destroyed (Yeager 1989, p 27). The revolution put an end to competitive politics and suppressed all other parties with a significant following and electoral support. It was not until 1980 that
elections were resumed. However, these were one-party elections, which, rather than reflecting the aspirations and wishes of the citizenry, largely endorsed the choice of the party.

As stated above the reintroduction of the multiparty system in 1992 brought periodic multiparty elections, the results of all of which were disputed. In the 1995 elections, for instance, a narrow margin of 0.4 per cent separated the two presidential candidates. According to domestic and international observers the elections were marred by massive irregularities, including intimidation, fraud, rigging and an electoral commission biased in favour of the ruling party, the CCM.

The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the Commonwealth Observer Group, the Zanzibar Election Monitoring Group (ZEMOG), and the International Observer Group (IOG) all expressed the view that the elections could not be regarded as free and fair (TEMCO 2004, p 19). Interestingly, prior to the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) officially announcing the CCM’s victory, and in response to unofficial announcements of the opposition’s victory, the CCM submitted a formal protest against the election results and declared the whole process to have not been free and fair. This complaint was dropped rapidly when the ZEC declared the CCM’s presidential candidate the winner.

The result of the dispute was that the 1995 elections did not pave the way for democratic consolidation but led instead to a political standoff, with the CUF and its followers refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the elections and of the CCM government. For four years after the elections the CUF’s members of Parliament boycotted both the Union and the Zanzibar parliaments, thereby depriving almost half of Zanzibar’s electorate of parliamentary representation.

During the 2000 elections similar patterns and cases of massive irregularities compelled the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) to declare the elections ‘aborted’ because of ‘widespread deliberate and severe violations of electoral rules and procedures, causing a substantial number of voters, candidates, and/or parties to withdraw from the race’ (TEMCO 2000, p 190). Institutional manipulation of the electoral process, or what Cowen & Laakso (2002) call ‘institutional bribery’, was carried out in the form of crafting the rules to prevent certain people from registering as voters.

The five-year residential requirement and its partisan interpretation were used to exclude some, although exceptions were made in the case of government employees, including the military, police and special departments, and international organisations. More prevalent was observed bias on the part

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of the institutional infrastructure of elections, including government employees, particularly officials of the electoral body, regional commissioners (RCs), district commissioners (DCs), Shehas, and the police force. The role of the Shehas as ex officio polling agents of the electoral commission significantly jeopardised the fairness of the electoral process. The TEMCO report (2000, p 108) states, ‘evidence from almost all constituencies where TEMCO placed its monitors shows [that] most Shehas abused their powers … Instead of performing an advisory function as stipulated by law, they became the decision-makers in favour of the ruling party’.

More serious was the cancellation of the vote-counting exercise in 16 of Zanzibar’s 50 constituencies, all of them in Urban West Region, and the insecure transfer of ballot boxes and their subsequent disappearance, which left the electoral process in disarray. The re-run of the elections in the 16 constituencies took place without the participation of the major opposition party, the CUF, which boycotted it.

Popular demonstrations in the streets of Zanzibar in January 2001 demanding a re-run of the 2000 elections resulted in a violent encounter between demonstrators and security forces, leaving about 30 people dead and resulting in more than 2000 becoming refugees in neighbouring Kenya (TEMCO 2000, p 20). Thus, instead of being a positive step towards democratic consolidation, the 2000 general elections were a relapse into non-democratic processes.

The 2005 elections were preceded by the preparation and adoption, for the first time in Tanzania’s political history, of the permanent voter register (PVR). In the past, voter registration had been undertaken six months before each election, causing a variety of problems, including the exclusion of eligible voters and illegal transfers of would-be voters to other regions. The PVR was expected to be more inclusive, accurate, and cost-effective. In practice, however, it was either inadequate or incapable of creating an accurate, inclusive and credible voters’ roll.

The registration process was marred by several instances of irregularity, gross violations of laws and rules guiding voter registration, chaos, and violent conflict. Cases of illegal registration of the under-aged and ineligible were reported in several registration centres. The applicability of a three-year residential requirement for eligibility was manipulated by the party in power, who transferred military personnel to specific areas (Killian & Kamata 2006). In addition, paramilitary forces invaded registration centres, demanding to be registered and creating a sense of insecurity, which ultimately bred chaos. Indeed,

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5 The Shehas are functionaries of the central government at the local level. They are appointed by the regional commissioner upon the advice of the district commissioner.
in its final election report even the ZEC acknowledged the intrusive role played by the special forces and their refusal to abide by the ZEC’s rules (ZEC 2007, p 68). Moreover, the use of the so-called ‘Sheha’s residents’ register’ (popularly known as the Sheha’s book) to determine residency became a source of massive exclusion of would-be voters in many regions, particularly in Unguja Urban-West, where about 40 per cent of voters live.

Some improvements in the institutional infrastructure of the elections were noted on voting day. The counting process was more transparent than it had been in previous elections, a total of about 1 600 polling stations opened on time, and, in many parts of the country, particularly in rural Pemba and Unguja, voting was peaceful and orderly (NDI 2005, pp 28-9). Despite these improvements, however, there were significant irregularities, especially relating to the compilation of the votes.

According to TEMCO’s report, on election day about 33 per cent of the polling stations it observed had ‘unsatisfactory’ voters’ lists or there were discrepancies between the lists displayed and the register; posting of voter lists was, in most cases, delayed and there was a lack of transparency in tallying the presidential votes (Mushi 2006, p 13). All these irregularities resulted in confusion, both in relation to the results and about the state of civic harmony in Zanzibar. For this reason TEMCO gave the election a qualified free and fair verdict because of the ‘aforesaid doubts resulting from lack of transparency’.

As it had in the previous two elections the CUF declared the 2005 elections not to have been free and fair, declined to ‘recognize the results of the elections’ and ‘does not recognize the government of Amani Karume and CCM’ (CUF 2005, p 1). The CUF maintained that the PVR, which they dubbed ‘Permanent Vote Rigging’, was at the centre of the electoral irregularities (CUF 2005, p 35). However, unlike in the past, the CUF decided to join the House of Representatives, while maintaining its position of not recognising the president, boycotting the inauguration ceremony of President Karume and that of the House of Representatives.

Thus, despite the fact that there were noticeable improvements in the 2005 electoral process in terms of peace in most parts of Zanzibar and the fact that no results were nullified and there was no hijacking of ballot boxes, the seriousness of the irregularities that did take place might have been significant enough to affect the freeness and fairness of the elections. In addition, the perception of the major players as to whether the government represents their wishes is critical for democratic consolidation, and this element is still missing.

This leads to another critical question – what kind of electoral outcome indicates democratic consolidation in Zanzibar? As Mushi (2006, p 13) stated, ‘there were significant shortcomings in the [2005] Zanzibar elections which make it difficult to determine the reliability and legitimacy of the results’. The same can
be said about the 1995 and 2000 elections. In all three a discrepancy in votes was a recurring anomaly, with only a slight degree of variation.

In 1995 the neutrality and impartiality of the ZEC was seriously questioned after it presented two sets of presidential election results – the unofficial and the official figures. The former showed the CUF candidate leading, with 51.4 per cent, while the CCM candidate trailed, with 48.6 per cent. The later version indicated that the CCM candidate had won 50.2 per cent, the CUF candidate 49.8 per cent (Anglin 2000, p 44).

Other irregularities involved inflating the number of votes, that is, in one constituency the ZEC recorded 25 per cent more voters than those listed on the register, in another, the figures were inflated by 50 per cent (Anglin 2000, p 44). In the 2000 elections the suspension and subsequent nullification of the vote-counting process, hijacking of ballot boxes, and the re-run of the elections without the participation of major opposition parties make it difficult to interpret the outcome meaningfully.

The 2005 election results, particularly the presidential results, were tainted by the lack of transparency in the process of compiling the results. In its report the CUF claims that, as a result of multiple voting and voting by ineligible voters, the number of voters at polling centres such as Potoa, Binguni and Kikungwi, significantly exceeded the allotted number of people (CUF 2005, pp 26-7). As a consequence, instead of building political trust the electoral outcomes have tended to raise more questions than answers about the legitimacy of the government.

The 2005 elections were not very different from the two previous ones in terms of some key political actors questioning whether elections are the only means of constituting governments. The behaviour and beliefs of the elite are recognised as being very important for democratic consolidation (Diamond 1999, p 66). In Zanzibar, it is indeed during election times that political elites tend to threaten to use non-electoral means of changing and constituting governments.

In the 2000 TEMCO report it was concluded that campaign messages ‘indicated that neither the CUF nor the CCM was willing to concede defeat’. The then minister for women and children was quoted as saying that since the government had come to power through a revolution the CCM was not ready to surrender that power through the ballot box (TEMCO 2000, p 118). Similar threats were reiterated during the 2005 campaign. President Karume announced publicly that the equipment and personnel used in the 1964 Revolution were still available and could be used again if it was deemed necessary. The regional commissioner for Pemba South reminded the audience during a campaign rally that ‘the CCM government was formed through bloodshed using pangas, knives and stones. What about today when we have modern weapons like guns? We shall never let this country go!’ (TEMCO 2000, p 10).
During the 2005 election campaign the CUF emphasised the idea of ‘people’s power’. CUF leaders threatened that if they were denied victory, as they had been in 1995 and 2005, they would resort to ‘people’s power’ for their right to rule. The emphasis on ‘people’s power’ indeed indicated the possibility that either a military coup or an insurrection would be used as a means of capturing power. As Valenzuela (2000, pp 11-12) argues, ‘democratic consolidation cannot occur if military coups or insurrections are also seen by significant political actors as possible means to substitute governments. This is the basic linchpin underlying all the other elements that detract from the consolidation process.’

HISTORICAL MEMORY AND LEGITIMACY

In order to mobilise electoral support and legitimacy major parties tend to evoke collective memory, symbols, and experiences and, in the course of electoral campaigns, to remind themselves and opposition parties what they stand for and why. The Zanzibar experience has indicated that rather than induce a moderating effect election campaigns have tended to emphasise the differences between key social groups, thereby intensifying intolerance and mistrust.

In a paper entitled the ‘State of Politics in Tanzania’ Mukandala (2004, p 3) summarises the two powerful contending legacies that still inform the policies and behaviour of major parties in Zanzibar. These are: the legacy of slavery, Arab domination and exploitation, and pre-revolution electoral misdeeds and the legacy of the revolution.

Whereas the CUF analyses the colonial past with admiration and glorification, the CCM (whose party slogan is ‘Mapinduzi Daima [Revolution Forever]’) despises it. Thus, during campaign rallies in 2005 CCM candidates reminded their audiences that, through the 1964 revolution, it had liberated them from Arab domination and colonialism. A vote for the CUF would, effectively, bring back the domination of the sultanate. The CUF, on the other hand, portrays the pre-revolution period as a time when the socioeconomic well-being of the people of Zanzibar was better than it is today. These contrasting interpretations of the past have resulted in further polarisation and confrontation, particularly at election time. As Horowitz (1994, p 40) points out, ‘one of the ironies of democratic development is that as the future is being planned, the past intrudes with increasing severity’, making democratic consolidation difficult.

Another issue linked to the past and which, therefore, informs the positions of the parties, is that of the union. Whereas the CUF prefers a three-government
structure in order to ‘bring back the lost glory of Zanzibar as a sovereign state’, the CCM prefers the current structure of a two-government union. Despite the fact that both parties would prefer to have more autonomy this element alone does not seem to be sufficient to unify the two sides. As Valenzuela (2000) points out, all transitions tend to stimulate collective memories of past political symbols, institutions, leaders, parties, and social organisations that might be a source of significant division among different segments of the population, thereby making democratic consolidation difficult.

MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS

The creation of what Valenzuela (2000) calls ‘social demand processing settlements’ seems to be critical to the process of democratic consolidation. These settlements include, among other things, the setting up of new institutions (or the restructuring of old ones) that will receive and process social demands, the establishment or expansion of popular and other associations to voice demands, the development of mutually agreeable procedures for conflicting social groups to follow to settle their differences, and the existence of effective links between social groups and the political class in Parliament and the executive.

The introduction of multiparty politics has created alternative spaces in which social groups can express their interests and demands. It is in this context that the reconciliation agreements between the CCM and the CUF and known as MUAFAKA I Accord (1999) and MUAFAKA II Accord (2001) were reached in an attempt to establish new institutions charged with the task of processing social demands and supervising the implementation of mutually agreeable rules and procedures geared to the resolution of conflicts. Most of the agreements in both accords, however, are centred on elections, covering such reforms as the reconstitution of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission to include members of the opposition, establishing the PVR, ensuring equal access of all political parties to state media, and giving opposition members various government posts.

The MUAFAKA I Accord never got off the ground, largely because none of the agreements was implemented. The 2000 elections were therefore held without any agreed rules. Indeed, it was the fear of losing the elections that made the implementation of the MUAFAKA 1 Accord difficult. Initially MUAFAKA II was credited with bringing about civic peace and social co-existence as well as the successful 2003 by-election in Pemba. A book, titled *Muafaka: The Roots of Peace in Zanzibar* (ESAURP 2004), signalled the people’s hopes for lasting peace on the islands.

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7 MUAFAKA is the Kiswahili word for reconciliation.
Despite this promising start MUAFAKA II could not withstand the forces of cutthroat competition that are a typical feature of Zanzibar’s elections. It proved inadequate in solving the persistent problems, especially those related to elections and electoral competition. Thus, while it is recognised that social conflict in Zanzibar extends beyond elections, there has been a huge reliance on elections to solve all its political problems, but thus far competitive elections alone have failed to bring about lasting civic peace, political tolerance, and democratic consolidation.8

CONCLUSION: BEYOND ELECTIONS?

Experience gleaned from the three rounds of elections in Zanzibar since 1995 shows the limitations of elections in consolidating democracy in divided societies. Indeed, elections by themselves have so far proved to be incapable of bringing about democratic order on the islands.

This by no means suggests that elections do not matter in Zanzibar, and that they should be put on hold for a while, as Zakaria (2004) proposed when he wrote that ‘the heart of building democracy is building the institutions of liberty, not holding quick elections’.9 Rather, the findings in this article indicate that there is a need to pay attention not only to elections, but, equally importantly, to other processes and institutions of governance that enhance the rule of law and individual rights.

At best Zanzibar’s elections have been useful in creating an opportunity for its citizens to recognise various instances of violations of human rights. Each mismanaged election has tended to bring about a public outcry calling for constitutional reform and observance of the rule of law. Certainly, the re-introduction of the multiparty system in Zanzibar has opened a window of opportunity by permitting the existence of political pluralism and expression of diverse interests through political parties, civil society, and the media.

Yet, the reforms undertaken in these areas are still limited. The role of the media and civil society is still restricted, leaving little room for the promotion of democracy. Thus, democratic consolidation in Zanzibar needs to go beyond elections to include the transformation of other institutions and processes geared to promoting accountability and the rule of law as well as to establishing an inclusive, legitimate, and responsive political system.

8 As the 2010 elections in Tanzania approach there have been unsuccessful attempts to get the CCM and CUF to return to the negotiating table in order to pave the way for MUAFAKA III.

9 According to Zakaria (2004) institutions of liberty include, among others, a functioning judicial system accessible to the majority of the people, a free press, free speech, and multiple parties.
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 18(1).


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