Swaziland: Demise of democracy and the consolidation of autocracy (1968-1986)

Update July 2008

The first government of King Sobhuza II was headed by a member of the royal family, Prime Minister Prince Makhosini Dlamini, the leader of the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM); the cabinet consisted overwhelmingly of aristocrats, while a white finance minister reflected settler interests and some members of the cabinet were businessmen or professionals (Levin 1997, 84). The government thus largely reflected the power that had been accumulated by the monarchy and the traditional aristocracy and excluded the growing middle and working classes that had voted for the opposition and the peasants who had provided the INM with its overwhelming victory (Booth 1983, 65). At independence Swaziland joined the UN, the Commonwealth and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Throughout the Cold War Swaziland allied itself with the West and had close ties with the USA and the UK and maintained diplomatic relations with Israel and Taiwan, receiving development aid from those countries (Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1159).

The choice of a white as minister of finance was aimed at soothing the fears of foreign investors, who were woed by the King and senior INM politicians in the run-up to Independence, and the stable climate in the period that followed investment flows continued, primarily from South Africa (Levin 1997, 84; Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1155). Between 1977 and 1982 real GDP grew by an average of 3% per year (McLoughlin & Mehra 1988, 661). Economic growth was bought at the price of restricted room for political and economic manoeuvre because of the dominance of South Africa in the Customs Union and South African capital in the economy (Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1155). Inflation trends followed those in South Africa, with consumer prices rising by an average of 12% per year between 1979 and 1984 (McLoughlin & Mehra 1988, 669).

Labour policy after independence continued to privilege the interests of industry owners over those of workers, for union activity remained tightly controlled, the grievance (indvuna) system that had resulted in the 1963 strikes was reintroduced and state-established wage boards were dominated by government and management (Levin 1997, 89). Workers' bargaining power was further eroded as population growth and urbanisation led to ever increasing levels of unemployment (Booth 1983, 72). The number of registered unions declined from 15 to nine; employers preferred to work through works councils, while the aristocracy favoured the indvuna system and the state discouraged trade unionism (Levin 1997, 87, 88; Macmillan 1989, 306, 307). As a result "Between 1969 and 1972 the real living standards of the working class declined significantly... More than half of the labour force was faced with constant or declining money wages" (Levin 1997, 95).

The government followed an aggressive policy of Africanisation in the public and private sectors and, concomitant to that, expanded the educational system rapidly, to broaden its support in the middle classes (Booth 1983, 70; Levin 1997, 94). The government announced in 1970 that it had achieved 85% of its goals in terms of indigenisation of the public sector (Booth 1983, 70). New schools were built and teacher training was increased (Booth 1983, 58). Between 1968 and 1980 the number of primary schools increased by 26%, while the number of secondary schools increased by 165% in the same period (Booth 1983, 57). Child enrolment at primary schools expanded by 80% in this time and secondary school enrolment by 165% (Booth 1983, 57; Levin 1997, 94). Primary teacher employment increased by 102% and secondary by 457% (Booth 1983, 57). In 1973 the University College of Swaziland opened (Booth 1983, 56). The policy of Africanisation and educational expansion led to declines in standards in the civil service and examination pass rates for students (Booth 1983, 58, 70). Even so the growth of the education sector could not keep pace with population growth (Booth 1983, 58).

In August 1968 Sobhuza issued a royal charter establishing Tibiyo Taka Ngwane to manage the investment of earnings from mineral rights invested in the King 'in trust for the nation', which became, with Tisuka Taka Ngwane, a tool for large scale domestic capital formation and the enrichment of the ruling elite, especially the royal family (Levin 1997, 86; Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1155; Macmillan 1985, 664). The income from mineral rights was augmented by loans facilitated by the UN and the Commonwealth and used in joint ventures, share acquisitions and land purchases to create ventures that were run as private firms (Levin 1997, 85, 86; Macmillan 1989, 306, 307). The operations of Tibiyo Taka Ngwane were not made accountable to Parliament and were not open to public scrutiny (Levin 1997, 86). In 1971 the National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland (NIDCS) was established to attract foreign investment and accelerate industrial development (Levin 1997, 95).

The issue of land was a major post-independence priority, since at that point only 56% of the land was held "in trust for the nation" by the King (Booth 1983, 31, 65). A continual grievance, unresolved as yet, was the loss of huge tracts Swazi territory to the Boers in the 19th century, which later became part of South Africa (Booth 1983, 70). Europeans owned almost all of the title deed land, the most productive and best developed part of the country, and the selling prices for this land was greatly inflated by speculative activities (Booth 1983, 71; Levin 1997, 94). The British government refused to finance the repurchase of the land (Booth 1983, 71). The Land Speculation Control Act of 1972 attempted to make this land available for Swazi purchase by bringing down the prices through control measures that included a control board to govern land sales to non-Swazi citizens and the confiscation of the portion of a land sale regarded as the result of speculation (Levin 1997, 94; Booth 1983, 71). The settlers vigorously opposed the measures since they threatened a collapse in land values in the short term and increased the risks involved in capital investment for future economic development over the longer term (Booth 1983, 71).

These fears did not materialise since the Land Control Board did not hamper sales to foreign investors and capital continued to flow in, but it did not benefit the land-hungry peasantry, who still could not afford to buy land, but rather Tibiyo Taka Ngwane and small numbers of Swazi capitalist farmers (Booth 1983, 71; Levin 1997, 86, 94). By 1983 Swazi Nation Land formed about 60% of all land, 23% was owned by government ministries or Tibiyo Taka Ngwane and 17% was in foreign hands (Booth 1983, 91). Since the bulk of the population was rural and concentrated on the Swazi Nation Land, in 1970 the Rural Development Areas Programme was initiated to improve the income of peasants on Swazi National Land by adding elements of commercial production to subsistence farming, with financial aid from Britain, the World Bank and other donors (Levin 1997, 124, 126). Despite large investments only marginal gains were made at very high costs and the project wound down in 1984 (Levin 1997, 127 Booth 1983, 70).

In the year proceeding the 1972 election the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) split over plans to centralise leadership and make Dr Ambrose Zwane president for life, but Zwane managed to gain control over the main faction (Booth 1983, 70; Levin 1997, 95). Tensions also emerged within the ruling INM between modernisers and traditionalists (Booth 1983, 70). The elections were won by the INM who took 21 seats, but the Mpumalanga constituency, with its high numbers of farm workers, small farmers and middle class voters, was won by the Zwane faction of the NNLC which gave them the remaining three seats (Levin 1997, 96; Booth 1983, 72, 73. See May 1972 General Election for more detail). As economic growth would see the rise of these classes as a proportion of voters in the future, this outcome was regarded as a threat to the long term power of the monarchy and hegemony of the aristocracy; the hostility of Sobhuza to multi-party democracy, mollified by overwhelming victory of the INM in 1967, was revived (see 1967 Pre-independence General Election) (Booth 1983, 72, 73).

On 25 May, five days after the election, an NNLC Member of Parliament was served with an order of deportation, as an undesirable alien, and matters were quickly escalated into a full scale constitutional crisis (Levin 1997, 96; Booth 1983, 73; Macmillan 1989, 307, 308). In the High Court the NNLC obtained an order declaring him a citizen, so Parliament passed an amendment in November creating a Tribunal through which his citizenship was revoked, but the Appeal Court declared the amendment unconstitutional (Levin 1997, 96, 97; Booth 1983, 73; Macmillan 1989, 307, 308). On 12 April 1973, over the protests of the NNLC, Parliament passed a motion that "called on the king to devise ways and means of dealing with the crisis" (Levin 1997, 100) and then members decamped to the royal palace at Lobomba (Levin 1997, 100; Macmillan 1985, 665; Proctor 1973, 287). There Sobhuza met them and granted their request by suspending the constitution, dismissing Parliament and assuming all power, legislative, executive and judicial (Booth 1983, 73; Levin 1997, 100; Proctor 1973, 287). He furthermore proclaimed that he would rule by decree in council with the cabinet and that all political parties, meetings and public activities were banned (Booth 1983, 73; Levin 1997, 100).

A decree was issued providing for a 60 day detention without trial, renewable as frequently "as deemed necessary in the public interest" (Levin 1997, 100. A further decree settled the citizenship issue: Citizenship could be acquired only by allegiance to a chief (ukukhonta), thus "hardening the distinction between the Swazi of Swaziland and the Swazi of South Africa, and increased the insecurity of people of marginal status" (Macmillan 1989, 307, 308)). This was followed by the detention of four of the leaders of the NNLC, including Zwane, who was then forced into exile and allowed to return on condition that he abjure politics (Booth 1983, 73; Levin 1997, 105, 147). In the period that followed opposition leaders were co-opted, silenced or forced into exile (Booth 1983, 74). The elimination of political opposition led to industrial and social unrest. A march by striking railway workers in 1975 was broken up with tear gas by police, a dispute over teachers' salaries in October 1977 led to student boycotts and riots that were suppressed by riot police and mass arrests, as was a violent strike by sugar workers in 1978 (Booth 1983, 75).

Nevertheless, having neutralised the NNLC and removed all vehicles of public participation in political life, the monarchy was free to mould the constitutional order more to its liking (Levin 1997, 147, 105). In the meanwhile "the state became increasingly centralised and undemocratic. State power became personalised, centering on King Sobhuza II who came to occupy a special place in the hearts and minds of most Swazis" (Levin 1997, 103). A constitutional commission was appointed by the King in September 1973, packed with members of the government and the aristocracy, which finally returned its report five years later (Booth 1983, 76; Levin 1997, 105). Its recommendations were enshrined in the 1978 "Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland" King's Order-in-Council (Levin 1997, 104, 107). The order established resembled that of the suspended constitution except that political parties were to remain banned and the members of the House of Assembly would be indirectly elected; at tinkhundla level voters would elect delegates to a an electoral college that would elect members to the House of Assembly and Senate from among themselves in secret (Levin 1997, 107; Booth 1983, 76; Macmillan 1985, 665). The process was to be overseen by an electoral committee appointed by the King, candidates were vetted by the King and were not permitted to campaign and voting was public and not secret (Levin 1997, 107; Booth 1983, 76). "Parliament's role was limited to debating government proposals and advising the king" (Booth 1983, 76). Subsequently, an election was held in terms of this system See Tinkhundla elections, 1978-1993 for more information). Macmillan & Levin (2007, 1156) observe that by King Sobhuza's diamond jubilee in 1981 his authority was absolute.

Relations with South Africa proved to be difficult for Sobhuza and his successors after Mozambique's independence in 1975 as the royal family had to balance its traditional sympathy for the banned African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) with the overwhelming economic and military power of apartheid South Africa. In 1977, after a meeting between Sobhuza and ANC president Oliver Tambo, the ANC was permitted to establish a low-key diplomatic presence and by 1979 Swaziland had become a major corridor for smuggling guerrillas between South Africa and Mozambique and back again (Levin 1997, 169). These activities worried Swazi functionaries and the ANC was placed under pressure to reduce its operations (Levin 1997, 169). Nevertheless Swaziland sought closer ties with the frontline states, joined the Southern African Development Coordination Conference and aligned its stances with those of the OAU (Levin 1997, 168).

This provoked the wrath of the South African government, and along with other states in the region, Swaziland became the target of military and clandestine operations, beginning in June 1980 when South African agents bombed two ANC houses in Manzini and followed by a kidnapping in February 1981, an ambush in December 1981 and a landmine operation in 1982 (Booth 1983, 117, 118; Levin 1997, 169). Under these conditions the Swazis were forced to review their position and come to terms with South Africa. South African military pressure was accompanied by offering Swaziland a deal by which Swaziland would receive South African territory in exchange for signing a security pact, which was undertaken in February 1982, but only implemented with earnest after the King's death (Levin 1997, 170; Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1160).

King Sobhuza II died on 21 August 1982 and his death signaled the revival of another traditional Swazi custom, that of jockeying for positions of wealth and power amongst the ruling elite during the period of the regency (Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1156; Levin 1997, 148). Sobhuza had designated Queen Dzeliwe as regent with support of a 16 member liqoqo (National Council) and Prince Soziso as the "authorised person" to represent her before it (Booth 1983, 78). The factions involved in the Byzantine power struggle that ensued revolved around personal issues and cut across corporate centres of power (Levin 1997, 148). In March 1983, as a result of struggles within the inner circles of the ruling elite the Prime Minister, Prince Mabandla, was reluctantly dismissed from office by Queen Dzeliwe under pressure from members of the liqoqo; she in turn, because of her reluctance, was ousted in August by Prince Sozisa and replaced by the mother of Prince Makhosetive, Queen Ntfombi, and Makhosetive was also designated heir to the throne by the liqoqo (Levin 1997, 150, 152-156; Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1156).

The supporters of Mabandla and Dzeliwe were purged from all organs of state and signs of popular unrest suppressed through detentions, but conflict within the elite and social unrest continued leading to a purge of the cabinet in June 1984 and retaliatory accusations of financial misappropriation against members of the liqoqo (Levin 1997, 157-162). In August 1984 Sozisa was suspended as Authorised Person and more arrests followed, but in June 1985 a mass march of members of the royal family on parliament was held to protest against the actions of the liqoqo (Levin 1997, 162-164). As a result of the protest the liqoqo was purged and was downgraded to an advisory body, its opponents were released from detention and key members that had been removed were then brought to trial (Levin 1997, 165-166; Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1156).

The unseemly power struggle within the ruling elite, and popular perception of endemic corruption in the highest circles of state, dissipated the aura that Sobhuza had built up around the monarchy, which would, in any case, have been difficult to sustain, built as it was on his charisma and legitimated by the personality cult around him (Levin 1997, 110). In the middle of 1983 students, intellectuals and trade unionist assembled to form a loose coalition of popular organisations, the People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) (Levin 1997, 181). In August pamphlets appeared denouncing the dismissal of Queen Dzeliwe and student led protest marches occurred (Levin 1997, 197). In August 1984 at the University of Swaziland the detention of the members of the Students' Representative Council led to boycotts that escalated into conflict between the University Council and the cabinet over how the students were to be dealt with (Levin 1997, 197-199). On 1 January 1985 PUDEMO was launched clandestinely, an Executive Committee was elected and a People's Manifesto, reminiscent of the ANC's Freedom Charter was adopted (Levin 1997, 195-197).

In June 1982 the South African government announced that the KaNgwane apartheid Swazi ethnic "homeland" would be reincorporated into Swaziland (Booth 1983, 119-121; Macmillan 1989, 289). This was a strip of land on the along Swaziland's west and northern borders with a population of 250 000 people, almost half of whom had been forcibly moved there, and no economic base. Also to be transferred was the Ngwavuma district of northern Natal which had a population of about 135 000, mainly Tsonga people (Booth 1983, 119-121; Macmillan 1989, 289). The purpose was to denationalise black South Africans in furtherance of the apartheid policy, to obtain Swazi complicity in this and to create a greater Swazi buffer zone along major ANC infiltration routes from Mozambique. In September 1982 the Appeal Court of South Africa blocked the transfer of Ngwavuma and in the end the South African government withdrew the offer (Booth 1983, 119-121; Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1160).

In December 1982 the Swazi government arrested about 40 ANC members at placed them in detention (Booth 1983, 117, 118; Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1160). In March 1984, following the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique, the secret security pact of Swaziland with South Africa was made public and an earnest attempt was made to suppress the activities of the ANC in Swaziland (Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1160). More than 400 ANC members were detained and gun battles in April between ANC cadres and Swazi security forces broke out that, in the words of Levin (1997, 171), "resembled a small scale war". The ANC in Swaziland went underground and regrouped and during 1985 was able to establish an extensive network in the country (Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1160; Levin 1997, 175).

References

BOOTH, AR 1983 Swaziland: Tradition and Change in a Southern African Kingdom, Boulder, New York, 1983.

LEVIN, R 1997 When the sleeping grass awakens: land and power in Swaziland, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg.

MACMILLAN, H 1985 "Swaziland: Decolonisation and the Triumph of 'Tradition'", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 23(4), December, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/160683 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

MACMILLAN, H 1989 "A Nation Divided? The Swazi in Swaziland and the Transvaal, 1865-1986" IN Vail, L (ed) The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, University Of California Press, [www] http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft158004rs& chunk.id=d0e7328&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e7328&brand=eschol [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

MACMILLAN, H & LEVIN, R 2007 "Swaziland: Recent History" IN Frame, I (ed) Africa South of the Sahara 2008, Routledge.

MCLOUGHLIN, PM AND MEHRA, R 1988 "Swaziland's Macro-Economic Development Environment", Journal of Modern African Studies, 26(4), December, 661-675, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/161325 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

PROCTOR, JH 1973 "Traditionalism and Parliamentary Government in Swaziland", African Affairs, 72(288), July, 273-287, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/719848 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).