Namibia: The long road to independence (1977-1990)

Updated August 2009

Recognising that Namibian independence was inevitable, and in attempt to achieve an internal settlement that would secure it on its own terms so as to exclude SWAPO, South Africa convened the Turnhalle Conference of the ethnic political parties that it approved of in September 1977 (Saunders 2008, 827; Ellis 1981, 142). The Turnhalle Conference set 31 December 1978 as the date for independence (Saunders 2008, 827). In March 1977 the Turnhalle Conference produced a draft interim constitution that proposed a federation of 11 separate ethnic authorities that was rejected by the UN, SWAPO and the churches (Saunders 2008, 827; Ellis 1981, 142). SWAPO proposed instead a unitary parliamentary democracy based on universal adult franchise (Saunders 2008, 827). Also in 1977 South Africa severed the administration of Walvis Bay from that of South West Africa and transferred it back to the Cape (Evans 1990, 563). To lend legitimacy to the elections the pass laws were relaxed, some public facilities were desegregated as were residential areas and laws banning marriage and sex between racial groups abolished, but these measures did not affect the basic structures of privilege for Whites and exploitation of Blacks (Kiljunen, ML 1981b, 99; Green & Kiljunen 1981, 53). Amenities such as schools remained segregated and new vagrancy laws were introduced to substitute for pass control (Green & Kiljunen 1981, 53).

In 1977 the total population was estimated at 960 000 people, but it was widely believed that this, and previous census figures was an undercount due to resistance to census taking and the dubious legal status of people. The Whites numbered some 11.6% of the population, Cape Coloureds 3.9% and indigenous people 84.6% (Kiljunen, ML 1981a, 26). Half of the land surface was allocated for the use of Whites, including 90% of the arable land south of the police line (Kiljunen, ML 1981a, 27). Thus the African 85% of the population was concentrated on the reserves, which were of marginal agricultural value or overcrowded and degraded or both (Kiljunen, ML 1981a, 27). 46% of the economically active population were in the subsistence sector of the economy in 1977 that produced only 2% of GDP and which was too unproductive to provide for the support of the two-thirds of the population that was resident there and consequently the reserves functioned as a dumping ground for dependents of low-wage migrants workers who formed 22% of the labour force (Green & Kiljunen 1981, 33, 35).

The pre-election reforms changed little, for the majority of Africans continued to migrate from the Homelands to work in "White areas", on contracts of between six to eight months, so that at any one time almost two-thirds of households have absent members, as would almost all household over a period of between three to five years (Kiljunen, ML 1981b, 100). Wages remained low and discrimination in the education system and the work place ensured that the highest paying jobs were reserved for Whites and Africans were restricted to unskilled, dangerous and unpleasant work at low pay; in 1977 97% of white collar positions were held by Whites and 98% of unskilled workers were Black (Kiljunen, ML 1981b, 103; Melber 1983, 153). Moreover, the oppressive labour regime that denied workers the right to form trade uions or to strike (Melber 1983, 153, 154). In the absence of male labour and lack of funds to invest in agriculture as a result of low wages, the Homelands became increasingly overcrowded, agriculturally unproductive and subject to land deterioration (Kiljunen, ML 1981b, 100, 101, 105).

The consequence of the inequitable system was that inequality and poverty was pervasive. Though Whites numbered only 11.6% of the population they received 27.7% of income, while Cape Coloureds and indigeneous people who together formed 88.4 % of the population received only 12.8% of national income (44.1% was operating surpluses of large companies and 15.4% taxes on proprietors); thus a White earned on average R23 for every R1 earned by a Black person (Kiljunen, ML 1981a, 26; Green & Kiljunen 1981a, 48). Government expenditure was discriminatory and retrogressive with Europeans being the target of 53% of recurrent state spending and Blacks only 47%, moreover much of expenditure on Blacks was not aimed at providing them with services but at financing administrative organs of control (Green & Kiljunen 1981a, 52, 53).

South African economic policy was geared towards the exploitation of Namibia's natural resources to the benefit of White settlers and the creation of a captive market for South African goods. The major sectors of the economy were selectively developed with an eye to the export of resources so that two thirds of GDP was exported, 90% of physical goods, 100% of minerals and Karakul products, 99% of fish catches and 90% of beef production (Green & Kiljunen 1981, 37, 44). The bulk of exports were either to or through South Africa and 90% of imports were from South Africa (Green & Kiljunen 1981, 45). Mining, primarily of diamonds and uranium, employed only 4% of the population but contributed 33% of GDP in 1977 (Green & Kiljunen 1981, 40). The mining and beneficiation of base metals formed a valuable source of foreign exchange: In the early 1960s copper and lead smelting operations were commissioned and by the early 1970s base metal production in Tsumeb had become a major employer and exporter (Innes 1981, 70). The fishing industry also expanded rapidly in the 1960s, contributing around 25% of export earnings, but from the mid-1970s as a result of overfishing the industry was in decline (Innes 1981, 76). With agriculture, geared towards export Namibia was highly dependent on food impost from South Africa; according to Green & Kiljunen (1981, 38) 50% of grain, 25% of dairy products and 90% of other foodstuffs were imported. Manufacturing, which contributed a scant 14% of GDP in 1977, was aimed at export and revolved around the processing of fish, meat and metal ores (Green & Kiljunen 1981, 38; Innes 1981, 65). By contrast Namibia provided a captive market for South African manufactured goods that it could not sell internationally (Innes 1981, 77).

In preparation for the December 1978 elections, various ethnic political groups that had participated in the Turnhalle Conference formed an umbrella body, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, with the support of the South African government, which proposed an ethnic federation for an independent Namibia and the abolition of racial discrimination (DTA. Kiljunen, K 1981, 152). The elections themselves polarised the population leading to riots in Windhoek in March 1978 between DTA supporters and SWAPO supporters with the police providing support for the latter; the high turnout was exposed by a church report as the result of massive organised intimidation by the South African authorities (Ellis 1981, 141).

By the late 1970s the rebel Rhodesian settler regime was exhausted by protracted guerrilla warfare and African majority rule there seemed inevitable; the balance of power in the region had shifted substantially away from South Africa and in "an effort to gain time and get control in the direction in change South Africa agreed to sit down and talk over the Namibia Question" (Longmire 1990, 209). In July 1978 an agreement was reached with representatives of the five western members of the UN Security Council for the holding of UN supervised democratic elections which was enshrined in UN Security Council resolution 435, but South Africa reneged and held elections for a Constituent Assembly that was boycotted by SWAPO (Saunders 2008, 827). Further talks were held as the war dragged on and just when it seemed that agreement was imminent in July 1981 South Africa, with the support of the United States, demanded that Cuban troops be withdrawn before the independence process from Namibia could begin and the process stalled (Saunders 2008, 827; Longmire 1990, 210).

1988 proved to be a turning point for the independence Namibia's process. The battle for the Angola town of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987/8, between South Africa and its National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ally and the Angolan government supported by Cuba, ended in a stalemate and both sides recognised that a military solution to the conflict was not feasible (Meijer & Birmingham 2004). Renewed unrest emerged internally: In 1988 a school boycott was launched to protest the presence of South African military bases close to schools and in mid-year a massive work stay away followed (Kjeseth 1989, 16). The South African government responded with brutal force and launched also covert operations accompanied by a massive disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting SWAPO (Kjeseth 1989, 18).

With the military stalemate that had developed and the apparently endless internal unrest, the end of the Cold War provided South Africa a way out of the quagmire and progress became possible once more (Saunders 2008, 827, 828). In 1988 Angola agreed to the withdrawal of Cuban troops and South Africa to the implementation of Resolution 435; on 22 December South Africa, Angola and Cuba formally signed an agreement on the process of withdrawal that was to be followed on the deployment of the UN Transitional Assistance Group to monitor the process and supervise the election of a Constituent Assembly (UNTAG. Saunders 2008, 827, 828; Kjeseth 1989, 7). The issue of the status of Walvis Bay, still South African territory but of great importance to Namibia, through which the great bulk of its trade flowed, was not mentioned in the December 1988 agreement (Evans 1990, 559, 560). In February 1989 the deployment of UNTAG began, but the process was disrupted when in violation of the agreement PLAN guerrillas infiltrated in large numbers in April and the UN special representive gave South African troops permission to redeploy, resulting in the deaths of over 300 PLAN troops (Saunders 2008, 828; Kjeseth 1989, 7). Nevertheless by May peace was restored and the process continued; racial discrimination was abolished, amnesty granted to exiles and 42 000 refugees were returned to the country (Saunders 2008, 828).

On 7-11 November 1989 Constituent Assembly elections were held on the principle of proportional representation (see Independence Elections in 1989 for more information). The election was convincingly won by SWAPO with 57% of the vote (see Election results for details). The DTA obtained 29% of the vote, becoming the official opposition, while the remained of the vote was shared between eight other parties, five of whom won one or more seats in the Constituent Assembly.

The Constituent Assembly went to work immediately and on 9 February 1990 adopted the final constitution that enshrined the seven basic principles of UN Resolution 435 (for details on the process see Background to the development of electoral structures). Namibia was to be a unitary state with an entrenched constitution, an executive president by universal adult franchise by an absolute majority and a National Assembly elected by proportional representation with no minimum threshold for entry (see Constitution for details). The National Council was to be comprised of two members elected by each of 13 Regional Councils, the independence of the judiciary was established and a strong bill of rights adopted. The leader of SWAPO Sam Nujoma was elected the country's first president by the Constituent Assembly, Namibia became independent on the 21 March 1990 and the Constituent Assembly was reconstituted as the National Assembly (Saunders 2008, 828).

References

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