Zambia: Human Rights Commission

Updated December 2009

Note: See also CHEWE-CHANDA, A 2009 Promoting the Effectiveness of Democracy Protection Institutions in Southern Africa: The Commission for Investigations and the Permanent Human Rights Commission in Zambia [PDF document], EISA Research report No 43.

The Human Rights Commission (HRC) is established by the Constitution and its mandate articulated in the Human Rights Commission Act of 1996. It is tasked with the investigation of human rights violations and maladministration of justice and must propose remedies to prevent human rights abuses. It also mediates for victims of human rights abuse and acts as a spokesperson for detainees. The commission may investigate on its own initiative or on receipt of complaints or allegations by individuals or groups, to others acting on their behalf. However, its findings lead only to recommendations which have no legal force, although the government and its agencies are expected to act on them (Lumina 2006) .

The Human Rights Commission grew out of a commission of inquiry formed by President Chiluba in May 1993 to investigate human rights violations by past governments. The Munyama Commission, headed by prominent lawyer Bruce Munyama, held public hearings throughout the country and, among other things, exposed the use of torture in secret detention centres throughout the country. Among the conclusions of the Munyama Commission was a recommendation that a Human Rights Commission be established. Following on the Munyama Commission's suggestion, in 1996 the government made amendments to the constitution to provide for the establishment of a permanent Human Rights Commission under Article 125 (Human Rights Watch 2001).

The commission consists of a chairperson who has held the position of a judge and five other commissioners, appointed by the President. The presidential appointments are ratified by parliament. The tenure of office is three years, which is renewable, subject to presidential and parliamentary approval. The first commissioners were appointed for periods ranging between one and three years, in order to facilitate retirement by rotation. The commissioners are all full time and are appointed on government conditions. Apart from the chair, whose security of tenure is guaranteed by virtue of being a judge, other commissioners have no security of tenure.

Although appointments of commissioners must be ratified by parliament, there was uproar over the haste and the lack of transparency that characterised the appointment and parliamentary approval process of the first commission in 1997. The speed with which the appointments process of the commissioners was finalised fuelled suspicions that the establishment of the Human Rights Commission was intended to placate donor concerns about the human rights situation in the country in the hopes of restoring aid flows. At the outset, a concern by the human rights community and the political opposition was that most of the commissioners had no human rights credentials or records of commitment to human rights. Of greater concern was that as presidential appointees, the new commissioners may not have the authority to assert their independence from the government (Human Rights Watch 2001).

The commission receives an allocation in the government budget like all other regular government departments. However, since its inception, the government has not provided the Commission with an adequate budget or facilities required to undertake the mandated tasks. As a result of the lack of a resource base, the commission has been unable to attract or retain high calibre and skilled personnel. The commission also receives international support, which tends to be on a project by project basis. The Norwegian government funded the refurbishment of the commission's offices. Donor support for the commission's work waned somewhat after the initial year. This could be attributed both to the standard donor inattention with regard to the long-term growth of these commissions as well as to specific reservations about the dynamism of the Zambian Human Rights Commission.

To their credit, the commission members have attempted, amid inadequate resources and weak powers, to genuinely address some human rights issues. The commission has dealt with a substantial number of labour, marital, employment and tenant complaints. Its advocacy work on prison conditions has been useful in highlighting the appalling conditions that prisoners are subjected to. Following the October 1997 coup attempt, the Human Rights Commission showed commendable initiative, in the face of executive displeasure, by publicly condemning the government's use of torture and organising medical assistance for the torture victims. As a result, the Human Rights Commission has garnered greater respect among some Zambians for its interventions (Human Rights Watch 2001).

However, the effectiveness of the PHRC is compromised in many respects. It is reportedly under-resourced, has limited powers and authority, and is answerable to the organisation under investigation (Berg 2005) . The PHRC oversaw human rights committees in all provincial capitals, interceded on behalf of persons whose rights it believed were denied by the government, and spoke on behalf of detainees and prisoners. In 2006 the PHRC opened a new office in Livingstone; however, independent human rights groups complained that the PHRC was understaffed, underfinanced, and lacked sufficient authority to enforce its recommendations (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2007) .

At heart, the commission is still a weak body that is unable and/or unwilling to effect change on some of the more serious patterns of government abuse that occur in Zambia. Extra judicial killings and other abuse by police receive only intermittent attention from the commission as does the intimidation by government agents and ruling party cadres against the independent media and the nongovernmental human rights community. Serious questions remain about the ability of the commission to take to task the executive branch and its agencies and to remedy many known human rights violations.

The limitations of the commission are largely due to weaknesses in its founding statute. There are mixed opinions as to whether this is due to legislative oversight or actual design on the part of the former Chiluba government. The lack of enforcement powers is a major impediment that hamstrings the commission's ability to anything more than make recommendations with little or no meaningful impact. At the same time, some of the limitations appear to be coming from within the Human Rights Commission itself. There is evident caution by the commissioners as a collective to follow up on initial recommendations that are rejected by the government or to touch on more politically sensitive abuses by the government. The lack of enforcement powers has resulted on occasion in a more conciliatory approach being adopted than perhaps is necessary on the grounds that the government may respond more positively (Human Rights Watch 2001).

Official web site

Human Rights Commission: [www] http://www.hrc.org.zm/ [opens new window] (accessed 9 Mar 2010).

References

BERG, J 2005 Overview of Plural Policing Oversight in Southern African Development Countries, Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, [www] http://www.policeaccountability.co.za/Publications/Pub-Categories.asp?PubCatID=15 [opens new window] (accessed 9 Mar 2010).

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006: Zambia.

CONSTITUTION OF ZAMBIA 1996, [www] http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/ZM/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%201996.pdf/at_download/file [PDF document, opens new window] (accessed 9 Mar 2010).

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2001 Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa.

LUMINA, C 2006 Police Accountability and Policing Oversight Mechanisms in the Southern African Development Community, Institute for Security Studies. ASR 15 No.1.