THE DOMINANT-PARTY SYSTEM
Challenges for South Africa’s Second Decade of Democracy

By
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ABSTRACT
The existence of a dominant-party system in South Africa has raised growing concerns over its implications for the consolidation of democracy. This paper argues that while there appears to be no real threat to democracy in South Africa it does face several challenges, and successful democratic consolidation will depend upon alertness to signs of undemocratic practices associated with dominant-party systems. It is crucial to ensure that government remains accountable to its citizens. The ANC has demonstrated commitment to democratic principles and there remains sufficient debate and activism within society to keep a check on authoritarian tendencies. However, South African politics is characterised by weak opposition parties that continue to be associated with racial identity and hold little credibility amongst the electorate. South Africans also continue to vote in racial blocs, and the existence of a dominant party and a weak opposition has resulted in emerging voter apathy and withdrawal amongst some sections of the electorate. If the opposition is to fulfil its role in safeguarding accountability and democratic practice it must regain credibility and break away from racial politics to appeal to the African community. Civil society’s role in ensuring government accountability is also pivotal, particularly in the absence of a strong political opposition. The left-wing members of the ANC and its allies face similar challenges – they must work to retain their leverage and political influence within the Tripartite Alliance.
INTRODUCTION

The implications of a dominant-party system for the successful consolidation of democracy has long been an issue of interest amongst political scientists in democracies the world over. In a context in which one party dominates the political landscape and faces little prospect of electoral defeat concerns arise about the possibility of declining government response to public opinion, loss of accountability, and the overall erosion of democratic principles and development of authoritarian methods of rule. Since 1994, elections in South Africa, which have resulted in repeated overwhelming victory for the ruling African National Congress (ANC), have succeeded in projecting the nation’s young democracy into the limelight with regard to this particular political debate. The national celebrations marking ten years of freedom and democracy in South Africa in April 2004 took place against the backdrop of a clear ANC electoral victory at the 14 April polls, in which the ruling party and former liberation movement succeeded in securing 69.68 per cent of the national vote. Given that the ANC is now set to rule at least until 2009, what challenges does the dominant-party system present for South Africa’s second decade of democracy?

There is no doubt that the ANC has won a legitimate electoral victory. However, surveys of public opinion and voter intentions have suggested that this is not matched by unquestionable voter satisfaction and contentment with the current government and its delivery. Space, in fact, exists for a political opposition that would appeal to the interests of the electorate, not least South Africa’s black majority. In the absence of a credible opposition, however, South Africans continue to vote largely according to racial identity. This has entrenched the political dominance of the ANC, which continues to be perceived as the party representing the black majority, and has spurred the withdrawal from the democratic process of those sections of the electorate who do not identify with the dominant party.

The weakness of the political and parliamentary opposition equally raises concerns about how we can ensure that government remains accountable to its citizens. As a result, ‘increasingly the debate is not just about whether democracy in South Africa will survive, but about the quality of that democracy’ (Southall 2001, p 1). While there appears to be no real threat to democracy in South Africa, it does face several challenges over the coming years, and successful democratic consolidation will depend upon alertness to the emergence of the undemocratic features frequently associated with dominant-party systems.

This paper therefore explores these challenges. It begins by considering the theoretical arguments and debates surrounding the dominant-party system and democracy. The following section then seeks to provide an understanding of the

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1 See, for example, Pempel. (1990) for a study of party dominance in advanced industrialised countries. Arian and Barnes (1974) discuss the dominant-party systems of Italy and Israel. Giliomee and Simkins (1999) look at the dominant-party regimes of South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia.
nature of the dominant-party system in the South African political setting. This is done through a brief overview of the nation’s three democratic elections and examination of both the ruling ANC as dominant party and the role and nature of political opposition in South Africa. This is followed by an analysis and discussion of the implications of this system and the challenges for South Africa’s second decade of democracy.

**CONCEPTUALISING DOMINANT-PARTY SYSTEMS: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE**

In a recent issue of EISA’s *Election Update*, Matlosa and Karume (2004, pp 9-10) categorised the dominant-party system as a system ‘in which despite the multi-party situation, only one party is so dominant that it directs the political system and is firmly in control of state power over a fairly long duration of time that even opposition parties make little if any dent on the political hegemony of a dominant ruling party’.

This scenario is clearly a cause for concern if we concur with the negative view that the dominant-party system is inimical to democracy. Much of the debate surrounding the incompatibility of the dominant-party system with democracy centres on the theory that the alternation of power is crucial for democracy.² It has been argued that ‘one party dominance becomes problematic when a governing party sees less and less need to respond to public opinion because it is assured of re-election’ (Africa, Mattes, Herzenberg & Banda 2003, p 2). The existence of political opposition within a competitive party system presents alternatives to the governing party and therefore stimulates debate within society about ideas and policies and allows society to question the actions and choices of government. Moreover, it is argued that countervailing forces, the most effective of which is the existence of a strong political opposition, are essential to check moves by the incumbency towards authoritarian tendencies and abuse of power (Giliomee & Simkins 1999, p 337). This viewpoint is vehemently argued by Giliomee and Simkins in their useful, although somewhat cynical, analysis of one-party domination and democracy, *The Awkward Embrace*. For them, in a dominant-party system ‘the vital elements of democracy, namely genuine competition and uncertainty in electoral outcomes, are removed in a process that is self-sustaining’ (1999, p 340). It is argued that this process is characterised by a blurring of the boundary between party and state, which has the effect of reducing the likely formation of independent groups from within civil society that are autonomous from the ruling party; and a growing ‘preponderance’ of political power, leading to abuse of office and ‘arbitrary decision-making that undermines the integrity of democratic institutions, particularly that of the legislature and its ability to check the executive’ (1999, p 340).

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² See, for example, Huntington 1991; Przeworski & Limongi 1997; and debates in Giliomee & Simkins 1999.
The dominant-party system has, therefore, frequently been linked to concerns about the emergence of autocratic regimes and the one-party state, not least within the African context. While the definition of democracy should by no means be reduced to the holding of elections, elections are undoubtedly a key vehicle by which the political leadership is able to retain dominance. A number of states, for example, have seen the manipulation of electoral laws and regulations by the incumbent party with the intention of disadvantaging opposition and ensuring the retention of power. Elections in Zimbabwe in 2000 and 2002 are a case in point. The ongoing political crisis of legitimacy currently being played out in the country lends credibility to those aspects of ‘the process of entrenching dominance’ (Giliomee & Simkins 1999, p 340), which extend beyond the formal electoral arena to undermine the entire democratic system. The dominant party trend in a number of African states since independence has resulted in the regression and reversal of democratic gains of successful transitions in the region and threatens attempts at democratic consolidation.

On the other hand, some advocate caution in branding the dominant-party system irreconcilable with the advancement of democracy. Arian and Barnes, in fact, in an article aptly entitled ‘The Dominant-party system, A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability’ (1974), hail the system as a ‘stabilising mechanism’. Writing in 1974, their analysis is based upon examination of the dominant parties and party systems in Israel and Italy from the 1960s and 1940s respectively. The authors provide relevant insights into the nature of these systems which could be applied to others, and prove particularly useful to a study of the dominant-party system in South Africa. Their contention that the dominant-party system be conceived as ‘a model of how democracy and stability may be combined under difficult conditions’ (1974, p 593), as well as ‘its superiority as a means to stability in fragmented polities’ (1974, p 600), is worth considering in the South African context.

Furthermore, while dominant-party systems have not infrequently been characterised by the use of illegitimate means, such as the aforementioned electoral manipulation and even coercion, as a method of retaining power and electoral dominance, it is crucial to note that this is not a feature which can be applied to such systems across the board. Rather, political dominance can equally be achieved by democratic means. Therefore, in some cases, although possibilities for alternation may seem remote, dominance has been won through competitive elections and the ‘politics of consensus’ (Matlosa & Karume 2004, p 14). Not only does this confer a legitimacy on the dominant ruling party by the electorate, the party cannot ignore the existence of political opposition (Chan 1976, p 4, cited in Friedman 1999, p 100) and also, therefore, voter preferences (Friedman 1999, p 100).

South Africa formally has a multiparty system in which one party is dominant. Hence it is not a ‘given’ that the dominant party can rely on continued dominance. Rather, Arian and Barnes (1974, p 599) propose that ‘the politician of the dominant party can rely on electoral stability if he makes the appropriate decisions; he can rely on the cooperation of the satellite parties and the harmlessness of the opposition
if he has electoral stability’ (1974, p 614). The issue of the ability to retain dominance therefore acquires added importance. Under circumstances in which continued dominance is not inevitable, Arian and Barnes suggest that ‘political strategy is determining’ and the dominant party must position itself strategically within the society and strategise ‘vis-à-vis’ the opposition.

Under a system in which party dominance has been won within the democratic rules of the game, the dominant party has to function within the boundaries of the democratic system. Within this system are rules and institutions which administer checks and balances on abuse of power – although it should be noted that their effectiveness is dependent upon how advanced the system is, and the effectiveness and autonomy of the mechanisms and institutions in place. Equally, the ideology by which the party is identified by the electorate puts certain constraints on its ‘freedom of maneuver’ (Arian & Barnes 1974, p 597). However, while continuing dominance is by no means assured, Arian and Barnes (1974, pp 599-600) have also argued that ‘the dominant party is the authority that defines the boundaries between the permissible and the unacceptable’ (1974, p 597). It therefore has a distinct advantage over the opposition. When the dominant party is a former liberation movement with a particularly symbolic identity and which plays an historically significant role, this gains added weight. The dominant party is able to consume the national political agenda. Giliomee and Simkins (1999, p xvi), drawing on the work of Pempel (1990), refer to the party as administering a ‘historic project’, generating ‘even more dominance’.

However, it should be noted that much also depends on the nature and legitimacy of that dominance. Using the aforementioned example of those parties that emerged from the liberation struggle against colonial rule, such parties are able to use their liberation credentials to retain support (Baregu 2004; Suttner 2004). Moreover, the manner in which such credentials resonate with the majority of the electorate should not be underestimated. Often it serves not only to legitimate the party as a hegemonic power, but also to delegitimate the opposition. As the dominant party comes to represent the nation and democracy, opposition can be depicted as opposing the national project (Myburgh 2004; Suttner 2004). On the other hand, it is also important not to overstate the case, as Friedman points out that ‘delegitimation’ of opposition is by no means a ‘gift’ given to the dominant party. Rather, ‘conditions must exist in which the electorate is open to delegitimation’ (Friedman 1999, p 101). Society’s response to and continuation or cessation of support for the dominant party is therefore also determined by its perception of the opposition and its identity, strategy and actions. Given the political weight of the dominant party, however, this perception is likely to be greatly influenced by the strategy of the ruling party.

Needless to say, therefore, this is an interconnected and dialectical process. The continued dominance of one party is inextricably linked to both the opinion of the electorate (on whom the dominant party relies for its continued political legitimacy) and to the existence of political competition in the form of opposition.
parties – neither of which it can ignore. However, a crucial point raised by Arian and Barnes is that ‘dominant parties exist in dominant-party systems. Long dominance by one party affects the way the other political forces perceive the political system … the dominant party comes to be identified with the regime and even with the epoch. Opposition parties are reduced to a role of carping and sniping rather than that of developing immediate alternatives’ (Arian & Barnes 1974, p 599). As such, within the confines of this ‘system’, in which one party is dominant, the strategy and response of the opposition inevitably come to be driven by that of the dominant party.

Given this outline of some of the theories concerning the nature of the dominant-party system and its relationship to democracy, it is important next to contextualise our analysis. The discussion that follows seeks to facilitate an understanding of the extent to which some of the arguments surrounding the dominant-party system and its compatibility (or otherwise) with the development and consolidation of a healthy democracy apply to the South African case.

THE ELECTORAL DOMINANCE OF THE ANC

The ongoing debate surrounding South Africa’s dominant-party system has gained increased significance in the nation’s three democratic elections. To enable a more informed examination of the South African context, this section will briefly cover the results of these elections.

In 1994, the ANC entered into the Government of National Unity (GNU) with 62.65 per cent of votes, alongside the National Party (NP) – now the New National Party (NNP), with 20.39 per cent, and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), with 10.54 per cent (EISA 1999). The political transition of 1994 brought about the end of a racially exclusive and discriminatory political system and the extension of democratic rights to the majority. Realistically, the results of the 1994 election were preordained – there was no other probable outcome than that the ANC would win a majority. The election was largely symbolic, ‘a rite of passage’ rather than a contest between parties (Daniel 2004, p 13). However, the formation of the GNU, born of ongoing negotiation between parties, brought about the need for South Africa to embrace a politics of unity and consensus building.

The GNU was crucial to the formation of the new democracy, ‘incorporating the three largest parties, each representing major racial and ethnic segments of the electorate’ (Schlemmer 1999, pp 281-82). In a deeply divided and unequal society, historically constructed along racial lines, it is no surprise that voting patterns were along racial lines. A random sample survey conducted at the time suggested that 75.2 per cent of blacks voted for the ANC, compared to only 0.8 per cent of whites; while 48.3 per cent of whites voted for the National Party (Idasa, Market and Opinion Surveys 1999).

In 1999 the ANC’s share of the votes rose to 66.35 per cent. Some commentators saw the 1999 election as a ‘consolidation election’ (Southall 1999, p 15). The ANC
returned to power as the dominant party and South Africans witnessed the smooth succession to power of President Mbeki; some have suggested that the ‘reformulation’ that took place amongst some opposition parties signified a movement away from the politics of the past; the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) played an invaluable role in overcoming many of the organisational problems of 1994; and the election served as a confirmation of what Southall (1999, p 15) terms ‘South Africa’s broad acceptance of democratic rules of the game’. It has also been said that 1999 ‘represented the first “normalised” test of South African political attitudes given that the 1994 elections had been an emotionally charged “liberation election”’ (Louw 2000, p 218).

### Table 1

**Election Results (% votes for those parties that won seats in the National Assembly)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Election Results, % Votes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>62,65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP (NP)</td>
<td>20,39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>10,54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA (DP)</td>
<td>1,73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>0,45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>1,25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>2,17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>0,07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEB</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>–</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EISA 1994, 1999; Independent Electoral Commission 2004*

However, 1999 also saw a weakening of the political opposition in Parliament. As indicated in Table 2, in 1994 148 seats were occupied by six opposition parties, whereas, in 1999, the opposition gained only 134 seats, this time shared between twice as many parties. Having left the GNU in 1996 – feeling it would be able to do more to represent its constituency if it were in opposition – the NP saw a dramatic
reduction in its support from 20.39 per cent of the vote in 1994 to a mere 6.87 per cent in 1999. This is despite the resignation of F W de Klerk in 1997 and the party’s attempt to revamp itself as the New National Party (NNP). In its place, the election saw the Democratic Party (DP) emerge as the official opposition under the leadership of Tony Leon, obtaining 9.56 per cent of the vote, up from 1.73 per cent in 1994. Support for the IFP, while still considerable, fell from 10.54 to 8.58 per cent in 1999. Although the election witnessed the emergence of some new extreme left- and right-wing parties, their share of the votes remained fairly insignificant and, while a sizeable proportion of white voters transferred their allegiance from the NNP to the DP, the voting in the 1999 election continued to reflect the fact that people vote largely in racial blocs. The newly formed United Democratic Movement (UDM), which hoped to attract both black and white voters – and particularly to win some black support away from the ANC – succeeded only in garnering support from some disgruntled blacks in the former Transkei (Louw 2000, p 221).

With regard to 2004, the efficiency and professionalism that characterised the election were undoubtedly encouraging. The work of the IEC, and the attitude and involvement of civil society and of the political parties themselves contributed to what appeared to be a broad national project to ensure that the elections were carried out successfully, and signified the commitment of South Africa to the strengthening of its own democracy. However, the 2004 election has also fuelled growing concern about the future of democracy in South Africa as results indicated a consolidation of the dominant-party system. The most significant outcome for the opposition in this election was the increasing popularity of the Democratic Alliance (DA) – formerly the DP in the 1999 election. The party reaffirmed its place as the main opposition, with 12.37 per cent of the vote, up from 9.56 per cent in 1999. By contrast, the election represented an affirmation of the diminishing role of the NNP in the South African political scene, with the party emerging with a mere 1.65 per cent of the vote. Other opposition parties fared poorly, though the IFP’s vote increased slightly compared to that in 1999 and the newly formed Independent Democrats (ID), led by former Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) member, Patricia De Lille, managed to draw a fairly impressive number of votes for its first election, securing 1.73 per cent. The ANC won an overwhelming 69.68 per cent – an increase of 3.33 per cent since 1999. While an ANC victory may have come as no surprise, the diminishing challenge posed by the opposition, and the consummate strengthening of the ruling party’s hold over the national political agenda, raises some crucial questions about the direction democracy in South Africa will take in the second decade of the country’s liberation.

The past ten years have demanded of commentators patience and a certain amount of caution when making predictions for South Africa’s future. In many ways it has been too early to predict how sustainable this young democracy will be, or, as some cynics have projected, whether South Africa will conform to the stereotype of other African states, declining into authoritarianism and a steady abuse of power. The immense social and economic challenges faced by the new
ANC government of reversing the inequalities of apartheid would prove challenging for any new democracy, let alone one laden with a legacy of racial inequality and discrimination. With its status and widespread support base, the ANC was arguably the only party capable of carrying out this project successfully. It was generally accepted that change would not occur overnight, and appreciated ‘that a well-intentioned government is faced by remarkably difficult circumstances’ (Southall 1999, p 14). The need to right the wrongs of the past and the significance of the extension of the democratic right to the majority can, in part, help to account for why elections based on real policy issues, and the conduct of successful opposition campaigns grounded in the provision of real policy alternatives, have not been forthcoming. Nonetheless, ten years on, given the tremendous hold on political power by the ANC and the nature of the political opposition which has emerged within this context, the key concern is what implications this carries for South Africa’s second decade of democracy.

It has been established that dominant-party systems are by no means uniform (Giliomee & Simkins 1999, pp xvii-xviii). The rise of one party to dominance may take place by democratic or inherently undemocratic means. Giliomee and Simkins (1999, p xviii) categorise South Africa as ‘a democratic system with a dominant party playing according to some liberal democratic rules, but still well short of the alternation of power’. They take a particularly negative stance on the ANC’s dominance and the prospects it holds for democratic consolidation.

This issue of adherence to the rules of liberal democracy is critical to our analysis. In a paper presented at EISA in May 2004 Rod Alence, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, highlighted a crucial point – that in South Africa ‘the emergence of a single party dominant regime has coincided with the institutional strengthening of political contestation and constitutional government’ and, moreover, that the growth of this dominance ‘has not been taken as licence to dismantle [these institutions]’. In fact, Alence goes on to state that in contrast to the abuse of power and the unconstitutional tendencies of some of the ruling party’s counterparts on the continent, ‘the government has more consistently treated the consolidation of democracy as a central component of its project of postapartheid governance’. The ANC government has given no indication that it wishes to suppress opposition. On the contrary, ‘the South Africa [sic] Constitution provides for a liberal regime for the formation and operation of political parties, which the government has upheld’ (Edigheji 2004, p 17).

It is therefore necessary to place our analysis within South Africa’s specific political setting, and to exercise some caution when making pessimistic predictions.

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3 Suttner (2004) also provides an interesting discussion point. He challenges the argument that the existence of a political opposition capable of becoming an alternative ruling party (and therefore able to keep a check on the abuse of power by the incumbent) is a requirement for democratic consolidation. Rather, he points to the effectiveness of and trust in constitutional mechanisms and institutions in South Africa, which are far more likely to facilitate the preservation of democracy.
about the future of democracy. The cooperation of political parties in the 2004 election and the relative freedom given to institutions such as the media and civil society organisations involved in the electoral process serve to exemplify this. Time and resources were put into ensuring that the 2004 election was run efficiently, in strict accordance with the electoral law, and with consideration of the rights and needs of the electorate. Indeed, the 2004 election appears to have evinced a growing respect for the role and authority of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) amongst both the electorate and the political parties themselves. If, as Southall (1999, p 9) has argued, 1999 was a reflection of South Africa’s acceptance of democracy as the only ‘game in town’, then 2004 can only be seen as an encouraging indication of democratic consolidation in the country. To reiterate the point made earlier, the ANC is not a party that has achieved dominance by undemocratic means. This said, however, it is necessary to go beyond the definition given by Giliomee and Simkins above, and to expand on and outline some of the features of the dominant-party system as it is in South Africa. Matlosa and Karume (2004, p 10) have described what they see as some key features of the South African setting. These are ‘continuous electoral victories of a dominant party over time by huge margins and, as such, reducing oppositional contest to second fiddle; political hegemony of the ruling party over state institutions, including control of the largest share of the legislature and local government authorities; and sole determination and direction of development policy trajectories by the ruling party with little challenge or credible policy alternatives from opposition parties over time’. Of equal importance when applying particular theories of the dominant party debate to South Africa is to understand the specific nature of the ANC as ruling party and the origins of democracy in South Africa, from which we cannot divorce the country’s unique political history. The protracted struggle against apartheid means that the historical role of the ANC carries tremendous significance. It is therefore futile to analyse South Africa’s democratic development without placing it in the context of its history of apartheid politics and racial separation on the one hand, and the politics of liberation on the other. No one would disagree that this still fundamentally serves to shape the nature of contemporary South African politics.

South Africa is by no means unique in the fact that the leading nationalist liberation movement during its struggle became the governing party. Such parties have been able to command significant political legitimacy and support during the post-independence era, such that they are assured of a period of political power to embark on a ‘nation-building project’ as the new government. The result has been that systems characterised by the dominant party syndrome have tended to emerge in this context.

The ANC, since its formation in 1912, has been able to extend its appeal and expand its support base to varying groups within society so that it has within its ranks supporters who are at differing points along the ideological spectrum (Reddy 2002, pp 7-8). This feature has become more pronounced because of the precariously balanced relationship of the party with both business and capital, and with the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) in the Tripartite Alliance (see Suttner 2004). This balance has to be carefully maintained: as Faull (2004, p 10) points out, the party’s manifesto must be crafted to ‘tie in the votes of trade union members, communists, the urban and rural poor, and the leafy suburbanites of the emergent middle class’. An additional dimension of the dominant party in the South African context is therefore its historic alliance with labour and the political left. However, while Cosatu played a valuable role in the political struggle, its influence on the ANC government’s policies post-1990 has given labour far less to shout about, as the government has moved away from leftist policies towards the global economic orthodoxy of neo-liberalism. There consequently exists a contentious power balance within the alliance, in which labour and the Left must consider which is the lesser of two evils: they can ‘cooperate and face marginalization’, or oppose their ally but risk ‘a government coming to power that is less friendly towards labour’ (Webster 2001, p 271).

The breadth of the ANC comes from the party’s long history and evolution as a liberation-movement-cum-political-party. Having moved in its inception from the middle-class black politics of an educated elite to the politics of mass protest and the urban uprising of the 1970s and 1980s, the party extended both its ideological influence and moral authority, while its longstanding policy of non-racialism broadened its influence amongst some non-blacks during the struggle against apartheid. As a result, its extensive influence, ‘strong organisational structures’ (Reddy 2002), and centralised leadership (Butler 2003, pp 8-9) have enabled the party to contain the varying viewpoints and policy stances within it in order to retain the cohesion and authority of the party (Butler 2003; Reddy 2002).

Interestingly, the dominant-party system headed by the Congress Party in post-colonial India – widely seen as having nurtured the development of a democratic system in the country – has been likened by Reddy (2002) to the ANC. Challenging the assumed negative correlation between ANC dominance and democracy, and drawing on work by Arian and Barnes (1974), he argues (p 1) that ‘both parties bring three necessary ingredients for democratic consolidation: political stability, legitimacy and a democratic value system’. These three ingredients provide a useful means by which to understand both party dominance in the South African setting and how these factors can have positive implications for democratic consolidation.

Firstly, with regard to political stability, if we reflect on the theoretical arguments touched on earlier regarding the benefits of a dominant party to fragmented societies, a party whose authority the electorate respects is a stabilising and unifying force. Negotiation, cooperation and compromise between parties became crucial to both a smooth and peaceful transition and a long-term environment of stability if South Africa was to survive – let alone set itself on a path toward democracy. By the end of apartheid, the ANC and its leadership had commanded a sufficient amount of the support and authority vital to overcoming past divisions and bringing society at large on board the nation-building project.
for a new South Africa. To this extent we can see how the broad support base of the ANC offered significant political stability.

Secondly, the liberation credentials of the ANC give it a political legitimacy that is difficult to rival and – perhaps more importantly – a moral legitimacy. This is undoubtedly reinforced by the liberation leadership of Nelson Mandela and his cohorts: the democratic principles that formed the pillar of the party’s mandate, its condemnation of violence, and its popular appeal and mandate of non-racialism. Through the ANC’s pivotal role in the protracted struggle, the party has commanded a sustained political hegemony.

Thirdly, with regard to bringing about a democratic value system, fundamental to the South African context is that the ANC ‘played a major role in crafting the country’s democratic constitution’ (Giliomme & Simkins 1999, p xvi). Moreover, the founding of the party was grounded in democratic principle and the extension of democratic rights to the majority.

These three features provide a backdrop that helps to explain the emergence of ANC dominance. Nonetheless, as the ANC looks set to dominate South African politics for the foreseeable future, this has inevitably raised simultaneous concerns about the detrimental implications for democracy. A key concern relates to South Africa’s continued adherence to the principles of liberal democracy. One argument proposes that liberal democracy is being steadily ‘eroded’ in South Africa, and that the domination of politics by one party and the seemingly bleak prospects for the alternation of power are instead directing South Africa toward ‘mere majoritarianism and electoralism’ (Giliomme & Simkins 1999). Despite the provisions and mechanisms in place to protect the Constitution and prevent the abuse of power, Giliomme and Simkins (1999, p xviii) argue that there is ‘an acute tension … between the sovereignty of the constitution and the “sovereignty” claimed by a party with an overwhelming majority’. Others have expanded on this to state that, as the ruling party sees itself as ‘synonymous with “the people” (meaning the black majority)’, democracy has come to be interpreted as ‘indistinct from ANC rule’ (Myburgh 2004). This, therefore, has a significant effect both on the way the dominant party perceives its political opposition and on the nature of the relationship they conduct with one another. This will be elaborated on in the next section of this paper. Needless to say, this relationship is, to a large extent, determined by the dominant party.

However, if, in a democratic system, the dominant party is unable to ignore the existence of political opposition party strategy becomes crucial to the continuation of dominance (Arian & Barnes 1974, pp 599-600). Moreover, the legitimacy of the government rests on its ability to deliver the promised goods to its citizens. In the South African context, this point needs further exploration. Despite questionable government performance and policy choices, continuing impoverishment of the black majority, and the limited reach of the government’s transformation project to address socio-economic inequalities, the ANC retains a far-reaching hold over the South African polity. A survey conducted by the Helen Suzman Foundation
in 2002 ‘showed that only 11 per cent of ANC supporters felt that poor people and the unemployed benefited most from government polices’, while ‘77 per cent felt that poor people were the most neglected group’ (Schlemmer 2004a). The fact that the ANC is enjoying an increasing percentage of the nation’s vote despite its failure to bring about substantial socio-economic transformation may appear something of a paradox. How can we explain this continued support?

Arian and Barnes (1974, p 598) have referred to one aspect of the dominant party’s strategy as ‘selective mobilisation’. The dominant party ‘needs majority or near majority support in order to remain in power’, but, at the same time, it must be careful about promising ‘everything to everyone’. The party therefore needs to ensure that it uses its ability and reach to give the appearance of representing the nation, selectively mobilising and meeting demands of groups throughout society. They suggest that, while many groups will be left ‘dissatisfied’ with the party and its delivery, ‘power remains elusive for those denied access as long as the dominant party can grant sufficient rewards to maintain its dominance’.

The continued support for the ANC can, of course, be partly accounted for by the ‘symbolism of liberation’, which still remains influential amongst sections of the electorate (Schlemmer 2004a). However, Schlemmer also astutely comments that ‘a common feature of non-mobilised poor people in unequal societies is self-pity. This self-pity creates a powerful need for demonstrations of sympathy and for a leadership that “cares”.’ He also notes (2004a) that despite the limitations and absence of some government welfare programmes, therefore, aspects such as expanded social pensions, child grants, comprehensive social subsides, and the ANC government’s ‘infinite patience in the face of non-payment of local rates, service charges and housing bonds have reinforced its image as a “caring party”’. Such notions were reinforced by the personalised and door-to-door campaigning of President Mbeki during the recent election, and the ANC campaign slogan – ‘a better life for all’.

In light of this, Butler’s conclusion (2003, p 13) that ‘the movement’s popular reach and legitimacy help to render the majority’s dire circumstances politically supportable, and its institutions ameliorate and contain the society’s diverse conflicts’ appears quite plausible. Although continuing dominance cannot be assured, a political environment and system are created in which the party’s dominance is essentially stabilised. Having said this, to reiterate that ‘dominant parties exist in “dominant-party systems”’ (Arian & Barnes 1974, p 599), it is crucial to understand the other part of the equation in this system – the political opposition.

**The State of the Opposition Parties**

Southall (2001, p 1) has observed that in South Africa, there is considerable debate over ‘the role, functions, legitimacy and capacity of political opposition’. As Table 2 shows, the past three elections have seen the opposition occupy a decreasing number of seats in Parliament, which, simultaneously, are being shared between a
growing number of opposition parties. The strength of an opposition, however, is not solely defined by the number of seats in its possession. The fragmentation and weakening of the opposition is also indicated by the various party identities, strategies, alignments and realignments over this period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1994 No of seats</th>
<th>1999 No of seats</th>
<th>2004 No of seats</th>
<th>+/-</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA (DP)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-9</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP (NP)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEB</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total seats</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total opposition parties in Parliament</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total opposition seats</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

Source, Table compiled from figures from the IEC 1994, 1999, 2004
Many analysts have predicted that the racial census of 1994 will, in time, come to be replaced by policy and issue-based voting as race loses its significance amongst the electorate. Moreover, as democracy matures in South Africa, this will, of course, be accompanied by the emergence of strengthened opposition parties challenging government power. The opposing argument, however, seriously questions the prospects of this happening in South Africa, given the nation’s unique political history. This political history has served, for the moment at least, to map out the nation’s political demography largely along racial lines and, subsequently, has seen the emergence of a dominant ruling party representing the black majority.

Theoretical discussions about the significance of the system in which dominant parties function suggest that the role of opposition comes to be dependent on, and determined by, the dominant party. In South Africa, the powerful liberation symbolism of the ANC gives it significant leverage within the system. As Reddy (2002, p 3) has argued, ‘the scope of opposition politics is undoubtedly narrowed and limited to relating to the dominant party’.

A key strategy of the dominant party, which, in turn, limits the cards that the opposition can play, is that in assuming ‘the “centre” of the ideological and policy spectrum’, while at the same time housing a diversity of opinions and viewpoints (Reddy 2002), it is able essentially to take the sting out of challenges and criticisms that come from the opposition. In the 2004 election campaign, for example, the campaign strategies of opposition parties such as the DA and UDM who targeted criticism of government performance – particularly with regard to service delivery and response to HIV/AIDS – largely failed, as the Government had already taken note of these issues prior to the election (Schlemmer 2004b, p 7). Indeed, the ANC appeared to have dealt with many of the issues raised by the opposition, and more, within its ‘a better life for all’ manifesto. By focusing on the party’s achievements in the past ten years, while also pledging that it would continue to do better, the ANC managed to cover the salient issues and opposition campaigning on the grounds of government failure to meet expectations in areas of service delivery and job creation was met with and counteracted by the ‘people’s contract to create work and fight poverty’.

Perhaps the more salient issue, therefore, has been opposition failure to present manifestos substantially different from that of the ruling party. Parties take similar stances on many major issues, such as macro-economic policy, with the ANC and DA both advocating promotion of economic growth and job creation through investment (Herzenberg 2004, p 15). For Schrire (2001, p 141), the major political parties in South Africa do not vary greatly in ‘ideology’ (in terms of being left, centre or right on the political spectrum) but, rather, are broadly ‘centrist’. Absence of a class-based politics in South Africa has re-emphasised, instead, political affiliation based on historical ties (Schrire 2001, p 141). The black majority continues to identify with the ANC, and the political opposition, rather than compete with the ANC for the African vote, has turned to appealing to those groups outside of the ANC’s hold – largely the white, Indian and coloured communities.
South Africa’s apartheid legacy, combined with the boundaries of the dominant-party system within which political parties operate, serves to highlight the continuing prevalence of racial identity in South African politics. The tendency, therefore, has been for party campaigns to mirror racial identities as the opposition continues to seek support from South Africa’s minority and, historically, more privileged communities. Furthermore, with the exception of white business, the ANC does not need the vote of the white minority to retain dominance (Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer 2001, p 167).

Although parties such as the DA and NNP may take a more ‘pro-business’ stance than the ANC, and therefore seem more likely to court the interests and favour of capital, even this avenue remains closed to the opposition as Southall (1999, pp 11-12) points out that business has entered into agreement with the ANC as ‘only [they]…could both call on and contain majority support while also implementing a neoliberal program’. Hence, while the years since 1994 have seen the emergence of a wealthy black middle class, this group are the beneficiaries of the ANC’s policies of affirmative action and black economic empowerment. We are therefore still to see the growth of an autonomous, and indeed multiracial, grouping from within the middle classes that would hold prospects for the formation of an independent political force challenging the ruling party. That being said, however, polls conducted by the Helen Suzman Foundation/Mark Data have shown that only 40 per cent of Africans with middle-income levels (R8 000 per month) hold the ANC as their first choice of political party (Schlemmer 2004a). This group could clearly, therefore, be open to alternatives.

Opposition parties have hence largely been criticised for failing to ‘transcend identity politics’ (Edigheji 2004, p 16), and their election campaign strategies targeting minority communities have lent credibility to this accusation. Many of the parties that have emerged out of the apartheid era are unavoidably tarred with the brush of racism. This has arguably been the fate of the NNP, and events following the 2004 election have seen the party formally disband. Despite its change in leadership since 1994 and the about-turn in its strategy – it has decided to work in co-operation with the ANC government, as opposed to against it – as the party that created and administered apartheid it was never likely to win over the black majority. Furthermore, its ambiguous stance left its supporters and target groups in the white and coloured communities uncertain of its policies and principles, and feeling that the party provides its constituency with no security or solid guarantees.4

The manifests of many of the smaller parties appeal to too narrow and specific an interest group. The far-right white parties, such as the Afrikaner Vryheidsfront Plus (VF/FF+) or Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging (AEB), for example, making demands for a separate Afrikaner nation, have found no real place for themselves

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4 See Lanegran 2001 for a deeper analysis of voter perceptions of opposition parties, campaign styles and strategies.
in the new South Africa, and both the PAC and the Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) have seen a decline in their support base in the years since 1994. These Africanist parties, rejecting a non-racial politics and advocating an extreme left viewpoint, have failed to posit a realistic and viable plan for South Africa’s future that would inspire the trust of any significant portion of the electorate. The African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), while it saw a marginal increase in votes in the 2004 election and has retained all six of its seats in Parliament, is appealing to a narrow interest group and has made little dent in the political landscape.

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the second largest opposition party, has, in the past ten years, succeeded in maintaining sufficient support to give it political weight in South Africa – particularly in its traditional stronghold of KwaZulu-Natal. However, this support is gradually declining. In fact, one of the most interesting outcomes of the 2004 election was the party’s loss of this highly contested province to the ANC. The ANC received 46.98 per cent of votes in KwaZulu-Natal compared to its 39.38 per cent in the 1999 provincial election, whereas the IFP percentage declined to 36.82 compared to 41.9 in 1999 (IEC 2004). This represents some significant gains for the ANC, which now holds all nine provincial premierships. This result perhaps serves to show a combination of changes taking place amongst the electorate in the province, in the form of the maturation of the electorate in the urban centres; and the growing concern of voters with socio-economic issues rather than with Zulu nationalism and the history of the Zulu nation. For the IFP, the election result is a reflection of the limitations of relying on the symbolism of ethnic identity to retain support.

The DA continues to retain its position as the main opposition, and emerged stronger from the 2004 election, with 12.37 per cent of the vote and fifty seats in Parliament, compared to 9.56 per cent and thirty-eight seats in 1999. Since positioning itself as a major contender, the DA has posed a threat to ANC authority – particularly in its strategy of raising ‘uncomfortable issues and questions’ about government decisions, attempting to distract the electorate from ANC ‘successes’ by bringing up issues of government accountability and corruption (Rapoo 2004, p 20).

Although the DA has proven itself to be a largely white party, as many previous white supporters of the NNP have transferred their allegiance to it, it has also garnered support from sections of the wealthier coloured electorate. The 2004 election campaign also saw the DA attempting to make inroads into the black community. The party has acknowledged that to increase its support base by any significant degree will require attracting the votes of the African majority. However, the past two elections have seen the party make little headway in this regard. In 1999, the DA made a major campaign faux pas with its ‘fight back’ slogan – far too easily interpreted as ‘fight black’ (Lanegran 2001, p 94).

Indeed, its slogan for the 2004 campaign, ‘South Africa deserves better’ – while attempting to suggest that all South Africans ‘deserve better’ than the ANC has been able to muster over the past ten years – could similarly be taken to hold
connotations of South Africa deserving ‘better’ than a black government. Such campaigns are likely to have a detrimental impact on the black majority’s perception of the political opposition. Unfortunately the party’s predominantly white leadership only serves to reinforce this image. As Lanegran (2001, p 93) notes, the 1999 ‘aggressive “Fight Back” message was clearly directed to racial minorities who felt threatened by their country’s rapid changes in general and affirmative action in particular’.

In 2004, therefore, the DA had to work to rid itself of the image of being a white party. However, while this time it approached the election under a banner claiming that it was working for the betterment of all South Africans, a prominent feature of the campaign was still the use of the ‘politics of fear’ (Landsberg 2004). A major element of the 2004 election campaign was the attempt to raise in the minds of voters the dangers of the ANC obtaining a two-thirds majority, and hence having the power to alter the Constitution. A further tactic used by Tony Leon was to instil in South Africans the fear of their democracy turning into a one-party state, with encroaching authoritarian tendencies and worrying levels of centralised power should the ANC be re-elected to government (Edigheji 2004, p 17).

This tactic of instilling fear into the electorate fuelled criticism that the opposition had failed to formulate concrete policies on which to campaign and which would persuade the electorate that they posed a viable alternative to the ANC. The DA also strongly criticised the government’s dealings with President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. While President Thabo Mbeki’s stance on the Zimbabwean situation has been an issue of concern to many South Africans, it is unlikely to be a vote-winner amongst the black majority. Crucially, the weakness in opposition campaigning was its failure to appeal to black majority interests. Instead of the issue of an ANC two-thirds majority, it is socio-economic issues such as the high unemployment rate, poverty and growing inequality that are uppermost in the minds of the majority of black voters (Schlemmer 2004b, p 7). Edigheji argues that underlying the ‘one party state’ campaign issue of the opposition is the fact that minority parties in South Africa want ‘an entitlement to votes, whether or not they identify with, and speak to, the wishes and aspirations of majority [sic] of voters’ (2004, p 17).

The smaller opposition parties continue to represent too narrow a policy agenda or target support group to appeal to or capture the vote of any significant number of voters. This can be said of parties such as the ACDP, the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), the FF+, the (Indian) Minority Front (MF), and the IFP. In short, ‘the electorate does not see current opposition parties as representing their interests’ (Habib & Taylor 2001, p 215). In addition, the growing number of opposition parties has led to increased fragmentation of opposition to the dominant ANC in Parliament and has largely negated opportunities for any potential challenge to its power.

Having outlined the nature both of the ANC as dominant party and of the political opposition that has taken shape to date, what can we say of its implications?
Opposition party alignments and strategies, voter behaviour and participation, and the extent and reach of the dominant party’s political power and hegemony present certain challenges to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa in the next ten years.

CHALLENGES FOR THE SECOND DECADE OF DEMOCRACY

One of the most significant aspects of the democracy debate is the response of the electorate (and, particularly in South Africa’s case, the various racial segments of the electorate) to the dominant-party system. A crucial aspect in this regard is that, despite the ANC’s electoral dominance, surveys of voting intentions and party preference have revealed that while the ANC has secured its dominance by consensus through the ballot, the African vote for the ANC is by no means set in stone. Whereas in October 1994 61 per cent of voters stated that they would vote for the ANC in a national government election, by October 2002 this proportion had decreased to 42 per cent. Confining this survey to black voters, 79 per cent expressed the intention to vote for the ANC in September/October 1994. This decreased to 76 per cent in February/March 1999 and to 55 per cent by September/October 2002 (Africa et al 2003). The ruling party is therefore clearly not insulated from loss of support. The figures cited earlier, reflecting voter scepticism about the extent to which the poor actually benefit the most from government policies, lend credibility to this.

The crux of the matter, however, is that because the opposition has failed to present voters with any viable or attractive alternatives to the current government the electorate is continuing to vote along racial lines. The fear politics promulgated by sections of the opposition that South Africa will decline into a one-party state is an insult to the intelligence of voters and to their ability to make an independent choice that will guide their own future. As Butler (2003, p 9) quite legitimately suggests, ‘it may be the current absence of credible opposition parties reflecting the interests of the discontented, rather than unshakeable affiliation, that secures current ANC control’. Edigheji (2004, p 18) has gone so far as to say that it is this situation ‘that will give rise to a one-party state, rather than anything the ANC does’.

A point which is particularly relevant to countries in the developing world – not least South Africa – is that ‘democratic consolidation … is dependent on the government’s ability to address the widespread poverty and economic inequalities within the society’ (Habib & Taylor 2001, p 210). The lack of serious policy alternatives from the opposition goes some way to explaining the continuous re-election of the ANC to power, despite indications of dissatisfaction amongst its support base over government delivery. The major challenge for opposition parties, therefore, is to begin to appeal to the African voter, and this will require a significant change in the opposition’s strategy. As Schlemmer (2004b, p 9) has argued, parties ‘will have to try to convey the additional benefits that alternative policies could
yield’. More importantly, however, he argues that such a strategy needs to be administered through ‘sustained engagement’ with voters, rather than just ‘mass rallies or “whistle stop” bus excursions’, ‘and a demonstration of what a stronger constructive opposition can offer’ (2004b, p 9). As Habib and Taylor (2001, p 209) quite concisely put it, ‘parties must not only exist in a legal or organizational sense, but they must also be mechanisms that enable representation and express the social interests of significant constituencies in society’.

A further challenge for the opposition is to reverse the demotivation and withdrawal from the democratic process of those sections of the population who do not identify with the ANC – namely South Africa’s white, Indian and coloured communities. One view would predict that, at best, this could amount to a more pronounced apathy and resignation in forthcoming years. At worst, dissatisfaction may take the form of outright rejection of the principles of democracy and the values it seeks to instil. One such consequence, for example, could be that extremist and separatist groups who do not feel a part of the new South Africa may begin to take a more organised form. Either way, marginalisation is likely to be compounded by both the continuation of racial politics under a dominant-party system in which South Africa’s minorities do not feel they are represented and the political ambiguity and weakness of opposition to the dominant party, which, instead of increasing the influence of minority groups, is likely only to further their withdrawal.

This is a trend that has already begun and could be set to continue should there be no significant shifts in political competition in the next decade. It should be said, however, that analysis of this trend cannot be restricted to minority communities alone, as South Africa’s three democratic elections have witnessed declining voter turnout and indications of widespread voter non-participation. Voter turnout decreased from 89.30 per cent in 1999, to 76.73 per cent in the 2004 election (Kotzé 2004). This amounts to approximately 15.8 million people who voted – 76.73 per cent of registered voters – slightly less than 60 per cent of the eligible population (IEC 2004; Schlemmer 2004b).

Afrobarometer surveys have also revealed that increasing numbers of people are expressing the intention not to vote (Africa et al 2003). While declining voter participation is a common feature of maturing democracies, the concern is that in South Africa it is symptomatic of party dominance and, more importantly, that it may become more pronounced in coming years. The worrying connotation of these figures is that in a political system in which the outcome of elections is a foregone conclusion, voters tend to think that there is no point in casting their vote. Given the lack of confidence voters appear to have in available opposition parties, some votes for the ANC may come from those voters who feel it is the only party likely to get into power.

The two key issues of concern arising from the identity politics and narrow policy programmes of the opposition within the dominant-party system are, therefore, that they maintain the alienation and marginalisation of South Africa’s minority communities into exclusive racial political groupings and also act as a
deterrent to the support of the African electorate, which continues to see the opposition as unrepresentative of its interests. The tendency of some parties to rely on adverse criticism of the ANC will only strengthen both the dominance of the ruling party and its tendency to portray the opposition as racist opponents of socio-economic transformation. This serves only to ‘play into the hands’ of the dominant party (see Giliomee & Simkins 1999, pp 12-13), which is able to convince its own supporters of the opposition’s desire to subvert the national project and reverse the gains of the black majority. For the ruling party and its supporters ‘opposition is frequently identified with the creation of obstacles to delivery and the protection of illegitimate special interests’ (Schrire 2001, p 147).

If racial politics are to be overcome, the challenge to maintain and consolidate democracy lies as much with the ruling party as it does with the opposition. Since the ANC does not need the support of the white minority to retain its dominance, it has displayed a tendency to abandon non-racialism and has instead placed emphasis on its ‘liberation struggle heritage’ (Maloka 2001, p 235) in order to appeal to its own supporters. Continued elevation of the liberation struggle in the politics of the ruling party may have a destabilising effect on democracy.

The current political predicament in Zimbabwe has demonstrated the volatility of the racial issue within politics, and the threat to democracy that a failure to move fully beyond race can present. In Zimbabwe, a threat to the power of the long-standing dominant party has seen the issue of racial identity resurface and be manipulated by a political leadership determined to retain that power. Some commentators on South Africa have therefore understandably warned of the authoritarian and oppressive tendencies that can emerge from this type of unrivalled dominance.5

Of further significance to the dominant-party system debate in South Africa are the conflicting interpretations of the ruling ANC and the political opposition of the role that opposition should play in the new democracy. Thus, while South Africa is formally a multi-party democracy with institutionalised political opposition, ‘the key debates revolve around which interests should be represented by which party and how should this opposition be expressed’ (Schrire 2001, p 141). South Africa’s political history of discrimination against the black majority renders this a delicate and controversial issue. A prominent concern has related to the tendency for the ANC leadership to display intolerance of criticism (both from opposition parties and from within its own ranks) and to view the opposition as enemies of the transformation project (Myburgh 2004). As Schrire (2001, p 140) has noted, while the ANC ‘recognizes the philosophical justifications for an opposition, it harbours serious reservations about the nature of opposition …Given its unqualified commitment to ‘transformation’, it maintains that opposition based upon a rejection of fundamental socio-economic change is not legitimate…[and]…it does not accept

5 See, for example, Giliomee and Simkins (1999, pp 343-50). Their analysis emphasises the ‘dangers’ of dominant-party rule and its potential to suppress political competition.
the legitimacy of opposition parties that are based upon the representation of minority interests’.

This can be seen most starkly in the ANC’s response to the DA. In contrast to the formation of various alliances between major opposition parties and the dominant ruling party, the DA has become known for its more ‘robust’ and adversarial stance. This created a considerable degree of animosity between the DA and the ANC government in the 2004 election. If we concur with Myburgh’s interpretation (2004) that ‘for Mbeki the opposition were welcome to participate in the elections, but once the will of the people had been freely expressed and the ANC returned to power, there should be unity in action, and the minority should submit to the majority’, then increasing intolerance of opposition – in particular when opposition takes a critical stance against the ruling party – could well be a warning sign to look out for.

It is therefore necessary to look closely at the forms of political strategy that have emerged under the dominant-party system. For some parties, the limited scope available to the opposition has cast the politics of cooperation with the ruling party in a more attractive light and as having the potential to be the most electorally lucrative option for opposition parties. The strategy of the NNP has involved allying itself with the ANC, claiming that it will best be able to represent the interests of its supporters through cooperation with the ruling party, rather than through continuous ‘attacks’ on its actions (Schrire 2001, p 142). However, the strategy has both spurred ongoing decline in the NNP’s support base and added to the parliamentary strength of the ANC. Most have argued that NNP leverage and influence within the alliance has been largely negligible (Schrire 2001, p 143), and events since the 2004 election have culminated in the effective disbanding of the party and its merger with the ANC.

In equal contrast to the DA has been the ‘co-optive opposition’ strategy adopted by the IFP. This has provided the party with participation in government and policy (Schrire 2001, p 142) but the benefits have largely accrued to ‘party leaders individually’ (Schrire 2001). The lack of influence that this form of politics has given the party as a whole and the limited extent to which IFP supporters have benefited are reflected in the party’s declining support since 1994 (see Tables 1 and 2).

The strategies of both the IFP and the NNP are indicative of party desire to retain access to the channels of power rather than to retain party principles or prioritise the concerns of supporters. Indeed, the NNP’s brief fling with the DP in the formation of the DA in 2000 (when the former witnessed large numbers of its supporters fleeing to the DP in the 1999 election), only for it to enter into an alliance with the ANC in 2001, is but one example of this. Under ANC dominance, it could be argued that an ‘if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em’ mentality has taken root amongst sections of the political opposition. This opportunism on the part of some parties –

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6 Schrire (2001, p141) has identified and provides analysis of what he sees as ‘three broad opposition strategies: robust, co-optive and co-operative’.
both the ruling ANC and the opposition (Habib & Nadvi 2002, p 333) – can be interpreted as symptomatic of the dominant-party system. As mounting an effective challenge to the ruling party seems so out of reach, parties have instead ‘sacrificed political principle for short term electoral gain’ (Habib & Nadvi 2002, p 333). The ANC, possessing greater political leverage, is equally able to use this to its advantage. A recent controversy of this sort was over the removal of the anti-defection clause from the Constitution. Legislation was amended in 2002 to allow floor crossing at the local government level and in 2003 at the national and provincial level. The floor-crossing legislation has been widely criticised as a deliberate ploy by the ANC to strengthen itself as it allows councillors to cross the floor to another party without losing their seats, while also stipulating that they can only do so if at least 10 per cent of party members wish to cross. This has conveniently protected the ANC from losing members to the opposition as it is unlikely that as many as 10 per cent of the dominant party’s members will wish to cross, while the legislation has ‘deprived [smaller parties] of a vital shield’ (Myburgh 2003, p 34). The enactment of the floor-crossing legislation demonstrates how the ruling party is able to use its position to consolidate further dominance (see Tables 3 and 4).

At the same time, some opposition party members have seen the legislation as an opportunity to retain personal access to power by joining the dominant party. In the floor crossing of March-April 2003, NNP defections in the Western Cape saw the province handed over to the ANC, while in the National Assembly, nine MPs from the UDM crossed over to the ANC (Myburgh 2003, p 34). In the floor-crossing window between 1 and 15 September 2004, the ANC acquired 326 councillors. The only parties that did not lose were the ID and the DA, although they only gained thirty-nine seats and twenty seats respectively (IEC 2004). The significance of these political re-alignments is that they entail a loss of accountability to supporters and diminishing competitiveness of the multi-party system. As Myburgh states, ‘There is little incentive for a defector to the ANC to represent the interests of his electorate once he has crossed over. From the moment a defector joins his new party, he falls under its discipline …There is no real mechanism by which aggrieved voters can make such defectors to the ruling party answer for their actions either’ (2003 p 36).

Under the dominant-party system, this type of politics therefore presents certain challenges to democracy in the longer term. On the one hand it has been argued that South Africa cannot afford a robust opposition because it has a destabilising effect in such an ethnically and racially fragmented society (Schrire 2004, p 144). Moreover, such a strategy coming from parties still considered predominantly ‘white’ has encouraged, and will encourage the ruling party increasingly to play ‘the race card’ (Schrire 2004, p 144) and ‘tempt the ANC to use its overwhelming majority to dominate parliamentary politics’ (Nijzink 2001, p 67). On the other hand, the continued presence of a feeble – and indeed, ‘co-optive’ and ‘co-operative’ – opposition (Schrire 2004, p 142), could result in a dangerous amount of power in the hands of the ANC. The party’s increased parliamentary power creates the risk of a ‘shift of real authority away from the constitution (and
Table 3
Floor Crossing Results 2002 (Local Government Level),
Movements to the ANC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No of Councillors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for the Community</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azanian People’s Organisation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breedevallei Onafhanklik</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Alliansie/Alliance</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middelburg Residents Organisation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Forum</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verenigde Gemeenskap Organisasie</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witzenberg Onafhanklike Vereniging</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ximoko Party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zibambeleni Development Organisation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>107</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** IEC 2002

constitutional structures) to the ruling party’ (Myburgh 2003, p 36); and its increased assurance of electoral dominance poses a significant threat to government accountability and responsiveness to the needs of citizens.

While it has been argued that ‘for a party to be termed opposition, it must envision and organise itself as an alternative governing party’ (Edigheji 2004, p 18), the role of the opposition is not confined to being able realistically to displace the ruling party. Rather, opposition must be a credible and legitimate voice in the
polity, whose views will be listened to (Friedman 1999, p 110) and which is able to hold government to account (Southall 2001). Given the current weakness of the opposition in South Africa, some would argue that such a possibility cannot readily be envisaged. A key question in the current situation will therefore be how we can safeguard government accountability, as well a party’s accountability to its supporters. What needs to be emphasised in the coming decade is that in a context in which the likelihood of displacing the dominant party is so marginal, the equally crucial role of the opposition of ensuring that the existing government remains accountable to the electorate becomes all the more important. Unless the opposition changes its current strategies and works hard to regain credibility, however, its ability to fulfil this role could well be undermined.

South Africa’s political development is so complex that any party failing to fulfil this role inevitably lends further advantage and political weight to the dominant party. As discussed above, however, any effective counterweight to party dominance is not going to come from parties opposing the current government’s policies of affirmative action and black economic empowerment. Although the ANC’s macro-economic policy of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear) may continue to be criticised by the political Left within the party’s own ranks, the

Table 4
Floor Crossing Results 2004 (National and Provincial Level),
Movements to the ANC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No of Councillors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance 2000+</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simunye in Christ Organisation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thembisa Concerned Residents Association</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>336</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled from IEC 2004 Floor-Crossing Results*
promotion of black economic empowerment has afforded the ANC significant influence amongst the African population. This will remain the case unless opposition parties also adopt policies that seek to redress South Africa’s racial inequalities. Indeed, unlike other faltering democracies on the continent, in which a growing educated black middle class has emerged as the main source of opposition during the post-independence period, in South Africa it is this group that has been the prime beneficiary of government policy. For Giliomee and Simkins (1999, p 3), therefore, ‘a middle class which has risen as a result of ruling party patronage does not play any significant role in broadening and strengthening democracy. It may, in fact, stifle such a development’.

**Opposition From Within the Dominant Party**

It is clear that a recurring issue in the dominant-party debate in South Africa is the safeguarding of democratic practice and accountability. Despite the ANC’s electoral dominance, its supporters and contending voices within the party itself have remained divided over party policies and, frequently, over the direction taken by a centralised leadership. The limitation of the benefits of government policies to a narrow stratum of the population has generated resentment from the Left. While it is not the purpose of this paper to detail the debate surrounding the political economy in South Africa, it is a hot topic and brings to our attention a further important issue in the debate about the future of South Africa’s democracy – that the ANC’s dominance presents challenges to those members of the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance who disagree with the macro-economic policy direction of the Mbeki presidency.

While the ruling party has an historical alignment with labour, there is significant debate about the extent to which the political Left actually retains meaningful influence within the alliance. This balance of power is of concern as, given the weakness of opposition parties in South Africa, internal pluralism and debate within the alliance itself has come to be seen as playing an extremely crucial role in maintaining checks on government power and ensuring that democracy is not undermined by arbitrary and centralised decision-making. Government has been criticised for deploying the more loyalist party members – known to be uncritical of decisions taken at the centre – to more prominent positions within state organs (Southall 2001, p 17). Such actions have functioned as mechanisms to curb criticism from within. As a result, healthy debate within the party is stifled, and critical voices have come to be portrayed by party leadership as enemies of the movement (Southall 2001, pp 17-18).

One opinion about the direction of South Africa’s democratic future, therefore, is that while the pact between labour and the ANC served its purpose during the years of political struggle, the best prospects for healthy democracy and representative government now lie in a formal split within the alliance itself (Habib & Taylor 2001). In Habib and Taylor’s opinion, the establishment of a labour-oriented
party presents the only possibility for the formation of a significant opposition to the ANC in South Africa. From their standpoint, ‘the alliance is undermining the attempts of both COSATU and the SACP to achieve their [social-democratic] goals’ (Habib & Taylor 2001, p 221). The likelihood of such a scenario emerging is, however, debatable. Suttner opposes Habib and Taylor’s suggestion, arguing that neither the SACP nor Cosatu is likely to leave the ANC, particularly given that numerous positions within the party have been filled by individuals from the two organisations (Suttner 2004, p 115). Moreover, in light of the party’s composition, the ANC equally ‘fears the electoral consequences of a split’ (Suttner 2004 p 115).

A further key issue is that the ANC’s move away from leftist policies towards the dominant neo-liberal orthodoxy advocated by the western liberal democracies in fact places some self-inflicted constraints on the party. While the move is frequently interpreted as a reflection of the party’s weakening commitment to its liberation promises, the flip side is that in terms of abuse of state power, the ANC is, to an extent, kept in check (Schrire 2001, pp 145-146; Butler 2003, p 10). The Government’s adoption of neo-liberalism has integrated South Africa into the world economy while seeking to reverse inequalities in wealth and opportunity through affirmative action polices (Habib & Nadvi 2002, p 336). In these circumstances South Africa’s reliance on capital and foreign investment, as well as its leading role in the African Renaissance and as an exemplar of economic development and governance on the continent, places its democracy far too directly in the global eye for government to risk stepping out of line.

Given the tenuous relationship between the ANC and some of its followers that has ensued as a result of economic policy, the party cannot afford either to abuse the position and authority that has been conferred on it by the electorate, and hence risk losing their support, or to deter investors and international actors by creating a climate of political instability – despite the fears generated by opposition parties about the dangerous consequences of an ANC two-thirds majority.

Realistically, the chances of the left-wing partners breaking from the ANC in the next decade appear unlikely. The pros of remaining with a party assured of electoral dominance somewhat outweigh the opportunities implied in opposing it. Given both the SACP and Cosatu’s long-standing ties with the ANC and the immensity of the challenge of denting the hegemonic power of the ruling party, the prospect of ‘going it alone’ is daunting. Rather, they ‘prefer access and influence to opposition and exclusion’ (Lodge 2002, p 155). A key factor, according to Webster (2001, p 267), is that the Cosatu leadership has suffered from a ‘brain drain’, losing many of its strong leaders to the Government during the transition to democracy. This has diminished the political orientation and strength that characterised the trade union movement during the 1980s.

Having said this, the confrontation that has arisen on occasion between the ANC and adversarial voices within Cosatu (Southall 2001, p 281) has succeeded in keeping the Government on its toes. Equally, the ANC has, since coming to power,
introduced an array of labour legislation to protect workers. While the party leadership’s intolerance of dissenting viewpoints is worrying, the fact that sections of the alliance continue to demonstrate openly their refusal to conform to the about-turn in the party’s neo-liberal economic policy since 1994 is a welcome indication of the role that the Left still has to play in ensuring accountability. Additionally, despite the argument that South Africa cannot presently afford a robust and adversarial opposition because of its political history and the relative youth of its democracy, ‘fragmentation’ of the ANC could also have destabilising effects (Butler 2003, p 6).

Nonetheless, these arguments do not perhaps sufficiently make up for the political principles and goals being sacrificed by many on the political left. The existence of a dominant party – let alone a dominant party with the extensive reach and hold boasted by the ANC – renders the challenge of guaranteeing both representation and accountability within a competitive party system far greater. In light of this, major challenges in the next decade are likely to lie within the party and the Tripartite Alliance. Proponents of left-wing policies must retain sufficient influence to make their voices heard; and rise above the temptation to choose the rewards offered for loyalty to the centre over their commitment to the goals and principles of their organisation. In the case of Cosatu, Webster (2001, p 271) proposes that it adopt the role of ‘a “left pressure group” inside the alliance pushing for redistributive policies’. The argument proposed earlier, regarding the vital importance of opposition being regarded as a credible voice able to ensure government accountability without necessarily needing to be an electoral threat, should apply equally to internal voices, regardless of their alliance with the ANC. Moreover, their value as a check on authoritarian tendencies and policy decisions will be more crucial than ever.

AFTERTHOUGHTS

South Africa’s unique political history has inevitably shaped its current politics and the formation of a dominant-party system. Indeed, it would not be overstating the case to argue that only a movement with the historic role, moral authority and hegemony of the ANC could hope to lead South Africa out of the dire circumstances of pre-1994 to a new democratic dispensation. The unifying effects of the ‘catch-all’ dominant party have doubtlessly helped to mediate conflicts and have contributed to a peaceful and smooth transition. While the consolidation of ANC domination has raised legitimate concerns about the prospects of successful democratic consolidation taking place simultaneously, there appear currently to be no serious threats to such consolidation.

The argument that the dominant-party system in South Africa is inherently undemocratic and is leading the nation into steady authoritarian decline requires reconsideration. Prospects for democracy are far more positive and it is unlikely that a one-party state will emerge in South Africa. Fear-mongering by some members
of the opposition about the ruling party’s desire to curb political freedom and to move towards a one-party state are merely tools to win votes, and are unsuccessful at that. The institutional checks and balances on the ruling party and its track record of recognition of civil liberties; adherence to the terms of the Constitution and the rule of law; the existence of an institutionalised political opposition and the strengthening of institutions of democracy and governance since 1994 lend credibility to this argument.

These issues aside, however, there nonetheless remain significant challenges for those playing a prominent role in South Africa’s democracy. Butler (2003, p 12) summarises the predicament fairly accurately when he states that ‘South Africa’s fundamental political dilemma is that liberation movement domination is a necessary condition for the entrenchment of democratic practices and institutions, but it is also and at the same time a threat to them’. One-party dominance becomes a threat to democracy when the governing party is assured of electoral victory and, as a result, ‘sees less and less need to respond to public opinion’ (Africa et al 2003, p 2). Hence, issues of government accountability are of tremendous importance in a dominant-party system, and a key question is how such accountability can be ensured when the ruling party faces no threat of electoral defeat? The ability of the opposition to fulfil its role in holding government to account is undermined by its weak position within the polity. This can partly be understood as symptomatic of the dominant-party system, the strength and leverage of opposition is essentially limited by both the symbolic identity and the extensive political power of the dominant party. The ANC’s control has most recently been demonstrated in effecting the controversial floor-crossing legislation, allowing the party to increase its dominance in both Parliament and the provincial legislatures.

However, while the ruling party has frequently been able to use both its liberation heritage and political hegemony to ‘delegitimate’ opposition parties, as Friedman has asserted, ‘conditions must exist in which the electorate is open to delegitimation’ (1999, p 101). There currently exists no opposition presenting a viable alternative to the ANC, while the insistence of some parties on formulating tactics that focus on criticism of government and, therefore, of black majority policies, undermines their legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate. Furthermore, tendencies toward political opportunism are equally undermining their credibility. Given that opinion polls have shown that many South Africans are open to alternatives, should they present themselves, the ANC’s electoral victory says more about a feeble opposition and the absence of credible alternatives than it does about undying support for the party.

The abstentions from voting and the withdrawal from political involvement of South Africa’s minority communities in particular – who do not feel represented by the current government – indicate more than any other factors the need for an opposition able to rejuvenate their participation. The co-optive and co-operative politics of some parties have served only to fuel this withdrawal.
A key feature linked to this is that political demography in South Africa continues to mirror racial divides. Opposition parties will need to make an effort to break away from narrow racial appeals and traditional constituencies and to start appealing to a more ‘diverse set of constituencies’ (Habib & Taylor 2001, p 216). If the dominant-party system is to be broken, an opposition party must emerge that, through policies that appeal to the majority of South Africans, is able to split the loyalties of the black community to garner a proportion of the ANC vote. A key challenge, therefore, is for South Africans to be driven to vote on the basis of policies offered rather than according to racial groupings. Until political parties transcend this racial politics, this is unlikely to happen. Moreover, the effectiveness of the tendency exhibited by the ruling party to play the race card in response to opposition criticism is unlikely to be thwarted. The ruling party must, however, also demonstrate greater tolerance of opposition. Racialised politics will equally only be overcome if the ANC is willing to let go of ‘race’ as a convenient political tool to defend its actions and policies or to scapegoat a critical opposition.

Given that the ANC is the party of liberation and that it is only ten years into South Africa’s democracy, the ability of opposition parties to present themselves as a viable alternative governing party to the ANC is perhaps restricted. The ANC has historically been a ‘catch-all’ party and commands a sustained hegemony which is difficult to rival. However, it is precisely under these circumstances that the ability of opposition parties to keep a check on the governing party’s power and hold the party accountable becomes all the more crucial. When an opposition lacks credibility amongst the electorate, its ability to fulfil its accountability function is undermined.

Within the ruling party itself, it will also be crucial to maintain sufficient political weight among those sections more critical of centralised decisions. The central leadership cracks the whip within the party and the Tripartite Alliance, and far too easily succeeds in portraying internal critics as self-seeking radicals and disruptors of the national project. If the ANC’s left-wing partners choose to remain in the alliance, the greatest challenge for them will be to continue to pressure the Government to hear their views and act upon them. This, of course, requires a cooperative and tolerant ANC leadership. It is business rather than Cosatu and the SACP that exerts greater leverage over the ruling party. The Left’s influence over government policies will therefore need to be significant, and it must prove itself a force to be reckoned with. As has been argued, however, the global environment and the neo-liberal policy direction the ANC has chosen do place certain limitations on state power, which might be beneficial in warding off the undemocratic tendencies often associated with dominant-party systems.

Challenges for South Africa’s second decade of democracy, therefore, remain numerous. The immensity of these challenges is greater because of the long-standing racial cleavages and skewed distribution of wealth amongst the population. However, it is important to note that, unlike those in some African states, South African civil society is active, well organised and, historically, politically charged. Unions and civic-based organisations have not failed to stand up and make their
voices heard – indeed, given the weakness of the political opposition in South Africa, the role of civil society in holding government to account is all the more important. Of equal significance is that the ANC’s traditional support base is a group with high expectations. The promises of both social and economic equality implicit in freedom from apartheid rule place limitations on the current government’s deviation from its pledge to serve the majority.

Nonetheless, if we are to look out for the warning signs of the undemocratic tendencies that have been attached to dominant-party systems, the watchdog role will be a pivotal one. Those concerned to see the successful consolidation of democracy in South Africa in the next ten years would do well to be vigilant of ANC intolerance – on the part both of the current president and that of his successor, whoever that may be. The overwhelming political power of South Africa’s dominant party and the risks this poses both to the competitiveness of the multi-party system and to the authority of the Constitution should not be underestimated. A key task for South Africa’s second decade of democracy will, therefore, be careful and ongoing monitoring of government actions by all. In short, the institutionalised means by which power has been conferred on the ANC should not lead to complacency about the party adhering unquestionably to democratic methods of rule. That said, however, many problems also lie in the weakness of South Africa’s opposition, who will need to alter their strategies and present themselves as credible players within the polity, whether or not they can realistically displace the ANC.

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