Zanzibar: The October 2000 Elections

Extracted from: "Zanzibar" IN Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa (2002), edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David Pottie, EISA, 413-416.

Following the 1995 election controversy and the political stalemate on the islands the western donor community froze development assistance to Zanzibar until political reforms were initiated. During the aid freeze Zanzibar received only US $2 million from Gulf states and many development projects involving education, health, water, roads and ports were stalled. Growth and income levels subsequently contracted in the islands.

In June 1999 CCM [Chama cha Mapinduzi], CUF [Civil United Front] and the Commonwealth signed an agreement on the political tensions in Zanzibar. The parties agreed to work for reconciliation. CUF ended its boycott of the House of Representatives and agreed to recognise the legitimacy of Amour's presidency. The agreement included a commitment, to reform the ZEC [Zanzibar Electoral Commission], to harmonise electoral laws, to enhance the independence of the judiciary, and to encourage equitable use of the publicly owned media. However, despite this agreement, political tensions continued in the islands, threatening to flare up as the parties approached election day. For example, during the election campaign CUF claimed that their party was repeatedly denied equitable access to public media. As a result they filmed their own rallies and distributed the tapes to their members for viewing elsewhere in Zanzibar.

Another longstanding contention between CUF and CCM was the arrest and detention, for over three years, of 18 members of CUF, on charges of treason following the 1995 elections. CUF also complained that police frequently banned their rallies on the pretext that violence would erupt. Amnesty International called for their immediate release and called upon the international community to closely monitor human rights violations in Zanzibar.

From August 2000 over 45 CUF members were detained following clashes with members of the CCM and running battles with police. CUF adopted the motto 'a tooth for a tooth" (jino kwajino in Swahili) and said that it would not accept defeat without a fight. The pre-election political environment in Zanzibar was therefore marked by a high degree of tension and uncertainty as well as charges and counter-charges from both the CUF and CCM as to what would occur on election day. At the same time, political leaders of all parties also issued public appeals for peace during the polls.

Zanzibar plays a significant role in the Tanzanian National Assembly, with 50 of the 231 seats for the 2000 elections. Zanzibar's relative over-representation in the National Assembly when measured by population is striking. On the mainland there were 9.6 million registered voters for 181 seats whereas only 440 000 voters in Zanzibar elected 50 seats. Thus, on average a national assembly seat from the mainland may represent 53 000 voters whereas a seat from Zanzibar represents only 8 800 voters; a dramatic difference in the number of votes required to win a seat in Zanzibar. The historic union of the two parts of the republic explains this relative disproportion in Zanzibar's favour.

The presidential elections for 2000 were conducted under slightly changed rules from the 1995 elections. As a result of a January 2000 constitutional amendment the winning candidate was the person who received the greatest number of votes rather than a majority .In the event of a tie, only the candidates who were tied could stand in a second ballot.

Voter registration on the mainland took place during 8-29 August and from 8-21 August on Zanzibar. Two main sources of difficulty were responsible for the ongoing suspicion of the voters roll. First, voter registration was based on population projections from the 1988 census, placing the country's total population at 31.27 million in July 1999. The country's age structure would indicate that nearly 60% of the population were aged 15 years or older. As such, the estimated size of the electorate at 10 317 891 appeared to be an underestimate. Second, the lack of a national identification document and the absence of a photograph on the voter registration certificate led to accusations that the system was open to fraud. It was maintained that registration certificates could be bought and sold and used by a person other than the one who registered. CCM and CUF accused one another of bringing ineligible voters to boost their relative support. An additional source of complaint was that copies of the voters roll were not available for public inspection or were incomplete. On the northern Zanzibar island of Pemba, both CUF members and domestic observers reported that civil servants were forced to disclose their registration numbers to the local authorities. According to some domestic election observers in Zanzibar, the failure to adequately establish the total number of eligible voters on the island, and irregularities in the posting of the voters roll provided the opportunity for both CCM and CUF to "import" ineligible voters on election day. Without this information it was impossible to check if the total number of voters exceeded the number of registered voters. In sum, the voter registration process was neither transparent nor credible.