South Africa: Revolt, reform and repression (1976-1994)

Updated February 2011

From 1976 to 1994 South Africa was wracked by social and economic crises, by intensified polarisation between and within race groups and by rising levels of political violence that continued even after apartheid had collapsed. In 1976 the South African Students Movement (SASM), an outgrowth of the Black consciousness (BC) movement, organised a school boycott against the inequality in education and the introduction of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of instruction (Beinart 2001, 237). On 16 June 1976 massive demonstrations by school students were fired on, two were killed, and the students rioted (Bonner Undated). African and Coloured townships across the country erupted into protest and 93 people were killed by the police in the next two days (Bonner Undated; Beinart 2001, 237, 238). Work stayaways were organised and a year of action followed as the government declared a state of emergency and struggled to suppress the insurrection by force (Beinart 2001, 238). As many as 12 000 youths left the country and in 1977 Black consciousness (BC) organisations were proscribed, political leaders and trade unionists were detained or banned, and the BC theorist and leader, Steven Biko was tortured to death in police detention (Beinart 2001, 238).

The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) split repeatedly in exile and become increasingly ineffectual so the African National Congress (ANC) was the primary beneficiary of the influx of youths who fled into exile and they greatly strengthened Umkhonto we Siswe (MK; Beinart 2001, 231; Williams 2006, 25). The independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 brought South Africa and South West Africa into direct contact with independent African states and facilitated the effective infiltration of South West African People's Organisation combatants from Angola and by 1977 MK had infiltrated hundreds of guerrillas from Mozambique and engaged in rebuilding the building the ANCs underground and on attacks on symbolic targets such as police stations (Williams 2006, 25; Beinart 2001, 244; South African History Online 2006). The African trade union movement that had emerged in the early 1970s continued to grow and by the end of the decade were beginning to wring recognition as negotiation partners from employers, while two large federations emerged one non-racial and the other aligned with the BC movement (Beinhart 2001, 242). Recognising that it could not trammel the growing power of the unions, much less crush them, the government legalised them in 1979 and attempted to regulate them (Fedderke & Simkins 2006, 35; de St Jorre 1986, 540.

The security situation, from the National Party (NP) government's point of view had deteriorated rapidly, military conscription of White men was extended from one to two years in 1977 and the development of the arms industry accelerated so that by 1977, when the UN Security Council's arms embargo was made compulsory, South Africa was meeting 75% of its arms needs internally, by 1984, it was 95% and from 1972 began exporting arms (excluding sea vessels. Williams 2006, 26; Terrill 1984, 4). Under NP leader PW Botha South Africa became increasingly a militarised society that resorted to political and economic destabilisation of its neighbours to exacerbate their internal conflicts and to repeated military incursions to force them to expel the ANC and SWAPO from their territories (for details see Angola: First civil war (1975-1992), Mozambique: One-party rule, socialism and civil war (1975-1986), Lesotho: Military rule (1986-1993) and Zimbabwe: Reconciliation, unity and conflict (1980-1989)).

Average annual population growth declined from its peak of 3.14% in 1970 to 2.62% by 1992; the rate for Africans peaked in 1980 at 3.37% and then declined to 2.96% in 1991, while that of Whites peaked in 1951 and declined steadily to 0.98% in 1991 (Beinart 2001, 354). The White share of the population fell from 17.3% of the population in 1970 to 13.2% in 1991 and the African share rose from 70.4 % to 75.6% (Beinar 2001, 353). While urbanization of Whites and Indians continued a sedate progress (from the high 87% in 1970 to 91% and 96% respectively) that of Coloureds and African rose rapidly (74% to 83% and 49% to 58%). South Africa surpassed the 50% urbanization mark only in 1980 (54%).

Average annual GDP growth declined steadily from 2.8% in 1975-1980 to 0.89% in 1991-1995 (Lewis 1990, 24; IMF 2008). The combination of very low growth rates after 1980 and rising population levels translated into declining per capita income, which fell 18% between 1981 and 1994, and rising unemployment and underemployment (a 1987 estimate was 37%) affected all South Africans, but Africans more than others (Fedderke & Simkins 2006, 35; Savage 1987, 606, 607; Simon 1989, 190). Inflation averaged 14.7% between 1981 and 1994 (IMF 2008). Persistent budget deficits led to rising government debt and by 1991 interest on public debt was 21% of government expenditure (Giliomee 1995, 89). The White share of national income continued to fall from 71.9% in 1970 to 56.2% in 1985 while those of Africans rose from 28.1% to 42.3% in the same period and the shares of Coloureds and Indians also improved (Lewis 1990, 39). The gap between Whites and African earnings narrowed from R14.90 earned by Whites for every R1.00 earned by African to R8.10 for every R1.00 (Lewis 1990, 39). Unionization and improved skill levels for some Africans led to the emergence of a substantial property owning urban African class (Simon 1989, 190). Nevertheless living standards for most Africans deteriorated. In 1980 13% of South Africans had no income and by 1987 30% of metropolitan African households were below the poverty line as were 70% of those in the rural areas and homelands (Savage 1987, 604).

The deteriorating economic situation was due to in part to the accumulating economic inefficiencies of apartheid. Attempts to maintain control of Africans' movement and to develop the homelands as viable entities demanded ever increasing shares of national income, while absorbing ever more skilled workers into the growing bureaucracy (Lewis 1990, 17; Aron & Muellbauer 2001, 14; Giliomee 1995, 89). Apartheid education created a shortage of skilled labour on the one hand and a burgeoning population of African without marketable skills on the other. The first led to declining productivity and fuelled inflation and the second to growing unemployment and political unrest (Aron & Muellbauer 2001, 14; Lewis 1990, 17; Simon 1989, 190). Embargo fears led to import substitution through the development of uneconomical industries that was a further drain on national income and skills, as was increased security spending (Lewis 1990, 17; Aron & Muellbauer 2001, 14). After the 1976 Uprising immigration was restricted to an influx of whites from Zimbabwe, while highly skilled South African Whites began to flow out in waves as each new crisis emerged (Lewis 1990, 22)

Economic difficulties were deepened by a series of external shocks following rapidly one on the other. Foreign investors lost confidence in the economy and after 1976 investment rates declined to little more than was needed to replace capital that had depreciated (Aron & Muellbauer 2001, 14; Giliomee 1995, 88). In 1979 Iran stopped supplying oil trade and more expensive oil had to be sourced on the open market leading to further inflation (Fedderke & Simkins 2006, 35). In 1983 the value of the rand plummeted as the gold price fell and as investors withdrew (Aron & Muellbauer 2001, 11, 12). In 1985 American bankers declined to roll over South African debt and a further capital flight with a renewed decline in the rand followed (Aron & Muellbauer 2001, 11, 12; Giliomee 1995, 88). All this placed acute strains on the balance of payments and a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy followed resulting in economic stagnation and rising unemployment between 1986 and 1994 (Aron & Muellbauer 2001, 12).

The impact of the government's apartheid policies were immiserating for Black people. Between 1965 and 1985 860 400 people, mostly Coloureds and Indians but also many African and very few Whites, were moved to segregate urban areas (Simon 1989, 191). To discourage urbanization by Africans the government stopped building houses for them, leading to acute shortages and massive overcrowding (Savage 1987, 615). The consequence was that large numbers of people were forced to squat on private or public land and build shacks from whatever material they could obtain, initially in the homelands, but increasingly in the urban areas also (Savage 1987, 615; Simon 1989, 199). High levels of poverty and unemployment led to malnutrition, growth stunting, nutritional diseases and death by starvation amongst children; the infant mortality rate for Africans was 80/1000 in 1982 compared with 13/1000 for Whites (Savage 1987, 617).

Regardless of the accumulating evidence that the homeland system was unworkable, the NP government pressed on: "Independence" was granted to the Transkei in 1976, followed by Boputatswana, Venda and then lastly Ciskei in 1981 and about nine million South Africans were stripped of their citizenship (Lewis 1990,15). However, attempts to confer independence on KwaNdebele were defeated by violent protests (de St Jorre 1986, 541). By 1980 52.7% of the country's population was squeezed into the 13% of land allocated to the reserves (Savage 1987, 606). Nearly 60% of homeland dwellers were cut off from unemployment and living in extreme poverty where "having a remittance income from a migrant, or of having an income from a pensioner, is critical to physical survival" (Savage 1987, 606, 607). In 1985 over 1.8 million people worked as migrant labourers on contracts, separated from their families, while 614,847 people commuted daily from dormitory cities in the homelands to the urban areas to work, with 20% of these travelling on average for 3,5 to 7 hours a day and the rest an average of 2.5 hours a day (Savage 1987, 606).

By 1978 it was clear to the leadership of the ruling NP that "the status quo had become economically, politically and socially untenable" (Simon 1989, 189; Shearing 1986, 297). Under PW Botha, who became Prime Minister in 1978, a series of "reforms" followed that tinkered with the system to reduce its dysfunctionality and make it more palatable to Blacks and international critics without fundamentally altering it (Sommer 1996, 60). The earliest measures were aimed at mollifying the radicalised and militant African urban dwellers. In the late 1970s leasehold rights were extended to urban Africans and by 1986 they were given full freehold rights (Simon 1989, 198; de St Jorre 1986, 543). From 1977 the building of low cost houses by the state for Africans was resumed, but could not keep up with the building backlog and squatting in the urban areas became endemic and eventually the government was forced to implement site and service schemes (South African History Online 2006, Simon 1989, 199). In late 1983 the government introduced elective municipal council for Africans in the urban areas, but after a boycott campaign by the UDF only a fraction of eligible voters registered and of these only 21% of registered voters voted (Simon 1989, 201; Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 58). In 1986 restrictions on the movements of Africans were formally abolished and passbooks were replaced by a national identity book for all South Africans, but new administrative measures were taken to control movement (Savage 1987, 606; de St Jorre 1986, 543). Legislation was also passed in 1986 to restore the South African citizenship of Africans living legally in the urban areas, who had lost it when five of the homelands became independent (Simon 1989, 190, 200; de St Jorre 1986, 543). However, neither of the 1986 measures applied to Africans living in the "independent" homelands.

The constitution of 1983 provided for three separate houses for Whites, Coloureds and Indians in parliament and for a strong executive presidency (Beinart 2001, 247). The constitutional arrangement ensured that the president would effectively be elected by the majority party in the White chamber and that legislative deadlocks between the three chambers would be resolve by the ruling White party (Stultz 1984, 269). This attempt to co-opt Coloureds and Indians while entrenching White dominance was endorsed by 66% of Whites in a referendum (although it led to the breakaway of the Conservative Party from the NP), but outraged Africans (Stultz 1984, 269; Beinart 2001, 247). Elections were held for the Coloured and Indian chambers in 1984 but, as the result of a massive boycott campaign by the newly formed United Democratic Front (UDF), only 29% Coloureds and 19% Indians, who had bothered to register vote, voted (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 61).

Many measures taken were aimed at reducing the hardships and humiliations experienced by Blacks generally. Expenditure on Black education was greatly increased, but the government was still spending R7 for whites for every R1 spent on Blacks in the mid-1980s (de St Jorre 1986, 543).In 1982 the government stopped the routine eviction of Blacks from inner city suburbs and these became racially mixed, while applications by Black business people to live in wealthy White suburbs were granted (Rule Simon 1989, 196). The ban on inter-racial sex and marriage was repealed in 1984 (de St Jorre 1986, 540). In 1984 the government began to issue permits for Blacks to engage in business in the central business districts of major cities and to permit municipalities to open public amenities to all, while hotels and restaurants were permitted to desegregate their facilities in 1986 (Simon 1989, 194, 1995; de St Jorre 1986, 543).

The government's reforms failed to win the support of Black people and the response was rather greater militancy and intensified resistance between 1979 and 1989. The suppression of the BC movement created a political vacuum that the ANC was able to fill (Simon 1989, 189, 190; Beinart 2001, 251). A plethora of grass roots organizations emerged in the late 1970s, the most important of which were the student and civic organizations, that, together with the rapidly growing trade unions, mobilized communities to consumer boycotts wide spread protests, in townships and renewed rebellion in the schools, while strikes became more frequent and militant (Beinart 2001, 249, 250; Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 36-41). The Natal Indian Congress (NIC) led a boycott campaign against the South African Indian Council election of 1978 through rallies, door to door visits and leaflet drops (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 42). The bulk of the trade unions and the new organizations espoused non-racial nationalism and therefore adhered to the ANC's Freedom Charter, so the movement was called "Charterism" (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 43, 44).

In 1983 the proposed African municipal councils and Tricameral constitution, provoked a massive backlash from Blacks. A national conference attended by leaders of the ANC, trade unions, churches and community organization rejected the measures and called instead for a national convention to formulate a democratic constitution (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 47, 48). Local and regional committees were launched at public rallies to coordinate resistance efforts and a national umbrella body, the United Democratic Front (UDF), was launched in August 1983 by delegates from 565 organisations across the country (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 47-49; Sommer 1996, 60). The militant and uncompromising character of the new movement was summed up by Dr Allan Boesak: "We want all our rights, we want them here and we want them now" (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 51). The UDF boycott campaign against the African councils and Coloured and Indian parliamentary chambers used the tactics developed by NIC and victory was signaled by low voter registration and low voter turnout figures (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 58, 61).

Subsequent UDF activities such as boycotts, work stayaways and the use of funerals of activists killed by the police as mass protest demonstrations were initiated at different levels, but were invariably driven at local level (Sommer 1996, 60; Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 53). In August 1984 the Vaal Civic Association (VCA) and the Azanian People's Organisation organized a school and rent boycott (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 66, 67). Students, demanding the resignation of municipal councilors, prevented 60% of Sharpeville's workers from going to work on 3 September and then burned most of the shops and public buildings in the township during the course of the day; similar actions in neighbouring townships paralyzed industries in the area for a week and the revolt spread to other areas (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 66, 67; de St Jorre 1986, 542). The authorities responded by sending 7000 troops into the affected townships and in response national student and unionist bodies called a two day general strike the in Transvaal; more than a million workers and students stayed away from work and school (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 67, 69; de St Jorre 1986, 542). In November the insurrection spread across the townships of the Eastern Cape and by July 1985 96 people were dead, 105 councillors had been attacked and 66 of their properties burned down (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 69, 75; de St Jorre 1986, 542). As a result of attacks on councillors and council officials only three of 139 councils were still functioning by 1985 and attacks were widened to include people such as policemen who were regarded as government collaborators or supporters (Swilling 1985, 365; de St Jorre 1986, 542). The government's efforts at co-opting Blacks were violently and abruptly brought to an end (Shearing 1986, 299).

The continuing unrest and violence, ever more frequent labour strikes, the increase in MK bombings and the spiraling demands that security made both on their time and on their pockets were disastrous for the morale of Whites. The NP began to shed support to the right and the left; from a high of 65% of the vote in 1977 its share declined to 48% in 1989 (Nohlen et al 1999). As the government's reforms unfurled and Black resistance grew the right became increasingly militant and extraparliamentary paramilitary groups began to proliferate (Shearing 1986, 299; de St Jorre 1986, 549). On the left, young men, appalled at having to supply the manpower for the military occupation of Black townships, formed the End Conscription Campaign and the immigration of young Whites escalated (Shearing 1986, 299; de St Jorre 1986, 553).

On the 21 July 1985 the government declared a state of emergency for eight months, the army occupied most townships, COSAS was banned and 44 000 people were detained, crippling UDF leadership structures (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 78, 79; de St Jorre 1986, 546). The UDF responded with boycotts of White owned shops and the youth organised street committees (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 79). In 1986 the newly formed Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) called a May Day stayaway that was observed by 1.5 million workers (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 85, 86). The government preempted mass protests to mark the tenth anniversary of the 1976 Uprising by imposing a new state of emergency that lasted for four years and introduce de facto military rule; over the next six month 25 000 people were detained (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, 87).

Through military occupation of the townships the government reestablished a measure of control over them, but boycotts of White businesses and of paying rent continued, the councils remained moribund and students stayed out of school; essentially the townships belong to the army by day and to the youth by night (de St Jorre 1986, 546; Sommer 1996, 60; Meer 1987, 402, 403). The ANC also stepped up its attacks on government installations (de St Jorre 1986, 554). The government resorted to covert measures to attempt to break the resistance, including mobilizing vigilantes and supporters of Inkatha (a Zulu homeland based ethnic movement) to attack the youth and so created the "Black on Black" violence that persisted for the next decade (Meer 1987, 403; de St Jorre 1986, 546). The leadership vacuum created by the detention, jailing, arrest and murder of UDF and COSATU leaders was in part filled by Church leaders who increasingly articulated Black rejection of and resistance to apartheid (Meer 1987, 401; de St Jorre 1986, 550). An impasse had developed, the government was not able to suppress its opponents, nor were they able to overthrow the government (Sommer 1996, 60).

The costs of the war in South West Africa, and Angola's growing air power, forced the government to begin negotiations for independence for the territory; by the end of 1988 a cease fire was in place and an agreement had been reached and on the 21 March 1990 Namibia became independent (Giliomee 1995, 90, 91; South African History Online 2006).

By 1989 it was becoming clear to the leadership of the NP that negotiations with the ANC were the only way to find a political solution that would halt the country's decent into violence, economic stagnation and social disintegration, while the ANC's chief financier, the Soviet Union, placed the ANC under pressure to negotiate a settlement with the government (Giliomee 1995, 85, 89, 91, 92; Sommer 1996, 60). In August 1989 the leadership of the NP forced PW Botha to step down and FW de Klerk became President; he immediately began secret discussions about negotiation prospects with Nelson Mandela, who was still in prison, while the ANC responded by issuing a set of preconditions for talks (Adam & Moodley 1989, 379; Sommer 1996, 60). In the September 1989 Tricameral elections the NP requested a mandate from the White electorate to negotiate with the ANC, which it received (Adam & Moodley 1989, 367, 369).

In February 1990 FW de Klerk released Mandela and some political prisoners and unbanned the ANC, SACP, the PAC and other political organizations, but it was not until June that the state of emergency was lifted (Adam & Moodley 1989, 369; Nohlan et al 1999, 833; South African History Online). The desegregation of public facilities was begun in March 1990 and by June 1991 most discriminatory legislation had been repealed (South African History Online 2006). The transition was characterized by large scale violence. The war between ANC and Inkatha supporters in Natal and the Witwatersrand escalated, attacks on Africans by White extremists occurred sporadically, police atrocities against Blacks were undiminished and evidence mounted of the complicity of the security forces in fostering and funding the violence (South African History Online 2006). The ANC launched a campaign of mass action to pressurize the government to act clamp down on the security forces, but only in August 1992 did the government purge the top ranks of the army and police of right wing officers (South African History Online 2006).

The negotiating process drawn out as the parties struggled to establish trust in one another and it was frequently suspended as a result of spiraling political violence in the country (Sommer 1996, 62). It took until the end of 1991 to lay the groundwork for negotiations, which began in December 1991, and final agreement on the transitional Constitution, electoral law and on transitional executive structures was only reached at the end of 1993 (see Constitution of the Republic, Act 200 of 1993, Electoral Act and Independent Electoral Commission Act. Sommer 1996, 53, 62, 63; Giliomee 1995, 96, 97). Even, then it was only the eve of the election that the right wing Freedom Front and Inkatha could be persuaded to participate in them (Giliomee 1995, 96, 97). South Africa's first democratic elections were held on 27 April 1994 under conditions of uncharacteristic tranquility and in a mood of public exuberance; voter turnout was estimated at around 90% (See Democratic Elections). The elections were handsomely won by the ANC with 63% of the vote, the NP won 20% of the vote and Inkatha 10.5% (See 1994 National Assembly results). The new dispensation established a quasi-federal system with nine provinces; the NP and Inkatha narrowly won the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal respectively, while the ANC controlled the other seven (See 1994 Provincial Legislature Results). Nelson Mandela was elected as South Africa's first Black President by the National Assembly and a government of national unity was installed that included the NP and Inkatha, with cabinet posts allocated according to each part's share of the vote, as had been agreed on during negotiations (Giliomee 1995,103, 104).

References

ADAM, H &338; MOODLEY, K 1989 "Negotiations about What in South Africa?", Journal of Modern African Studies, 27(3), September, 367-381, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/161098 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

ARON, J & MUELLBAUER, J 2001 "Interest rate effects on output: evidence from a GDP forecasting model for South Africa", IMF Staff Papers, IMF Annual Research Conference (2002), [www] http://129.67.96.112/conferences/2002-UPaGiSSA/papers/Aron-csae2002.pdf [PDF document, opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

BEINART, W 2001 Twentieth-century South Africa, Oxfrord University Press.

BONNER, P Undated "Chapter 2 - The Soweto Uprising of June 1976: A Turning Points Event" IN Turning Points Book 5, South African History Online", [www] http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/online%20books/turningpoints/bk5/chapter2.htm [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

DE ST JORRE, J 1986 "South Africa Embattled", Foreign Affairs, 653, 538-563, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043080 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

DU PISANI, JA , BROODRYK, M & COETZER, PW 1990 "Protest Marches in South Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, 28(4), December, 573-602, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/160922 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

GILIOMEE, H 1995 "Democratization in South Africa", Political Science Quarterly, 110(1), Spring, 83-104, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152052 [opens new window (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

IMF 2008 World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008, [www] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

KIBBLE, S & BUSH, R 1986 "Reform of Apartheid and Continued Destabilisation in Southern Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, 24(2), June, 203-227, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/160691 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

LEVIN, R 1997 When the sleeping grass awakens: land and power in Swaziland, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg.

LEVY, PI 1999 "Sanctions on South Africa: what did they do?", Economic Growth Center Yale University Discussion Paper no 796, [www] http://aida.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp796.pdf [PDF document, opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

LODGE, T & NASSON, B 1991 All, Here and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s, New Africa Books.

MEER, F 1987 "South Africa's Tomorrow", Third World Quarterly, 9(2), 396-407, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3991890 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

NOHLEN, D, THIBAUT, B & KRENNERICH, M 1999 Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook, Oxford University Press.

SAVAGE, M 1987 "The Cost of Apartheid", Third World Quarterly, 9(2), April, 601-621, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/3991899 [opens new winwow] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

SHEARING, C 1986 "Policing South Africa: Reflections on Botha's Reforms", The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, 11(3), Autumn, 293-307, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/3341105 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

SIMON, D 1989 "Crisis and Change in South Africa: Implications for the Apartheid City", Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 14(2), 189-206, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/622812 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

SOMMER, H 1996 "From Apartheid to Democracy: Patterns of Violent and Nonviolent Direct Action in South Africa, 1984-1994", Africa Today, 43(1), 53-76, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187081 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE 2006 "South African History Timelines: 1900s", http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/general/1900s.html [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE Undated "The ANCs Armed Struggle: 1970s - 1980s: The revival of armed activity", [www] http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governence-projects/organisations/anc-history/76-present.htm [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

STULTZ, NM 19841984 "Interpreting Constitutional Change in South Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, 22(3), September, 353-379, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/160451 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

SWILLING, M 1985 "Urban Social Movements under Apartheid".Cahiers d'études africaines, 25(99), 363 - 379.

TERRILL, WA 1984 "South African Arms Sales and the Strengthening of Apartheid", Africa Today, 31(2), 3-13, [www] http://www.jstor.org/stable/4186221 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).

WILLIAMS, RM 2006 "The Impact of Guerrilla Armies on the Creation of South Africa's Armed Forces", Institute for Security Studies Monograph No 127, November.