Resurgence of Swaziland and the triumph of the aristocracy (1946-1968)

Updated July 2008

In the period after the Second World War the economy of Swaziland underwent rapid expansion and diversification as the result of massive foreign investment, primarily by South African and British firms (Macmillan 1989, 305; Booth 1983, 31, 32; Levin 1997, 57). This process was given further impetus by the victory of the National Party in South Africa which led to the relocation of firms and also by the investments made by the Colonial Development Corporation (Booth 1983, 31, 32; Levin 1997, 57). The development of rail infrastructure and massive irrigation networks led to large scale forestry projects and sugar and citrus farming as well as iron and coal mining; these in turn stimulated construction, light industry and tourism (Macmillan 1989, 305; Booth 1983, 31, 32). The internal demand for labour led to a decline in migrancy and labour was even drawn from neighbouring countries, so that the number of African foreigners increased by 152% to 3.4% of the population while the white population increased by 84.9% (Booth 1983, 31, 32; Macmillan 1989, 305; Kuper 1963, 77). A measure of the extent and rapidity of economic growth is that the poll tax, which had contributed more than 40% of government revenue in 1946, constituted only 5% by 1956 (Kuper 1863, 74).

A new element was introduced into the equation, when the Colonial Development Corporation included an interest in the Ushuthu Forest Project for the "Swazi Nation" (Levin 1997, 54). Moreover, the 1946 Native Land Resettlement Scheme was abandoned and land earmarked for Swazi use in 1944 became Swazi Nation Land in 1955 (Levin 1997, 52-54, 59). The boom also stimulated the entry of Swazis into retail, through the agency of the Swazi Commercial Amadoda, laid the foundation for the emergence of a substantial Swazi middle class closely tied to the royal family and the aristocracy (Macmillan 1985, 655; Levin 1997, 57). Nevertheless by 1963 settlers still owned 90% of the irrigated land and all of the mines (Kuper 1963, 75).

The 1950s also saw made in the development of siSwati as a national literary language with a seminal grammar published in 1952 and a draft orthography in 1956, but adoption of siSwati in schools was delayed until the language was further developed (Macmillan 1989, 302). Secondary education was expanded and by 1963 there were 300 schools for Swazis, primarily in mission hands subsidized by the government, while school enrolment had risen from 30% in 1945 to 55% in 1959 (Macmillan 1985, 656; Kuper 1963, 82, 83).

British policy had become increasingly opposed to the incorporation of Swaziland into the Union of South Africa; the ascendancy of the National Party in South Africa and the introduction of Apartheid made this unconscionable (Booth 1983, 32, 33; Levin 1997, 52). The policy of indirect rule moved in the direction of increasing the power and responsibilities of the monarchy and the chiefs and the colonial government became increasingly responsive to the wishes of King Sobhuza and the Swaziland National Council (SNC) (Booth 1983, 32, 33; Levin 1997, 52). The 1944 Native Administration Proclamation was revisited and replaced with that of 1950, which restored much of customary law powers of the King and the chiefs lost under King Bhunu (Booth 1983, 32, 33; Levin 1997, 52, 53). The Native Courts Proclamation of 1950 enabled the King, with the approval of the Resident Commissioner, to establish a Swazi court structure and system (Levin 1997, 53; (Booth 1983, 33). A further proclamation in 1950 established the Swaziland National Treasury with an independent revenue base, from which the royal family, chiefs and "Native Administration" officials were paid (Levin 1997, 53; Booth 1983, 33). The effect of all this was to greatly enhance the power and prestige of the monarchy and the aristocracy (Macmillan 1985, 649).

The next logical step was to further devolve power through a nationally constituted arrangement and the issue of constitutional development was raised by the colonial authorities in 1959 (Macmillan 1989, 305; 1985, 658). A series of discussions with the European Advisory Council (EAC) and the SNC followed, culminating in the appointment of a constitutional committee in November 1960 consisting of representatives of the government, the EAC and the SNC (Levin 1997, 61). Sobhuza was anxious to prevent changes that would shift power from the monarchy and the traditional aristocracy and was especially suspicious of mass-based political movements that might provide alternative centres of power, as happened elsewhere in post-war Africa(Macmillan 1985, 658). He proposed that the new legislature be equally constituted of settlers and Swazis, with each represented by members elected in its own traditional way, and that "Control over Swazi law and custom, as well as Swazi Nation land and minerals, would be vested in the King and Council" (Macmillan 1985, 658). The ironic consequence was that this proposal prompted the formation of a political party that posed just such a threat, The Swaziland Progressive Association, founded in 1929 and revived in 1949, transformed itself into the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) in 1960, much to Sobhuza's annoyance (Macmillan 1989, 302; 1985, 658; Levin 1997, 61). The SPP's three members on the constitutional committee, as SNS representatives, were quickly forced out (Levin 1997, 61, 62).

The constitutional committee's report was published in March 1962 and recommended the creation of a nine member executive council and a 24 member legislature; the first would comprise of the governor, three ex officio members an official and two Swazi and two white nominated members, while the latter would consist of 12 Swazis and 12 whites (Levin 1997, 62). It also recommended that Sobhuza's proposals on custom, minerals and land be adopted, which proved difficult for the colonial government and the settlers, resulting in prolonged period of negotiation (Levin 1997, 62, 63, 70; Macmillan 1989, 306, 307). Two constitutional conferences that were held in London in 1962 and 1963 failed resolve the impasse and in May 1963 the British imposed their own solution (Booth 1983, 66; Levin 1997, 70). They proposed that a Queen's Commissioner be vested with executive power, mineral rights and the right to nominate four of the 28 legislative seats, so as to deny either settlers or the King control; eight legislative seats would be "elected" through the traditional tinkhundla (chiefdoms grouped for age regiment mobilisation), eight Swazis would be elected on a national roll, four whites would be elected on a white roll and four whites would be elected on a national roll (Levin 1997, 71). This proposal displeased settlers and the Swazi aristocracy and common opposition drew them closer to one another (Booth 1983, 66; Levin 1997, 70, 71).

Political parties began to proliferate, split and merge. In February and again in August 1962 the SPP split and two of the factions with the bulk of its membership joined the African nationalist Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) formed in April 1963; the NNCL advocated a democratic constitutional monarchy and independence for the Kingdom (Levin 1993, 63, 64; Macmillan 1989, 306). The conservative Swaziland Democratic Party was formed to represent the middle-classes and opposed the Africanism of the NNLC, favouring instead an alliance with the settlers (Levin 1997, 64; Kuper 1963, 80). The Mbandzeni Party and the Convention Party merged in July 1962 to form the Mbandzeni National Convention (MNC), which attempted to straddle the divide between those supporting monarchial absolutism and those desiring a constitutional monarchy, while espousing African nationalism (Levin 1997, 64, 1965). The diversity of parties reflected the increasing class complexity of Swaziland and the diversity of interests that had emerged as the consequence of sustained socio-economic development, but also presented a challenge to the hegemony of the emerging aristocracy-settler alliance (Booth 1983, 65; Macmillan 1985, 658).

The post-war boom leveled off in the early 1960s and with the mechanization of agriculture and a rising population transformed the labour shortage became a surplus (Booth 1983, 32). Firms responded by freezing wages and cutting other incentives and the traditional method of voicing worker's grievances, through local representatives of the King (tindvuna), failed to adequately express worker's demands so that an increasingly militant trade union movement began to emerge culminating in a series of strikes in 1962 and 1963 (Booth 1983, 32; Macmillan 1989, 306). The NNLC, whose leaders had close ties with the banned African National Congress of South Africa and South African Communist Party, sought to exploit the situation by forming an alliance with the striking workers and called a general strike in their support on 9 June 2003 (Macmillan 1985, 658; Levin 1997, 67). Sobhuza and the government alike felt the situation slipping from their hands so a state of emergency was declared and British troops rushed in from Kenya to quell the unrest; the emergency remained in force for the next five years and trade union activity was progressively curtailed (Booth 1983, 32).

The government blamed the SNC for the failure of the indvuna system, while the SNC blamed foreigners for stirring unrest (Macmillan 1989, 306). The settlers, for their part, were impressed by the King's handling of the strike in general, and his anti-trade unionism in particular, and the two parties drew even closer to one another, but the government and foreign capital favoured the emergence of trade unions that were orientated to shop-floor rather than political issues and the politicization of the strike was condemned by all (Levin 1997, 69, 70). The leadership of the NNLC was bogged down in litigation as a result of trumped up charges, its organizational ability was seriously weakened and it was all but bankrupted (Levin 1997, 70).

In January 1964, in opposition to the democratic aspects of the imposed constitution and its marginalisation of the monarchy, Sobhuza called a referendum. Though it was boycotted by the political parties, in it the constitution was overwhelmingly (98.87%) rejected by voters; the British disregarded the referendum and decided to press ahead with the election in June (Levin 1997, 72; Macmillan 1985, 659). The validity of the referendum as a test of Swazi views was doubtful, for the entire process was managed by the SNC from start to finish, including the campaign and mobilisation of voters, as well as the poliing and the tally of the final results (Potholm 1966, 315).

Under pressure from the aristocracy and the settlers, and against the opposition of the colonial authorities, the King and the SNC formed the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) in April 1964 to contest the election, while the settlers formed the United Swaziland Association (USA) (Macmillan 1989, 306). The INM's victory was overwhelming, for it won all eight elective seats with 85.47% of the vote, they received the eight tinkhundla seats from the SNC and they won one of the white seats; their USA allies took a further six seats (Macmillan & Levin 2007, 1155; Booth 1983, 66; see 1964 Election for details). The NNCL won 12% of the vote while the SPP and the SDP took the rest, but none of these parties won any seats (Booth 1983, 66). In view of its poor showing, the SDP leadership dissolved the party and joined the INM; the SPP had performed even worse than the SDP and was a spent force (Macmillan 1989, 306; Levin 1997, 74; Potholm 1966, 317, 318) for some indicative figures). The MNC disbanded before the election to join the INM (Potholm 1966, 318).

The 1964 election provided Sobhuza with the leverage to exclude the NNLC from the constitution making process and to vigorously pursue his constitutional agenda (Booth 1983, 68; Macmillan 1985, 662, 663). Furthermore he was determined that the future constitution would not include special seats reserved for whites, and despite opposition from the USA, he was able to convince both international and local capital and the majority of settlers that such special protection of their interests was unnecessary (Levin 1997, 74-76; Booth 1983, 69). Indeed, at this time whites formed only around 3.6% of the population (Potholm 1966, 315).

The constitution that was promulgated in February 1967 concentrated a great deal of power in the King's hands; he was given executive power and the right to appoint the Chief Justice, the Prime Minister was to be drawn from the largest party in Parliament, but acted in an advisory capacity to the King (Levin 1997, 78; Booth 1983, 69). Furthermore he was empowered to nominate six of the members of the House of Assembly (one fifth), while the remaining 24 members were to be elected from eight three member constituencies by universal adult franchise with each voter having three votes; the large size of the constituencies ensured that urban opposition strongholds could be combined with rural areas so as to dilute the force of their votes (Proctor 1973, 275; Booth 1983, 69). The Senate was to be composed of six nominees of the king and six members elected by the House of Assembly (Proctor 1973, 275). He was, however, prohibited from appointing members of parliament "so as to deny a majority to the party or coalition which had won most of the elected seats" (Proctor 1973, 275). The land tenure system was maintained, mineral rights were vested with the King and the government had no jurisdiction over matters related customary law (Booth 1983, 68; Macmillan 1985, 644). SiSwati was made an official language, along with English, and following year it was finally introduced at school (Macmillan 1989, 307). With the entrenchment of settlers' property right and the abolition of special seats for whites the USA lost its raison d'être and disappeared as a political force (Booth 1983, 69).

Elections in terms of the new constitution were held in April 1967. The INM received 79,4% of the vote and won all 24 elective seats in the House of Assembly, the NNLC received 20.2% and two other parties the remaining 0.4% between them. All 24 seats went to the INM, but came close to winning Mphumalanga constituency with 47% of the vote there where it received strong support from urban voters and industrial workers (Booth 1983, 72. See The 1967 pre-independence general election for more details). On the 25 April Sobhuza was installed as King and on 6 September 1968 Swaziland finally attained its independence (Booth 1983, 69).

In the years leading up to independence there were indications that the swelling Swazi nationalism was taking on a chauvinistic exclusivism that was directed at foreign Africans (and not white settlers) who had been attracted into the economy by the post-war boom or came as refugees as a result of Apartheid South Africa's clampdown on African political movements and who were urbanized; they were often skilled workers some of whom had played a role in the emergence of the trade union movement (Macmillan 1989, 307). Though calls had been made to tighten up on immigration, the conflict between the colonial government and the SNC over the definition of "Swaziness" bedeviled efforts in this direction; the former believed that a long term of residence was a sufficient yardstick, while the latter insisted that only allegiance to a chief could make an African from elsewhere a Swazi and it was this position that triumphed after independence, with significant political, economic and financial consequences (Macmillan 1989, 307). No exception was made for Swazis from South Africa (Macmillan 1989, 307).

References

BOOTH, AR 1983 Swaziland: Tradition and Change in a Southern African Kingdom, Boulder, New York, 1983.

KUPER, H 1963 The Swazi: a South African kingdom, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York.

LEVIN, R 1997 When the sleeping grass awakens: land and power in Swaziland, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg.

MACMILLAN, H 1985 "Swaziland: Decolonisation and the Triumph of 'Tradition'", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 23(4), December, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/160683 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

MACMILLAN, H 1989 "A Nation Divided? The Swazi in Swaziland and the Transvaal, 1865-1986" IN Vail, L (ed) The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, University Of California Press, [www] http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft158004rs& chunk.id=d0e7328&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e7328&brand=eschol [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

MACMILLAN, H & LEVIN, R 2007 "Swaziland: Recent History" IN Frame, I (ed) Africa South of the Sahara 2008, Routledge.

POTHOLM, CP 1966 "Changing Political Configurations in Swaziland", Journal of Modern African Studies, 4(3), November, 313-322, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/159202 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

PROCTOR, JH 1973 "Traditionalism and Parliamentary Government in Swaziland", African Affairs, 72(288), July, 273-287, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/719848 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).