South Africa: The presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008)
Updated February 2011
The transition of power from President Mandela to President Mbeki was smooth since it was foreseen well in advance, for as Vice President Thabo Mbeki had already been given charge of the day to day affairs of governance more than two years previously (Southall 1999, 10). He continued to include the IFP in government and retained the conservative macro-economic policies of his predecessor, winning support from the business community (Southall 1999, 10; Pillay 2008, 10). The government's economic policies placed strain on the relationship between the ruling the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and the other two members of the Tripart Alliance, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party, that almost led to its breakup in 2002 (Pillay 2006, 167). South Africa's policy with respect to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and its foreign policy with respect to Zimbabwe also came under attack, not only from COSATU and the SACP, but also from a wide range of civil society actors.
The impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic that that had swept the country in the 1990s was catastrophic for South Africans. Between 1996 and 2002 life expectancy at birth declined from 57 to 52.5 years and then further to 50.2 years in mid-2008 (London 2004, 1; SSA 2008, 6). Prevalence rates amongst people aged 15-45 climbed from 10.8% in 2001 to 18.1% in 2006 and was estimated at 18.8% in mid-2008 (WHO 2008, 4; SSA 2008, 6). The inaction of the government on the HIV/AIDS epidemic led the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), which was established in 1998 and focused initially on forcing multi-national drug companies to permit the importation of cheaper generic drugs, to mobilise South Africans to pressure the government to respond to the crisis (Robins & von Lieres 2004, 577). President Mbeki, however, questioned the scientific consensus that the HIV virus was the cause of AIDS, while the minister of Health asserted that the government could not afford to treat AIDS despite research that demonstrated that it was cheaper to treat the disease than the opportunistic infections arising from it (Robins & von Lieres 2004, 578). After a campaign to garner public support and litigation in the High and Constitutional Courts TAC was able to obtain orders forcing the reluctant government to roll out treatment, first for expectant mothers in December 2001 and then in November 2003 for the population at large (Robins & von Lieres 2004, 581; 582).
From 2000 onwards the rapid decline of the economy of Zimbabwe and increasing political repression there resulted in waves of refugees into South Africa and by 2008 there were around 3 millions Zimbabweans living in the country (see Zimbabwe: Dissent and repression (2000-2007); Solidarity Peace Trust 2007, 10-13; Steinberg 2008). The immediate response of President Mbeki was to attempt to secure international financial aid for Zimbabwe and to supply some aid from South Africa, rather than to confront Robert Mugabe over his lawless actions and their negative economic and social implications for South Africa, but this approach (termed "quiet diplomacy") attracted criticism both at home and abroad (Lodge 2004, 3, 8; McKinley 2004, 360). The South African government, however, continued to support Mugabe, accusing western countries of neo-colonialism and opposing efforts to impose political and economic sanctions, so that with the support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and South Africa Mugabe was able to continue his policies and Zimbabwe slid steadily towards economic ruin, social misery and authoritarian state sponsored terrorism (Lodge 2004, 4, 5; McKinley 2004, 360). The deteriorating situation led Mbeki to attempt to broker dialogue between the Zimbabwean government and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change in 2003 and he claimed, all evidence to the contrary, that the talks were making progress (Lodge 2004, 5, 6). From 2002 onwards both COSATU and the SACP condemned the actions of the Zimbabwean government for their violations of human rights and emiseration of the Zimbabwean people, but only in late 2004, when it became clear that the Zimbabwean dialogue was leading nowhere, did COSATU openly reject quiet diplomacy, once more heightening tension between the government and COSATU (Lodge 2004, 7; Solidarity Peace Trust 2007, 26; Gumede 2005, 148).
A number of violent White right wing extremist groups emerged in the new millennium, but for the most part the intelligence services and the police were able to neutralise them before they could execute their plans (Schönteich and Henri Boshoff 2003). However, a group called the Boeremag, some of its members officers in the Defence Force, managed to detonate seven bombs mainly on train lines in Soweto in October killing one person and causing R2 million in damage, while a Mosque and a Buddhist temple were also targeted; in November the group bombed a police building at an airport and a bridge (Schönteich and Henri Boshoff 2003). In the next few months the police arrested 23 people, 21 people were charged and the bombing ceased; at the time of writing their trial is still ongoing (Schönteich and Henri Boshoff 2003).
Elections were held on 14 April 2004, in which 77% of registered voters cast their ballots, returning the ANC to power with an increased majority of 69.7% compared with 66.4% in 1999 (see National results 2004 and 1999 National Assembly votes and seats by party). The Democratic Party (DP) gained support again, winning 12.4% as against 9.6% in 1999, while the New National Party (NNP) continued its precipitous decline, winning only 1.7% of the votes as compared with 6.9% in 1999 and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) continued its steady decline, down to 7% from 8.6% in 1999. The ANC won 45% on the vote in the Western Cape and took the NNP on as a junior coalition partner to form a government, while in KwaZulu-Natal it became the largest party in the Legislature for the firsts time and governed in coalition with the IFP again (see Provincial legislature results 2004). The other seven province were won by the ANC again, with increased majorities. Thabo Mbeki was elected President for a second term by the National Assembly.
Annual population growth continued to decline, but more rapidly as a result of the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic; it was 2.62% in 1992, 1.45% in 2001/2 and 0.82% in 2007/8 (Beinart 2001, 354; SSA 2008, 7). Since the plague afflicted Africans much more than other groups the shares of the different groups remained much the same in 2008 as they had been in 2001, in 2008 Africans were 79.2% of the population, Whites 9.2%, Coloureds 9% and Asians 2.6% (SSA 2008, 3; 2001, 4, 5).
Average annual real GDP growth rate rose from 1.8% between 1997 and 1999 to 3.4% between 2000 and 2003 and to 5.1% between 2004 and 2007; however growth fell off to 3.1% for 2008; the last quarter of the year and the first quarter of 2009 showed declines in real GDP as the global financial crisis made its impact and the economy went into recession (IMF 2008; SARB 2009, 1, 5). Average annual real GDP per capita growth rose from 0.2% between 1997 and 1999 to 2.2% between 2000 and 2003 and to 4.1% between 2004 and 2007 (IMF 2008). The Reserve Bank was able to keep inflation under 6% for the most part between 1999 and 2006, but in 2007 it rose to 7.2% and then to 11.5% in 2008 (SSA 2009b). Unemployment increased substantially from 19.5% in 1996 and peaked at 31% in 2003, before declining to 23.5% at the end of 2008 (SSA 2009a, xi; ASGISA 2008, 4). The fiscal discipline practiced by the government led to a fall in the proportion of government spending on the servicing of debt from 19% in the 2000/1 financial year to 9.5% in 2007/8 (McIntyre & van den Heever 2007, 85).
It emerged in 2002 that the popular Vice President, Jacob Zuma, was under investigation for fraud, and though the prosecuting authority declined to lay charges for lack of evidence in 2003, the judgement rendered at a trial of an associate of his led to his dismissal from the cabinet in 2005 and renewed investigations (Jolobe 2008, 5). However, the ANC's National General Council did not endorse Mbeki's decision, but gave Zuma their full support (Jolobe 2008, 5, 6). The stop-start investigation proceedings and the firing of Zuma as Vice president fuelled suspicions in the ANC that he was the victim of a plot to eliminate him as a potential rival to the increasingly unpopular Mbeki, whose autocratic style and centralisation of power in the presidency was resented by many within the ANC and in the Tripart Alliance (Pillay 2008, 9; Jolobe 2008, 4, 6). Matters came to a head at the ANC's 2007 Polekwane conference where Mbeki's attempt to obtain a third term as president of the party was resoundingly defeated; instead Jacob Zuma was elected president and Mbeki supporters were purged from the national leadership (Jolobe 2008, 6; Pillay 2008, 10).
In the meanwhile the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe became difficult to ignore, so that when opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and other opposition figures were beaten by police, the SADC felt obliged to act and in March 2007 Mbeki was appointed as a mediator between the government and the two main opposition parties, despite his previous failure in this role and his evident partiality towards Mugabe (Solidarity Peace Trust 2007, 13, 16). Nevertheless agreement on changes to the constitution and to the Electoral Act were agreed on and elections were held in March 2008, but when it became evident to Mugabe that he had lost the first round by a plurality to Tsvangirai, and would almost certainly lose the constitutionally mandated second round of elections to him by an absolute majority, Mugabe delayed the publication of the presidential results by the Electoral Commission and unleashed a massive campaign of abductions, beating and murder against the members of the opposition parties their supporters and members of non-governmental organisations (see Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and their aftermath). Once more the SADC dispatched Mbeki as mediator and in September 2008 a power sharing agreement was reached.
South African xenophobia towards immigrants from other African countries grew steadily as South Africa opened up to the continent manifested itself in sporadic attacks on foreigners (Williams, V 2008, 2). Church leaders, academics and human rights activists expressed concern on the matter, the South African Human Rights Commission called a consultative conference that set up a Roll-Back Xenophobia campaign and public hearings were held in 2004 that resulted in the proposal to government of measures to combat xenophobia; however, the proposals were not acted on (Williams, V 2008, 2, 3). A new wave of economic and political refugees from Zimbabwe in early 2008, fleeing the terror unleashed by Mugabe and the collapse of the economy there, added to the widespread perception that South Africa was being swamp by foreigners (Williams, V 2008, 4). In May 2008 the poorest urban settlements in South Africa were wracked by violence for two weeks as 35 000 foreigners were driven out, their belongings looted and their homes torched by mobs; 62 people, mainly foreigners, were killed, many women were raped and thousands returned to their home country, 26 000 to Mozambique alone (Nord 2008, 1; Steinberg 2008). The police were overwhelmed by the scale of the unrest and the army was sent into assist; over 1 300 people were arrested (Nord 2008, 1; Steinberg 2008). Many were able to return and rebuild their homes, some settled elsewhere in the city, but others, some 20 000 by June, were housed in temporary government created camps (Steinberg 2008). In July the government began evicting the refugees and dismantling the camps, but some 8 000 people refused to leave and the government cut-off assistance from the outside and cut their rations to force them out (Steinberg 2008).
In the wake of Mbeki's Polekwane defeat his supporters were ousted from leadership positions throughout the structures of the ANC and on 19 September 2008 the ANC's National Executive Committee requested his resignation as president, which was forthcoming two days later, and the party's Deputy President, Kgalema Motlanthe, was elected President by the National Assembly in his place on 25 September (Jolobe 2008, 3).
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