Zimbabwe before and after the June 2000 elections: an assessment (continued)

But the big question is: what now? After enjoying unfettered power courtesy of a two-thirds majority in parliament, how will the Mugabe government respond to having to share the political stage with the nine-month-old MDC? At the same time, how will the MDC handle coming off second best and being the junior partner in parliament when it expected to win the elections? Currently, both the MDC and ZANU PF are contemplating their next moves after what can only be described as an electoral earthquake that totally changed the political landscape in Zimbabwe. Early indications are that Mugabe will use this power to try and put more distance between ZANU PF and the MDC in order to extend the government's slim parliamentary majority of just four seats. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that he will use the opportunity to affect national reconciliation and institute a government of national unity. The personality cult built around him and his personality make-up (extreme arrogance and vanity) argues against such an eventuality.

However, the MDC's strong showing was an extraordinary performance for an opposition party in a country that ZANU PF had ruled virtually unchallenged for 20 years; and in the improbable atmosphere of an election campaign dominated by racially charged rhetoric from Mugabe, black Zimbabweans for the first time freely have chosen whites to represent them in parliament, only two decades after white minority rule ended. Furthermore, the election outcome denies ZANU PF the two-thirds majority in parliament that in the past gave Mugabe unchecked power, which he used to change the constitution 16 times - as he again did only weeks before the elections, to sanction the compulsory seizure of 804 white-owned farms covering some 660 000 hectares. ZANU PF and, in fact, Mugabe received a very strong signal that the post-liberation war euphoria amongst the people of Zimbabwe is now over and that quality of life and the state of the economy have replaced the "struggle ideology" as the issues foremost in the people's mind. Although he is entitled to lead Zimbabwe until 2002, perhaps Mugabe should hear the voices of his countrymen and begin to create the space for a new leader to be groomed to take the reins.

ZANU PF's election victory will keep Zimbabwe cut off from international loans and investment, while freeing Mugabe to push ahead with his goal of confiscating half of the country's white-owned farmland. While his presidential term does not end until 2002, even opposition parties agree that the ruling party's majority in parliament - though reduced to 92 from 147 seats - gives him license to continue his policies. However, with Mugabe in power, foreign aid is likely to stay on hold; international lenders stopped providing Zimbabwe with loans in 1995 when the country failed to meet commitments for cutting its budget deficit. And Mugabe has isolated the country from most aid or any new investment by his increasingly belligerent stance towards Western donor countries, and Britain in particular, which he blames for all of Zimbabwe's economic ills. Having made land redistribution and an emotional appeal to anti-colonial nostalgia the centrepieces of ZANU PF's election campaign, Mugabe will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to adopt a more conciliatory approach to the West.

Economically the election result has not been good for Zimbabwe because foreign markets and investors had been looking for a clear new direction to replace the lack of transparency, the corruption, and the lack of predictability in policy. In fact, confidence in the economy is low, according to the World Economic Forum's Africa Competitiveness Report of June 2000. Now that the election result has given the Mugabe government a mandate to continue with its land grab policy, foreign investment will be further discouraged by ZANU PF's tacit approval of land invasions and the prospect of similar initiatives aimed at business and urban land. Already, in the post-election period it has become apparent that while urban areas have remained relatively calm, illegal occupiers on rural farmland have stepped up their campaign of threats and intimidation against white landowners. The story of the Zimbabwean economy is a long litany of problems; and, ironically, in the aftermath of the elections, any lasting transition to a greater measure of democracy will depend on a recovery of the economy. There might be light at the end of the tunnel, though, with the adoption of the Zimbabwe Millennium Economic Recovery Programme - a multifaceted response to fundamental macro-economic imbalances in the Zimbabwean economy. But the new parliament, with its sizeable ZANU PF and MDC constituencies, must drive forward an economic reform process. The opportunity must not go unnoticed by the MDC that its advance will depend on helping to forge, in opposition, a coherent economic strategy to bring a higher standard of living to Zimbabwe's citizens.

Tragically, as matters now stand, Mugabe will be remembered for having squandered the chance to make Zimbabwe a model African state. His focus on confiscating white-owned land - and, more recently, threats of nationalization being made against the mining industry - has touched a raw nerve across the sub-continent, where economic disparities and the legacy of colonialism remain visible. Already the "demonstration effect" of his land grab policies is not lost on other countries in the southern African region: there are growing indications that pressure is mounting for similar actions to be taken in Namibia and South Africa, again targeting white farming communities. The spill-over effect of such actions may eventually also affect Zambia and Malawi - where either sizeable white commercial farming interests, or black-owned commercial estate farming enterprises, managed by whites, make a substantial contribution to GDP.

Moreover, a recent report of land invasions by landless peasants in the Paraná state of Brazil, attest to the fact that the "demonstration effect" of the events in Zimbabwe certainly has wider international ramifications. Also, the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) has warned that the violent run-up to Zimbabwe's parliamentary elections had had negative effects on the flow of foreign investment into the whole of southern Africa. And, clearly, what African Renaissance can South African President Thabo Mbeki talk of with any authority if he is seen to condone blatant electoral campaign thuggery and authoritarianism in Zimbabwe, and when his party (the African National Congress - ANC) proudly and piously hails as "free and fair" an election during which an opposition party was allowed neither to campaign freely in many areas nor to buy advertising on Zimbabwe's state-controlled media? There is a strong argument that if the so-called "miracle" of South Africa's transition is to mean anything, and if its message is to be kept alive domestically, there must be an intimate connection between South Africa's moral commitment to the promotion of democratic principles and the safeguarding of human rights, and its conduct of foreign relations.