FACTIONAL INTRIGUES AND ALLIANCE POLITICS
The Case of NARC in Kenya’s 2002 Elections

By
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INTRODUCTION

Kenya’s 2002 elections were politically momentous. The new government, made up of coalition forces, has not only paved the way for a new political dispensation that analysts anticipate will set off Kenya’s much needed economic and political reconstruction (Barkan 2003), but most importantly it provides some important lessons for the study of coalition formations in politics. For one, it demonstrated to opposition parties elsewhere in Africa what can be achieved by standing together.

The formation of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was not a new phenomenon in Kenyan politics. A look at the country’s political history reveals a pattern of political coalitions over the years, made up not only of selected individuals co-opted by then President Daniel arap Moi to serve in his administration, but of political parties uniting for private interests. The formation of NARC, however, is more than short-term political manoeuvring, it was an unprecedented assembly of most of the main opposition parties, with the intention of ousting the Kenya African National Union (KANU) once and for all. As a result, an investigation of both its formation and governing performance six months after the elections seems opportune.

This paper analyses the National Rainbow Coalition, ‘the coalition of all coalitions’, in the context of the 2002 Kenyan elections. It comments first on the pre-election patterns of political coalition and the manoeuvring of key political figures between the different parties before the elections. It then examines the factors that inspired NARC’s formation. The most widely accepted rationale for the coalition, the paper emphasises, was the public’s desire to see changes in Kenya’s political environment. It also discusses key problems the coalition forces are now
facing, among which are power conflicts among politicians, the difficulty of managing and coordinating the government’s policy agenda, and the emergence within the alliance of opposition blocs along ethnic lines. NARC’s governing record in the context of the various political and economic reforms it has undertaken thus far is also reviewed briefly. The paper concludes that a coalition of such diverse forces may very well have expected to have a rough time in its early days as a ruling party. Fortunately for NARC both time and the people of Kenya are, for now, on its side.

**PRE-ELECTION PATTERNS OF COALITION FORMATION AND MANOEVRING**

Before the birth of NARC many political realignments, some more calculating than others, were orchestrated between KANU and smaller opposition parties. The most significant of these was KANU’s formal alliance with Raila Odinga’s National Development Party (NDP). This took place during a meeting of KANU national delegates, chaired by Moi, in March 2002, where the party constitution was amended and the ‘new KANU’, with a new party line-up, was created to allow for the absorption of the NDP (Karega-Munene 2003).

Each party, it seems, had what the other needed. Odinga’s political suaveness and the support he enjoyed from the Luo areas of the Nyanza province were some of the rewards he brought to the alliance. Conversely, Odinga wanted nothing less than a presidential seat, and he hoped that, as KANU’s new secretary general, he would move up when the time came. The alliance necessitated some reorganisation within KANU’s party structures.1 Odinga was installed as the new secretary general of the party, replacing John Joseph Kamotho. It was a small price to pay for the twenty Luo-Nyanza parliamentary seats he delivered, which greatly enhanced KANU’s electoral prospects. The new KANU, as it came to be known, consisted of several different factions. Apart from Odinga’s NDP cohort there was the old guard led by the then vice-president, George Saitoti, and other prominent groups, which included reformist new-guard parliamentarians and KANU moderates (Center for Strategic and International Studies December 2002, pp 2-6).

The newly reconstituted KANU did not last for long, however. It was disrupted when Moi endorsed an inexperienced Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor. Many interpreted this move as Moi’s desperate attempt to continue to rule Kenya by proxy (Munene 2003). With the announcement by Moi of the 42-year-old Kenyatta as his preferred successor, Raila Odinga and other ambitious KANU leaders saw their opportunity of succeeding Moi disappear.

Kenyatta’s limited experience in government and his considerable dependence

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1 The party line-up at the end of the KANU national delegates meeting held on 18 March 2002 was: Raila Odinga, secretary general; Uhuru Kenyatta, vice-chairman; Musalia Mudavadi, vice-chairman; Kalonzo Musyoka, vice-chairman; Katana Ngala, vice-chairman.

2 At this time Uhuru had only been a Member of Parliament since October 2001, having been nominated by Moi himself.
on Moi were not well received. He had tried to contest a parliamentary seat in 1997 on a KANU ticket in his home area and had lost. Most of the top ‘new KANU’ leaders felt they were being marginalised and this, compounded by the possibility of the party losing as a result of Kenyatta’s lack of political experience, left most of them with little choice but to leave the party and move into other advantageous alliances (Holmquist 2003). The other reason this dispirited group gave for abandoning KANU was that they disagreed with the methods used by KANU to nominate its presidential candidate. The men, who included Raila Odinga, George Saitoti, Kalonzo Musyoka and William Ole Ntimama, had hoped that the nomination of the KANU presidential candidate would be open and the process carried out in a more transparent manner (Wanyande 2003).

The most telling of these alliances in Kenya’s politically charged pre-election environment, after the implosion of new KANU, was, of course, NARC, although there were other minor mergers before NARC. The ex-KANU leaders, with the help and under the leadership of Raila Odinga, formed a scanty coalition, known as the Rainbow Coalition, which later took over an already existing minor party called the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This was necessary, as the coalition was made up of a number of registered parties, which could not join the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) until it became a registered political party (Wanyande 2003). NAK was a coalition of leaders and parties, the most notable of whom were Kibaki of the Democratic Party (DP); Kijana Wamalwa of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Kenya (Ford-Kenya); and Charity Ngilu of the National Party of Kenya (Holmquist 2003). Another significant alliance in terms of voter support and influence was the Social Democratic Party, which was initially made up of two factions. One was headed by Prof Anyang’ Nyongo (Kenya’s current Minister of Planning and National Development) before it opportunistically crossed over to the LDP as a way of joining NARC. The other faction, headed by James Orengo, remained independent of all the numerous alliances and mergers forming across the political arena. Lastly there was the Ford People Coalition, a weak coalition comprising three political parties: Ford People, Safina, and the National Labour Party. Deeply divided on many fronts, the coalition soon disintegrated – yet another example of the factional intrigues in Kenya’s chequered political history.

The pre-election milieu in Kenya was characterised by a number of such factional intrigues and manoeuvrings. Politicians, without reservation, jumped from one camp to another, striving to be a member of a side with the potential to win. The support accorded by outsiders to the cooperation between KANU and Raila Odinga earlier in 2002 and the rapidity with which individual politicians jumped into this political alliance are testimony to this trait. It appeared that the NDP alliance, coupled with Moi’s efforts to woo the Kikuyu through Uhuru Kenyatta, intensified the winning potential of the ‘new KANU’ and, for many politicians, being in KANU appeared to be a sure way of securing a parliamentary seat. This support group included political heavy weights such as Njenga Karume, the patron of the Democratic Party, who had, in fact, twice before supported Kibaki’s candidacy.
It wasn’t long, however, before the same politicians ditched the new KANU and coalesced with NARC. Many were honest enough to admit that when misfortune befell the new KANU it became evident that they would not win if they remained in the party.

With Raila Odinga no longer part of the team holding together the political strings within the alliance, the political dynamics in Kenya changed and, as a result, many politicians started to shift alliances. Former NDP members, as expected, followed Odinga. Others who left included the new recruits and aspiring youths who had been elevated to the ranks of vice-chairman within KANU, and a few old KANU members rebelliously followed in Odinga’s footsteps. Among this latter group were vice-president George Saitoti, Joseph Kamotho, Fred Gumo and Moody Awori (Munene 2003). Many of these politicians, according to analysts, abandoned KANU simply in order to survive in Kenya’s volatile political arena.

**REVIEW OF NARC – FROM CONCEPTION TO CURRENT STATUS**

Neither the establishment of NARC nor the subsequent influence and power it commanded politically would have been possible without the fusion of two most significant opposition political parties. These were the newly created LDP – Raila Odinga’s coalition of KANU renegades and the major opposition bloc of the National Alliance of Kenya. NAK joined LDP on 14 October, the day that Uhuru Kenyatta was named KANU presidential candidate. On 21 October fourteen parties, including Odinga’s predominant LDP Party, merged to form the National Rainbow Coalition.

Analysts have recorded many factors that inspired leaders of the coalition to unite. The most widely accepted rationale, and one canvassed by NARC itself, is that the people of Kenya desired to see a united democratic front within the opposition. Popular pressure from below demanding opposition unity was hard to ignore. According to the opposition coalition, at every political rally they attended, political parties noticed a growing consensus among their supporters calling for such unity. Needless to say, steps were thus taken towards establishing a coalition force that would accord with the wishes of the Kenyan people ‘to rid their country of authoritarian rule and restore some of the democratic forces that had been derailed over the decades’. Such demands for unity were certainly not a figment of the opposition forces’ imagination. Chants of ‘unite, unite’, it was observed by some, were heard frequently as the campaign proceeded.

The 1997 election results were further proof of how much of the electorate’s support was for the different opposition parties. In the 1997 general elections four of NARC’s coalition leaders who contested the presidency individually received close to 58 per cent of the presidential votes. Mwai Kibaki, Raila Odinga, Kijana

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Wimalwa and Charity Ngilu respectively received 31 per cent, 11 per cent, 8 per cent and just below 8 per cent of the votes. However, they lost to Moi because they had split the vote. Their poor planning and complete disregard for the importance of a winning strategy, it seems, robbed them of victory.

The decision by the fourteen parties that made up NARC to unite was, without doubt, a calculated vote pooling move. The coalition forces were confident they would succeed at the polls and the 1997 election numbers assured them of such victory. In fact, had it not been for the disputes over leadership and positions of power and internal party differences of policy bedevilling attempts to forge unity, the 1992 election results would also have presented an opportunity for opposition unification. Moi only received 36 per cent of the votes in these elections, whilst the combined opposition presidential candidates accumulated 64 percent.

The other factor that has no doubt tainted the new government’s image and is touted by the opposition (mostly KANU) as the most likely element that brought them together, is that they all aspired to the top leadership. Ousting Moi and ridding the country of his authoritarian rule was not the only thing they hoped for. All considered themselves eligible for Moi’s position, and all were inevitably in pursuit of personal ambitions. Indeed, in the months running up to the elections, political analysts had their doubts about the credibility and honesty of its members, since

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of votes per candidate/party</th>
<th>Percentage of votes per candidate/party</th>
<th>Parties and Presidential Candidates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2500856</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union (KANU) – Moi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911742</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>Democratic Party – Mwai Kibaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>667886</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>National Development Party (NDP) – Raila Odinga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>505704</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>Ford Kenya – Kijana Wamalwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>488600</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party – Charity Ngilu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8306</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>Ford People – Kimani Wanyoike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78325</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6161419</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** DONOR INFORMATION CENTRE ON ELECTIONS IN KENYA
Kibaki and most of his teammates were party to Moi’s decades of plundering. The adage ‘old wine in new bottles’ was used frequently by the media in reference to this scepticism. Each coalition leader had earned extensive political credentials during his stints in Moi’s government. Mwai Kibaki was vice-president for 10 years, a minister for 25 years, and a Member of Parliament for 39 years. George Saitoti was vice-president for 13 years, a minister for 18 years, and a Member of Parliament for 18 years. The others had similar experience and had held a variety of ministerial portfolios over the years.

There are other less mundane and inconsequential explanations. The coalition’s loathing of Moi and his administration, for example, cannot be overstated as one of the factors behind the unification of the major opposition parties. After several failed attempts by individual parties to bring an end to Moi’s authoritarian rule and KANU’s dominance since 1963, parties were eventually convinced that this would only be possible through collective efforts. Moi’s government was decrepit and inept; the economy had almost collapsed, with a growth rate of 0.7 per cent in 2002; corruption was an everyday phenomenon; poverty and crime were on the rise; and basic social services were almost non-existent. At this stage a change of regime was necessary, with the aim of establishing a credible/capable democratic and developmental government.

**Election Performance**

There may be mixed feelings about NARC’s performance after its election victory, but it has been showered with praises for the way it conducted itself in the electoral arena during the campaign period. The merger proved to be ‘a coalition of all coalitions’ – for one thing, it survived the process of nominating parliamentary candidates without disappointing other aspirant party members. Most of the NARC parties had agreed to field a single parliamentary and civic candidate in each constituency and ward across the country. A few parties, however, were not bound by this agreement. The strategy of automatically nominating some party members as candidates for some constituencies avoided disappointing hopeful candidates and, more importantly, it prevented members from splitting into new alliances (Holmquist 2003).

In addition, Kibaki’s non-confrontational, non-overpowering disposition helped to defuse whatever tensions may have arisen within the coalition during the nomination and campaign period. However, to all intents and purposes, the establishment and electoral performance of NARC was a clear vindication of the value of alliance politics under conditions of a weak and fragmented opposition. Much of NARC’s success must also be attributed to other members of the team, which included professionals, as well as political heavyweights who, according to political analysts, worked as a team. The team was especially commendable for its ability to work together through focused consultations and teamwork. For example,
when Kibaki was injured in a road accident, his departure for London, where he was hospitalised, did not stop his teammates from campaigning with the same degree of fervour and commitment (Munene 2003).

NARC’s victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections shows that all its hard work, its relentless campaign strategies and Kibaki’s ability to placate his ambitious party colleagues paid off in the end. The results were no surprise, but they were nonetheless a great achievement for NARC. The results of the 2002 elections at both the provincial and national level show how sweeping Mwai Kibaki’s victory was. He received 62.2 per cent of the total vote, compared to Uhuru Kenyatta’s 31.6 per cent. The rest of the votes went to Simeon Nyachae (6.5%), James Orengo, and Wawere Ngéthe. Kibaki reached the 25 per cent target in all eight provinces, which enabled him to meet the constitutional requirement that requires 25 per cent of the vote in five provinces. He did not, however, win all eight provinces; in some he lost to Uhuru, indicating that his support and that of his counterparts was concentrated in specific parts of the country. In the North Eastern province, for instance, NARC won only eleven parliamentary seats and Kibaki received a mere 37.1 per cent of the votes (Throup 2003, pp 2-9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties and Presidential Candidates</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>% per candidate/party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya African National Union (KANU) – Uhuru Kenyatta</td>
<td>1 835 890</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford People – Simon Nyachae</td>
<td>345 152</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)</td>
<td>3 646 277</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>119 516</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5 946 835</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
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Source: Donor Information Centre on Elections in Kenya

**DIVISIONS WITHIN NARC**

Since its victory NARC has been afflicted by divisions and tensions caused by a combination of factors, including personal ambition and factional intrigues. A coalition formation made up of such disparate personalities and policy agendas would probably have had divisions from the beginning, though they might have been non-threatening. Since its landslide win, however, more divisions seem to have crept into the ruling coalition, this time threatening actually to split the alliance into a number of opposing sides, on ethnic lines. It must be noted that when almost
all the opposition powers united under one bloc, this was seen as the first attempt by parties in Kenya to coalesce around a progressive and democratic agenda and not along ethnic lines. Competition for support was no longer based on ethnic divisions; parties found themselves competing across a broad range of constituencies. Many voters also followed this new trend. Some voted across ethnic boundaries, others avoided all ethnic affiliations and were only interested in voting for a regime change. It is therefore disappointing to see a resurgence of ethnicity, especially since Kibaki, a non-ethnic dogmatist, initially worked hard to obliterate the palpable ethnic divisions within his coalition. One of his strategies was to appoint Cabinet members not only with regard to merit but also to region.

Given that the unity of the NARC opposition was forged in haste – it was constructed in the midst of the campaigns and its party structures, internal rules and procedures were instituted without prior testing – the divisions that now plague the coalition were inevitable. These tensions and divisions have manifested themselves in a number of ways and have been most damaging in Parliament. Some of the NARC backbenchers, particularly members of the LDP and the KANU alliance, have continuously opposed the government, threatening many of Kibaki’s legislative initiatives. For example, they forced the administration to withdraw a Bill aimed at setting up an anti-corruption commission, which, regrettably, stalled the administration’s anti-corruption work. Equally illustrative of the instability that faced NARC as a coalition government was an alliance with the opposition of dissatisfied NARC members, which resulted in the passing of the Finance Bill against the wishes of the government (Wanyande 2003).

It appears that the strains in the new government are caused largely by tensions and disagreements between the former opposition parties and the LDP, which consists of the former KANU members and Raila Odinga’s Luo supporters. To date the disagreements have centred on two contentious factors. Firstly, the LDP seems dissatisfied with its position within NARC’s party structures. It claims that, as a national party, it should be treated as an equal partner of NAK rather than merely as one of its fourteen constituent parties (Throup 2003, pp 2-9). Secondly, and related to this, LDP members were not given equal representation in government, as promised in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) they signed with NAK. NAK’s members hold fifteen government and fifteen Cabinet positions, while the LDP, the largest of the fourteen parties in NARC, has only eight Cabinet seats and eight assistant ministries (Throup 2003, pp 2-9).

Anxieties within the ruling coalition reached their peak when some LDP members called for a break-up of the coalition in March, arguing that it had achieved what it had set out to do and it no longer served anyone’s interests (Africa Confidential April 2003, p 3). All of this raises some serious doubts about Kibaki’s ability to exert his leadership upon the coalition, to placate the dissatisfied, and to tackle the tensions that are causing the rift between LDP members and the rest of the coalition. Without more leadership control from Kibaki and more cooperation between the coalition members, there will no doubt be tough times ahead.
Whether or not any of these accusations holds water, some issues threatened the ruling coalition from day one and thus could have affected its governing capacity. According to analysts, when Kibaki came to office and began to structure his new government, there were some initial uncertainties and delays. Firstly, he seems to have deliberately delayed the changeover process; he did not immediately replace the top people of the government as his party members had expected. This delay was later explained by his administration as a necessary way of ensuring a level of continuity in the handover, thus providing the new government with some degree of credibility (Holmquist 2003, pp 200-206). Although the right appointments were eventually made, and appropriate shifts and rotations within the civil service, military and the intelligence were instituted, the tardiness did create some apprehension amongst the coalition leaders.

The other factor that clearly undermined the NARC alliance in its early days of governing Kenya was that it lacked a clear policy direction. This was partly attributed to the absence of Kibaki’s leadership and guidance while ministers were devising new policies. Policy-making in Kibaki’s administration is an autonomous process; ministries are expected to devise their own agendas. Kibaki has given considerable power to his ministers to make policy, and has continued to encourage this autonomy by means of his hands-off style of governing, which is very different from that of Moi, who centralised policy-making and administration. Such independence and autonomy has come at a price, however. It seems to have created some uncertainty and confusion about policy (Holmquist 2003).

Apart from the ministries Kibaki has formed a number of groupings to deal with policy matters. Among these is the Task Resource Centre (TRC), staffed by a selection of intellectuals and professionals, and the Council of Elders, whose members are, purportedly, mostly economists, and which tends to act as Kibaki’s private advisory group (Munene 2003). The absence of effective coordination of policy-making in the early days of the administration exacerbated this confusion, as is evident from the case of free primary education. During the campaign period Kibaki and his coalition committed themselves to providing free primary education, only to realise later that this policy had not been thought out clearly. There was very little idea about exactly what aspects of education would be free, and very limited planning went into the processes. The result was a chaotic situation when schools opened and could not accommodate all the new students who sought admission. This is an illustration of how complex it can become for Kibaki, despite his earnest attempts to make policy-making an independent and empowering process for his ministers; to manage the government’s policy agenda and to secure agreement for it from all fourteen members of the coalition.

Despite these initial tribulations, the rest of the changeover processes were
smoothly instituted. The appointment of Kibaki’s Cabinet, for example, although it may have bred some initial dissatisfaction among those who were left out, balanced the diverse forces within the coalition while giving recognition to those who had administrative experience. Fortunately it was not difficult to find competent men and women – most of the coalition members had all the right qualifications, both academic and in terms of government experience, and some were former permanent secretaries. But it is Kibaki himself; Saitoti, his new minister of foreign affairs; and Amos Wako, the attorney general, who are NARC’s most experienced members. In terms of ethnicity the Cabinet appears to give representation to all the main ethnic groups: five Kikuyu members; five Abaluhya; four Luos; two Kalenjin; two Kamba; two Meru; two Mijikenda from the coastal province; two Masai; one Embu; and one Arab (Throup 2003, pp 2-9).

NARC’S GOVERNING RECORD

NARC’s governing record has, understandably, been of interest to many political groups in Kenya and to analysts in general. The most critical of these groups has been KANU, whose condemnation of NARC’s performance reached its peak when it termed the ruling party’s 100 days in office ‘a total fiasco’ (Miring’uh 2003, p 3). KANU put forward many reasons for this harsh charge. NARC’s hard-line position on corruption and the vigorous actions it had taken in the fight against it were interpreted as a mere vendetta against KANU’s leadership. KANU challenged the governing coalition to put up solid structures in its fight against corruption instead of pursuing personal vendettas against its past enemies.

More damaging, perhaps, has been the claim that NARC has failed to fulfil its promises. A fair share of this disapproval, surprisingly, came from NARC itself. NARC’s coalition partners, and thus the party’s authority, have also come under scrutiny. The coalition is said to be coming apart at the seams, with a number of its leaders caught in power struggles among themselves.

To some degree these accusations are KANU’s way of playing the opposition party it promised to be – providing checks and balances in the only way it knows. It is a realisation of Uhuru Kenyatta’s promise to ‘turn KANU’s attention to ensure that all those leaders and representatives Kenyans elected deliver on their promises, be unselfish, realistic and honest as they fulfil their responsibilities’.  

A more constructive assessment, however, reveals a slightly less stark picture. Firstly, in order to assess NARC’s performance it is necessary to list the major challenges NARC, as a new government, must pay attention to and against which it should be judged. The new government, for the most part, needs to restore its people’s confidence in itself and its institutions; it needs to revive the economy; fight corruption with new and committed individuals; and, most importantly, fulfil
the many promises it made during the campaign (Wanyande 2003).

Many of these promises are slowly being fulfilled or will eventually become a reality. Others, however, seem to have, disastrously, been blocked by Parliament. Among the few successes Kibaki’s government can genuinely brag about are the introduction of free primary education – although this has had mixed results; initiating reforms in the judiciary; regaining donor confidence; and, of course, putting the Constitution Review Commission back on track (Mbae 2003).

The adoption of the new Constitution, based on the draft constitution released in September 2002, was one of NARC’s many campaign pledges that has received some attention, but not as much as NARC promised during the campaign. The Constitution had some progressive democratic provisions, such as the one long advocated by women’s groups, on protection against discrimination and the preservation of matrimonial rights upon divorce, but it also had some contentious clauses. For example, the draft constitution created a new position – that of a powerful executive prime minister. Many coalition members are apprehensive of this position, as it is expected to be filled by Odinga. As a result, the constitutional review has been supported in LDP quarters and is being deliberately delayed by other factions.

The government’s move to implement free primary education, despite its initial problems, is considered by government supporters to have worked out better than expected, and credit should be given to NARC for fulfilling its promise in this regard. Critics of the government, however, disagree, believing the policy was implemented in haste, without much coordination or planning. Because resources are limited the program has been inundated with problems. These have included lack of physical facilities, limited education materials, and congestion – for example, a classroom intended for a maximum of fifty students now has to accommodate anything up to 150 students (Mbae 2003).

The early days of the administration saw some promising anti-corruption initiatives and the anti-corruption movement seems to be one of the government’s most successful endeavours thus far. It recently recovered KSh15-billion (US $187.5-million) stolen during the Moi era (Africa Confidential April 2003, p 3). The court system has also been targeted for reform through the establishment of a special commission to advance the reform agenda.

Discussions about human rights abuses have also been made a priority, with the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Kiraitu Murungi, calling for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission to deal with human rights violations under Moi’s regime.

In relation to economic and social issues and other reforms it seems the jury is still out. The free education policy, though initiated with very little preparation, has given Kibaki another opportunity to reconnect Kenya with the international donor community. Aid will be forthcoming for education and the government is negotiating new credit from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Africa Confidential April 2003, p 3). At least $300-million is expected in credit from the World Bank, provided Kibaki’s government enacts some of the new anti-corruption
laws.

CONCLUSION

From the above it appears that the NARC government is a fragile coalition, made up of members with very different political agendas. Already, NARC is experiencing a ruthless battle of personalities and ideas between the different factions, at the expense of Kenya’s recovery. Both the constitutional review and the anti-corruption initiatives have suffered setbacks as a result. And only a few of the many promises made have been fulfilled.

Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why the NARC government should remain optimistic. Among these is the fact that it has members who are genuine reformers and seem to be committed to the reform agenda. The international donor community has already made pledges to assist the government to rebuild Kenya. And the Kenyan people themselves still have confidence in the ruling coalition government. The new administration has a real opportunity to address many of Kenya’s problems. Fortunately for NARC there is still time to do so.

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