Zanzibar: Conflict prevention and management

Extracted from: Grant Masterson 2009 "Chapter 13: Tanzania and Zanzibar" IN Denis Kadima and Susan Booysen (eds) Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa 1989-2009: 20 Years of Multiparty Democracy, EISA, Johannesburg, 535-536.

Whilst conflict prevention on the mainland tends to be localised to particular local authorities, and therefore requires conflict management at the local level, the conflicts that have characterised electoral contests in Zanzibar require national interventions and solutions. The conflict between the CCM and CUF has been traced back to the interference of the British during Zanzibar's move towards independence in the early 1960s. The British manipulation of the electoral system in favour of the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP), primarily a Arab land-owner-supported party, saw the ZNP win the 1963 elections under heavily manipulated conditions. The Afro-Shirazi Party (which later merged with Tanu to become the CCM) consistently won the majority of the popular vote (54.3 per cent in the 1963 elections), although gerrymandering and constitutional clauses ensured that the ZNP and its partners maintained a majority in the House of Representatives (Karume 2004, 3-5). The largely African-supported ASP seized control in a revolutionary coup on 11 January 1964, toppling the rule of the sultan and taking charge of the government through a Revolutionary Council. The ASP continued to rule Zanzibar after the islands' unification into the Union of Tanzania, until the 1977 merger between the ASP and Tanu formed the CCM.

In the early 1990s, with the unbanning of opposition political parties, the Civic United Front was formed on the platform of seeking greater autonomy for Zanzibar within the Union. The CUF drew on the same ethnic and economic groups as the old ZNP, and was overwhelmingly popular in Pemba Island (Karume 2004, 6). The party's platform of greater autonomy for Zanzibar heightened tensions between the CUF and CCM, who accused the CUF of inciting secessionist agendas on the islands. The 1995 election results were announced under a cloud of complaints and irregularities, suggesting that the CUF had won the popular vote, but due to the constituency-based, winner takes all system in place for the elections, the CCM won a slender majority in the House of Representatives (see section on election results). The closely contested nature of the elections heightened tensions between the two parties, as the CCM was forced to envisage a situation where the loss of control of the House of Representatives in Zanzibar could in a worst-case scenario see the opposition leading the islands away from the Union. The CUF persisted with its claims that the elections were neither free nor fair to the detriment of aid flows from the international community, exacerbating the political impasse.

This poisoned the political atmosphere ahead of the 2000 elections, creating a heightened climate of tension that was not addressed prior to the violent clashes witnessed during polling (Karume 2004, 17). However, the major flashpoint around the 2000 elections occurred in January 2001, when public protests by CUF supporters contesting the results of the 2000 elections culminated in widespread clashes with the security forces and led to the loss of life on both sides of between 60-100 persons, depending on whose reports one believes (Karume 2004, 19). This catastrophic loss of life precipitated intervention from the international community, and culminated in a negotiated settlement known as the Muafaka II Accord, signed between the two parties and outlining agreed reforms to the ZEC, the electoral system, and crucially, the conditions for the establishment of a permanent voters' register (PVR). These conditions were to be in force for the 2005 elections, with a Joint Presidential Supervisory Committee (JPSC) comprising members of both parties established to manage the implementation of the accords (Commonwealth Observer Group 2005, 12-13).

As a result of the Muafaka II Accord, observer groups to the 2005 elections noted the improved circumstances under which the elections took place, although most groups noted that the 2005 polls were by no means completely satisfactory, with considerable room for improvement. However, the implementation of the Muafaka II Accord and the oversight of the JPSC increased the confidence of the CUF in the legitimacy of the process, and although incidences of violence were noted, these were significantly reduced in comparison to the 2000 elections and their aftermath. In the wake of the 2005 elections, some stakeholders have called for a fresh Muafaka II Accord, based on the success of the previous document in creating improved conditions for elections in Zanzibar. However, currently no such agreement exists (Tanzanian Election Monitoring Committee 2005, 108-113).

References

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP 2005 Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania - 30 October 2005: Report, [www] http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/39079/ 152078/147130/zanzibar__united_republic_of_tanzania.htm [PDF document, opens new window] (accessed 23 Feb 2010).

KARUME, S 2004 Dilemmas of Political Transition: Towards Institutionalisation of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania [PDF document]. EISA Research Report No. 7.

TANZANIAN ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE 2005 The 2005 Elections in Tanzania: Report of the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee.