Sudan: Questions on the Southern Sudan referendum put to UNIRED Director Denis Kadima

Updated 27 January 2010

Question: As I understand it, the primary function of UNIRED was to provide UN technical and infrastructure support for the referendum process in the Sudan, and especially to the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC), and that it was Denis [Kadima]' function to direct the provision of this support. Is this understanding correct?

Answer: UNIRED (United Nations Integrated Referendum and Electoral Division) is an integrated team composed of staff drawn from UNMIS (United Nations Mission in the Sudan) and UNDP. UNIRED is led by UNMIS. I am the Director and Chief Technical Assistance. As such I coordinate all the support to the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC). UNIRED's role is broadly to support the referenda processes (e.i. Southern Sudan and Abyei) and residual elections left over from the April 2010 elections.

The Division is also responsible for the coordination of international efforts towards the holding of a credible referendum in Southern Sudan. The UN's support is multi-dimensional and includes technical advice, logistical support, financial assistance through the UNDP Basket Fund and security advice.

Question: Media reports in October and November suggested that the SSRC was driven by internal political conflicts and was dysfunctionally paralysed by the conflicts. As a result, the media reports stated, the preparations for the referendum were far behind schedule. Yet, by all accounts, the referendum was apparently conducted effectively and relatively efficiently. To what extent did these reports reflect the actual conditions on the ground?

Answer: The challenges faced by the SSRC at the time were part of a teething process experienced by a body whose operationalisation only begun in mid-September, including staff recruitment. This was a natural process. The Commission has now overcome most of these difficulties.

Question: What role did UNIRED play in resolving conflicts and in facilitating the functioning of the SSRC as a team?

Answer: The SSRC resolved its internal problem alone.

Question: Did UNIRED have to make a major input in order to overcome organisational and logistical roll out at the eleventh hour?

Answer: Yes. UNIRED used planes, helicopters and other means to deliver materials, including ballot papers, to the most remote areas and those inaccessible by road.

Question: What role did organisations such as IFES play?

Answer: IFES also provided technical assistance with funding from USAID. IOM (International Organisation for Migration) supported voting in the eight countries (Australia, Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, UK and USA). Technical assistance by both organisations (i.e. IFES and IOM) was largely coordinated by UNIRED.

Question: A more recent news report claimed that several areas reported voter turnouts way in excess of 100% and that the SSRC was "quarantining" results for areas with turnouts of over 105% for further investigation. How widespread is this problem at this point?

Answer: Not more than 1% of polling stations/referendum centres.

Question: Does this point to ballot box stuffing?

Answer: No.

Question: In view of the resounding vote for independence, does it really affect the credibility of the overall results?

Answer: No. The high turnout in the Southern Sudan Referendum reflects an enthusiastic interest in the process and is common for similar electoral events where major constitutional or sovereignty issues are to be decided. In addition the unusually short period between voter registration and polling contributed to the sustained interest by those who had registered and the extended polling period of 7 days allowed the registrants more than sufficient time to express this interest and cast their ballots.

In order to ensure the integrity of the process and in particular the credibility of the results the SSRC established data centers to verify all results before they were released. Included in the data entry process was a mechanism where any results that appeared to require investigation were immediately identified.

In the data center in Juba 32 cases were identified as requiring investigation in the field as most often votes cast was higher than registered voters by at least 5%. These cases were investigated by checking the registered voters for the centers in the field. The data held in the field, i.e. the voter registration books, is more accurate as it lists registered voters by name as opposed to the summary sent to the data center at the end of voter registration. In all cases it was found that the summary of registered voters sent to the data center at the end of voter registration was inaccurate and was less than the actual number of registered voters in the center. The investigation therefore revealed that in actual fact the number of votes cast was not in excess of the registered voters for the center.

Given the high number of voter registration summary forms received at the data center, at the end of voter registration, with noticeable clerical errors (approx 900 out of 2,638 referendum centre) it was inevitable that some forms would not be obviously erroneous but if investigated could prove to contain inaccuracies. The investigations of the results process, referred to above, has confirmed that this is the case. In all cases the investigation revealed the errors were clerical in nature and pertained to the voter registration data and not the recording of results. These errors were corrected.