South African Electoral System Review Roundtable

Comments on evaluating the arguments put forward by Professors Faure and Venter for a future electoral system

Professor Nico Steytler, Director, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape

My brief is to evaluate the arguments put forward by Professors Faure and Venter on the electoral model that they have suggested.
The first half of their paper sets out the recent history of the debate on the electoral system in South Africa. The last time I encountered the two learned gentlemen was in 1995 in the Constitutional Assembly when the same issue was debated. On reading their proposal, I was struck how little the debate has moved forward. The same arguments that were put forward then, are being put forward now.
Today, more than seven years later, we can make a much more informed choice. We have had 7 years experience of how politics are played out through the electoral system. In 1995 we argued in the abstract, today we can argue more concretely.

Closed party list PR system

What have we learnt from the functioning of our closed party list PR system?

1. First, the party list system allows for and produces highly mobile politicians. In the first Parliament a 100 members left parliament -a phenomenon that could be explained by the need in the first five years to redeploy scare human resources.
But the same revolving door phenomenon persists in the second term. Here in the Western Cape we have had, since the 1999 elections, two premiers that came through that revolving door. What is the level of connectedness that the provincial electorate feel towards their 'unelected' representatives? That would certainly make for an interesting public opinion survey.

2. Second, the level of connectedness between MPs and the electorate is low. That has been recognized by all. The provision that 200 MPs be elected on from provincial lists has had no impact whatsoever.
The absence of any direct link with constituencies has been justified by some on the ground that MPs at the national level, when exercising their legislative function, should not be constrained by local issues and interests. This argument does not hold for for MPLs at provincial level. There MPLs, by and large, do not make laws. Five to ten laws a year maximum. The national laws that provinces is also low. Last year there were only 11 section 76 bills. The question is, then, what do MPLs do? Perhaps more importantly, what should they do?

3. Third, it allowed for a high level of gender representation – 30% in national parliament and in the provincial legislatures.

4. Fourth, crossing of the floor should be allowed, so the major parties agreed. The fundamental tenet of the closed party list system – the total control by the party bosses - has thus been softened.

5. Fifth, what has been the effect on the electoral system on the health of our party system? Evidence suggests that party membership is down. Party organizers can tell us whether the PR system is good or bad for party structures and membership. Does the PR system encourage election campaigns being conducted through the mass media, rather than through building up membership and through door to door campaigning?

Mixed Member PR System

We have also learnt about the functioning of an mix system at local government level after December 2000 election (and even before) – in metropolitan municipalities and most local municipalities a 50/50 split between PR and ward councillors.

1. First, the system was understood. The voters understood the system which combines party lists with constituencies. This system was complex yet it worked. With two to three ballot papers per voter, the electorate managed well. Even the politicians eventually came to grips with the complex formula for election to district municipalities.

2. Second, the system is working, although there are still growing pains about the role of the PR councilors. A political culture regarding their place on the ground will in due course emerge.

3. Third, the system did well on the gender score. At local municipality level 34% of ward councilors are women, while 42% of PR councilors are women. This high percentage is not doubt attributable to the unenforceable statutory directive that parties should ensure 50% women candidates.

Given this experience, let us now evaluate the model proposed by Faure and Venter.

Proposed Mixed Member PR System

It is a simple model: adapting the present closed party list PR system, by including a 50% constituency representation. This 50-50 model would start off with 200 constituencies with 200 compensatory seats on a party list system to ensure a high degree of proportionality. This is precisely the model that is currently in operation at local government level in the metropolitan municipalities and the majority of local municipalities.

1. Simplicity. The model meets this criterion in light of our experience of our local government electoral system and practice.

2. Inclusivity. The system need not perform worse on gender representation or political affiliations than the present system. The local government electoral system provides evidence to this effect.

3. Accountability. The authors claim that it would produce greater accountability. Clearly an argument can be made for greater connectedness. But they have also added a few measures to enhance this value.

• First, they call for the statutory regulation of internal party democracy. This concept, borrowed from the German political system, is based on the argument that if parties are central to who get elected, then the parties themselves must be democratic in their functioning. This argument has much to commend itself – the aim is to get a bond between the ordinary party member and candidates.
• Second, they propose the right to recall an MP. This measure - to strengthen accountability for constituency MPs - is less persuasive. I have two problems with this. First, a practical one. I know of no place where it works in practice. An example of a recall procedure in an indirect election system is in the NCOP; permanent delegates to the NCOP can be recalled by their provincial legislatures. This brings me to the question of principle. Does accountability mean that an MP should simply be a delegate of the constituency, conveying its mandate to Parliament and, if he or she fails to do so, be recalled?

The authors make much of accountability. What does it mean? It could mean that an MP must answer for his or her actions, and the electorate may every five years decide whether the answers were adequate. This poses the vital question: answerable for what functions, for what actions? What, then, are the functions of the MP? The authors list the following:

• There is a communication function - the MP conveys local concerns to the national arena.
• But there is an equally important function of leadership in the community, being an educator on national issues and policies.
• There is also the function to serve the people in the constituency – in general with championing the interests of the constituency, and on an individual basis, by being an ombudsman for grievances and complaints against the state administration.

4. The authors mention in passing the provincial electoral system. While they suggest that the same system applicable to national elections, should also apply to provincial elections, they argue that, because the constitutional status of provinces is in flux, no suggestions on electoral reform in provinces are made.

I think that attention should be given to the provincial electoral system because the electoral system may help shape the functioning of the provincial legislatures. As noted earlier, provincial legislatures play a limited legislative role. What they must do is to scrutinize how more than half the national budget is spent by the provincial administrations. Linked to a scrutiny function, would be a service functions - making sure that provincial governments deliver services in the vital areas of education, health, and social welfare. To execute this function best, I would argue, MPLs must be located in constituencies in order to serve the interest of that community.

Conclusion

The choice on an electoral system comes very seldom around. The choice comes around when there is a new political order as in South Africa in 1994 or a major crisis as in Lesotho in 1998. In all other cases change comes very seldom and very slowly. The reason is that the political parties that the system put in power are seldom keen to change the rules of the game to make it more difficult or more cumbersome for themselves. The prime example is Britain. The first past the post system has been under critique for decades but the two major political parties – Labour and Conservatives - benefiting from it, are happy to continue forming governments with less than majority support of the voters.

In South Africa we have a unique opportunity to choose an electoral system not clouded by a crisis. This proposal by Faure and Venter deserves our serious consideration as a viable and practical option.