Zimbabwe: Reconciliation, unity and conflict (1980-1989)

On taking office as prime minister Robert Mugabe adopted a conciliatory stance, emphasizing national unity, reconciliation and the need to overcome the conflicts of the past in the interests of building a common future while toning down the Marxist Socialist rhetoric that had marked the electoral campaign (Brown & Saunders 2007, 1287; Selby 2006, 113-114). The first government he formed included not only members of his victorious Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) , but the leader and other members of its rival, the Patriotic Front - Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) as well as whites joined (Brown & Saunders 2007, 1287; Esterhuysen 2004).

The government followed a largely pragmatic economic policy that respected the property protect clauses entrenched in the constitution and sought to establish a corporatist solution to resolving labour conflicts through joint state, capital and labour involvement, culminating in the Labour Relations Act of 1985 that formalized this strategy (Kanyenze 2004, 122; Gwisai 2002). State activism from early on focused on improving basic aspects of life for Africans, for as Gwisai (2002; but see also Dorman 2001, 61) points out:

Thus in education the number of primary schools doubled, while secondary school enrolment jumped from 66,000 in 1979 to nearly 150,000 by 1981. An extensive primary health care system was set up, which by 1990 had resulted in a reduction of infant mortality rates by sixteen per cent, while nearly 18,000 peasant families were resettled in the first three years. The Minimum Wages Act and Employment Act repealed some of the most obnoxious and racist of the colonial employment laws and guaranteed a national minimum wage which saw real wages rise in 1980-81 to the highest ever.

The corporatist approach to labour relations reflected a similar objective, namely that of aiding the economic recovery of industry with the lifting of sanctions in April 1980, for the white controlled private sector provided the revenue with which the government could expand social services (Gwisai 2002; Esterhuysen 2004). The proliferation of strikes immediately after independence, as a result of the rise in popular expectations, could only be contained and the government's growth goals met by the cooption of the labour movement through a corporatist strategy (Gwisai 2002; Kanyenze 2004, 111).

The economic boom that followed was tempered by recurring droughts, a world-wide recession, shortages of foreign exchange and the drain of skilled labour as white immigration accelerated (the number of whites declined from about 275 000 in 1975 to less than 100 000 by 1985; Esterhuysen 2004; Kanyenze 2004, 112, 119; see also Selby 2006 116-117). Measures to stabilise the economy managed to reduce inflation (which had hit 14% in 1981) and the growing state and trade deficits, but at the expense of economic growth, which fell form 11% in 1980 and 10% in 1981 to an average of 1.9% between 1983 and 1985 before rising to an average of 4% between 1986 and 1990 (Kanyenze 2004, 112-114).

The immigration of whites did provide opportunities for the educated urban population as the public and private sectors underwent rapid Africanisation (Esterhuysen 2004). However, economic growth did not result in a meaningful rise in living standards for most Zimbabweans. Growth in employment, at (2.7% per annum in 1986-1990) was insufficient to absorb the growth in the labour force (3% per annum over the same period; Kanyenze 2004, 114).

The state, moreover, lacked the resources (finances and expertise) to engage in meaningful land reform and the vague promises of assistance in this respect from the United States and Britain were not made good, while beaurocratic ineptitude and corruption made matters worse (Hanyama Undated; Selby 2006, 114-115, 134-135). Moreover the urgent need to restore an economy ravaged by war and sanctions forced the government to prioritise the needs of commercial farmers at the expense of peasant expectations and the huge inequities in land distribution remained (Brown & Saunders 2007, 1287; Hanyama Undated; Selby 2006, 114-115). A white agricultural technocrat respected by the white commercial farmers, Denis Norman, was appointed minister of agriculture, but the land issue, so central to nationalist mobilisation of peasants during the war, remained an issue as illegal land occupations took place encouraged by sections of the ruling party (Selby 2006, 115; ICG 2004, 32).

Between 1980-1984 35 000 households were resettled on 2 million hectares, but thereafter land resettlement declined markedly and land reform was virtually shelved, despite the passing of the 1985 Land Acquisitions Act (Kanyenze 2004, 115-116; ICG 2004, 35-36, 41). In total, between 1980 and 1990, 71 000 households were resettled on 3.5 million hectares; this Selby observes, "was a significant achievement, in aggregate terms, and unsurpassed in Africa. However, within the context of initial targets and the emerging performance results, it was deemed a failure by many groups, including officials of the government" (Hanyama Undated; Selby 2004, 134).

Destabilisation by South Africa, as a result of Zimbabwe's support for liberation movements, in the form of sabotage, bombings, attacks and misinformation fostered a climate of suspicion and distrust that wreaked havoc with the already strained relations between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU (Brown & Saunders 2007, 1287; CCJPZ 1997, 29). In response to perceived external and internal enemies Mugabe became increasingly authoritarian and ZANU-PF evermore intolerant of dissent and criticism and relations between the two parties and their leaders deteriorated steadily (Esterhuysen 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2004, 308-310). Attempts by Mugabe to consolidate national unity through the merger of the two rivals, who represented the two main ethnic and regional groupings of the country, as a step towards an eventual one party state were resisted by PF-ZAPU's leader, Joshua Nkomo (Brown & Saunders 2007, 1287; Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007). In the PF-ZAPU stronghold of Matabeleland signs of unrest emerged as a result of the apparent persecution of PF-ZAPU members, which Mugabe suspected was being fomented by Nkoma and he was demoting by Mugabe to a more junior position in the government in January 1981 (Esterhuysen 2004).

In 1982 PF-ZAPU dissidents and deserters from the army launched a campaign of attacks on government personnel and installations and acts of banditry; all PF-ZAPU members from the government after the discovery of an arms cache and a ruthless crackdown in Matabeleland was undertaken (Esterhuysen 2004; Brown & Saunders 2007, 1288; Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007). Dissidents were dealt with by resort to the security legislation inherited from the Smith regime which gave the Central Intelligence Organisation sweeping powers to detain opponents while the Shona dominated 5th Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland and given a carte blanche to suppress the unrest in 1982, though upheavals continued into 1987 (Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007; Esterhuysen 2004). The deployment of the 5th Brigade deepened the conflict from one between the an increasingly authoritarian government and increasingly lawless dissident movement to one between the numerically superior and dominant ZANU-PF supporting Shona and the numerically and politically weaker and PF-ZAPU supporting Ndebele, through their explicit identification of all Ndebele as dissidents and through the extreme violence visited on civilians in the area (this included public executions, mass beatings, rape and widespread detentions, torture and murder; CCJPZ 1997, 60). The crackdown and the starvation that followed in its wake led to the deaths of thousands of civilians (Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007; the ICG (2004, 38) cites estimates of between 10 000 and 20 000 casualties).

South Africa did not relax its efforts at destabilising Zimbabwe. As early as March 1981 South Africa withdrew from bilateral trade agreement and terminated employment of migrant labourers from Zimbabwe, while Zimbabwean goods were tied up in South African ports (Kanyenze 2004, 121). By supporting the rebel group RENAMO in Mozambique it was able to threaten access to the port of Beira, forcing Zimbabwe deploy troops there to attempt to re-establish the rail link and in the meanwhile increasing Zimbabwe's reliance on South Africa for exports and imports (Kanyenze 2004, 121; Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007). Apart from this and the support given to the dissidents in Matabeleland attacks on Zimbabwean military installations and on exiles from South Africa belonging to the African National Congress were made (Selby 2006, 120; ICG 2004, 36,-37).

Opposition party politics at the time was turbulent. Ian Smith's Republican Front (renamed the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ)) suffered defections in 1982 as all but seven MP's, dissatisfied with the hard oppositional tone that was adopted, and eventually formed the Independent Zimbabwe Group (IZG; Wikipedia 2007). Nkomo fled into exile in March 1983, but was persuaded to return in August, while Ndabaningi Sithole fled to the United States in the same year and did not return until 1992 (Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007). Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leader of the United African National Council (UANC) was detained for almost a year in 1983/4 on charges of conspiring against the state with the South African government, but was never brought to court (Dorman, SR 2004, 7).

It was in this environment that the 1985 elections were held (for more information see 1985 General Elections). ZANU-PF increased both its share of the vote (63% to 77%) and the number of seats it held in the House of Assembly (57 to 64). PF-ZAPU lost five of 20 seats, the UANC lost all three of its seats and ZANU-Sithole (later named ZANU-Ndonga) managed to gain a seat (see 1985 House of Assembly results for details). CAZ rebounded, to Mugabe's annoyance, taking 15 of the 20 seats reserved for whites and reducing the IZG to four seats. Though CAZ won only 55% of the vote in a low turnout, Mugabe interpreted the results as a rejection by whites of the government's attempts at reconciliation (Selby 2006, 121-122).

The deteriorating situation in Matabeleland, the electoral losses suffered and continued state harassment, of himself and his party, forced Nkomo into negotiations with Mugabe, culminating in the Unity Accord of December 1987 that merged PF-ZAPU with ZANU-PF; Mugabe became president of ZANU-PF and Nkomo one of two vice-presidents (Esterhuysen 2004; Masunungure 2004, 158-159). The accord also led to the granting of amnesty in for both dissidents and government forces involved in Matabeleland in April and June 1988; so ending the conflict (CCJPZ 1997, 73; Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007).

The merging of the parties gave ZANU-PF three-quarter majority (in fact 79 of 100 seats) in the House of Assembly which enabled significant changes to be made to the independence constitution that came into force in 1980. A powerful executive presidency was adopted with Mugabe as president and Nkomo as one of two vice-presidents (Esterhuysen 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2004, 313). The seven-year guarantee of separate reserved seats for whites had expired and their 20 seats in the House of Assembly were abolished and replaced by common-roll seats (elected in the interim by the sitting members (Esterhuysen 2004; Brown & Saunders 2007, 1288). ZANU-PF nominees replaced the ten white senate members and the body was abolished entirely in 1989 (Esterhuysen 2004; Brown & Saunders 2007, 1288). These measures not only united the nationalists in one camp and removed the whites as an independent force in Zimbabwean politics, but also thereby substantially advanced Mugabe's goal of creating a one-party state where ZANU-PF hegemony could be permanently secured (Gatcheni 2004, 313; Masunungure 2004, 159).

Mugabe again articulated the need for Zimbabwe to become a Marxist-socialist one-party state in 1988, but the unity that had been won was beginning to fray at the edges (Esterhuysen 2004). Dissent emerged within ZANU-PF itself, for hard-line Marxist-Leninists were dissatisfied with the perceived capitalist orientation of government policies, socialist rhetoric notwithstanding, while the trade union movement chaffed under the restrictions of the corporatist regime imposed by the 1985 Labour Relations Act and its subsequent amendments in 1988; ZANU-PF's response was to expel or suspend dissidents (Gwisai 2002; Masunungure 2004, 167). In October 1989 student protests led to the closure of the University of Zimbabwe and the arrest of student leaders, and when Morgan Tsvangirai, general secretary of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions objected, he too was arrested (Masunungure 2004, 170; Brown & Saunders 2007, 1288). On the other hand opposition emerged to the notion of a socialist one-party state, led by ZANU-PF secretary general Edgar Tekere, resulting in his expulsion in 1988 and the formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) under his leadership (Esterhuysen 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2004, 314). There remained also great bitterness in Matabeleland over the atrocities committed by the 5th Brigade in the preceding years (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2004, 311).

All of this foment was underpinned by the fact that the first decade after liberation had not led to any substantial improvement in economic conditions for the majority of Zimbabweans and unemployment in fact increased, the gains that had been made in education and healthcare notwithstanding (Esterhuysen 2004; Brown & Saunders 2007, 1288). To this can be added a perception that the leadership of ZANU-PF had become corrupted by power and the pursuit of wealth to the exclusion of all concern for the masses they claimed to represent, for as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2004, 313) puts it:

The state, the government and the ruling party became alienated from the people. The people realised that the political elite were beginning to betray them. The ruling party quickly realized the danger of being rejected by the people; hence it intensified the agenda of a one-party state that was going to close the door for regular elections as well as party choice.

The ZANU-PF congress, held in December 1989, was marked by controversy over the leadership role that Nkomo should play (specifically over the creation of a second vice-presidency for him in the party), as well as opposition to the creation of a one-party state (Brown & Saunders 2007, 1288).

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