Mozambique: Peace, democratisation and conflict (1995-2004)

Updated February 2008

The conclusion of the peace process and the successful conduct of democratic elections did not bring the high level of conflict between the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the opposition Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) to an end. The government formed by newly-elected President Joaquim Chissano was constituted exclusively of FRELIMO members, primarily southerners, though it was more technocratic in character than previous governments (Accord 1997). RENAMO demands that it be given the governorships of the provinces were disregarded by the government and no policy of reconciliation and inclusion was followed to heal the bitterness generated by the civil war so that the climate of mutual mistrust continued (See Towards the 1999 elections; Accord 1997). Indeed, as ISS (Undated) puts it: "The headlines were frequently dominated by the bitterness that surfaced from time to time between Frelimo and Renamo in public exchanges characterized by extreme language and inflammatory accusations". Nevertheless, demobilisation was successfully executed, and despite grievances amongst veterans as a result of the lack of opportunities available to them, the prospect of a return to civil war diminished over time (Accord 1997).

The post-war reconstruction programme, begun in 1993, enabled the economy to grow rapidly, albeit from an extremely low base (Cravinho & George 2007, 810; Accord 1997; Fauvet 2000, 12). Restorations of the Beira harbour and railway line to Harare were complete by the early 1990s while the restoration upgrade of the line from Nacala to Malawi was begun (Fauvet 2000, 12). In 1996 the Maputo Development Corridor was launched in partnership with South Africa to increase usage of Maputo as a port by South African industries and encourage tourism though upgrading of the harbour and road infrastructure (Fauvet 2000, 12). The restoration of the power lines from Cahora Bassa to South Africa facilitated the export of electricity (Fauvet 2000, 12). GDP growth averaged just under 10% a year between 1996 and 1999, while inflation fell between 1993-1996, averaging 26.5% per year in this period as opposed to 160% in 1987 and 35% in 1991 (Fauvet 2000, 12; Cravinho & George 2007, 802). By 1997 inflation had fallen to 5.5% and registered -1.3 in 1898 and 4.8% in 1999 and, moreover, price stabilization was led by food prices, which was of greatest significance to the poor (Fauvet 2000, 12). Economic growth was the result of the recovery of the depressed manufacturing industry (output rose by almost 50% in 1997) and of rises in mining production (30% in 1997 and 1998; mainly marble, bauxite and graphite), though the dramatic fall in graphite prices in 1999 led to a collapse of graphite production in 1999 (Fauvet 2000, 12).

The high growth rates experienced in the 1990s, however, did not translate into an improvement in living conditions for the bulk of the population; unemployment remained high and incomes low, inflation fell steadily but nevertheless translated into high living costs (IIASA 2001). Armed bandit gangs that had sprung up during the civil war continued to operate, persistent poverty fuelled high crime rates while the opening up of the economy, poor administrative controls and endemic corruption enabled the transit drug trade to South Africa to flourish (IIASA 2001). The tourism sector was slow to recover and foreign exchange earnings long remained dependent on the export of sea-foods while high foreign debt and donor dependence constrained the government's room to maneuver; foreign aid constituted some 60% of the State's budget (IIASA 2001; Accord 1997). The country benefited from substantial debt relief. In 1998 total foreign debt was US$5.5 billion; in April the World Bank and IMF declared that Mozambique was eligible for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and in June 1999 US$1.7 billion (30%) was written off (Africa Recovery 2000).

Poverty remained endemic, with 69% of Mozambicans living below the poverty line; with 80% of Mozambicans living in the countryside, the underdeveloped character of agriculture was closely linked to the scale of poverty in the country (Fauvet 2000, 12). Rudimentary agricultural techniques, lack of capital, a dearth of mechanical or even animal traction, an absence of fertilizer and pesticides and poor marketing infrastructure, agriculture remained locked largely in labour intensive, small scale, with output increases the result of extensive rather than intensive expansions (Fauvet 2000, 12). With low incomes and food reserves the rural population remained highly vulnerable to the natural disasters such as droughts and floods that wracked the country episodically (Fauvet 2000, 12). The economic reforms impacted on the urban population as well, for services were no longer provided free and food subsidies were withdrawn (Fauvet 2000, 12). An estimated 100 000 jobs were lost between 1990 and 2000 due to privatization and rationalisation, fueling unemployment, while real wages fell (Fauvet 2000, 12).

Despite the concerns about the difficulties created by aid-dependence and the capacity of the economy to effectively translate aid finance into on the ground development, the aid did enable real gains in welfare through expansion of education and healthcare (Rupiya 1998). The end of the civil war enabled a shift in expenditure away from defence to social services, particularly health and education (Fauvet 2000, 12). By 1998 the primary school system had made good the damage inflicted by the war and by 2000 81% of six year old children were able to begin school by comparison with 59% in 1992, but secondary and tertiary education facilities remained in short supply and there were high drop-out and failure rates throughout the educational system (Fauvet 2000, 12). Despite the increases in health spending and expansion of the healthcare network, only 40% of the population was covered in 2000, though vaccination campaigns against infectious diseases were successfully undertaken (Fauvet 2000, 12). Lack of potable water and adequate sanitation remained a major healthcare problem and cholera epidemics were widespread between 1997 and 1999 (Fauvet 2000, 12).

The conflict between the two parties created problems for the central government as it attempted to extend governance to the rural areas controlled by RENAMO in Sofala and Manica provinces, so that dual administrations emerged in these areas (ISS Undated; Accord 1997). In the Assembly of the Republic, however, the two parties cooperated well and differences of opinion that surfaced were often non-partisan in character (ISS Undated). RENAMO was at a disadvantage here, for it had large debts, difficulty on the ground transforming itself into a political party, was unable to formulate coherent policy positions and its members of parliament lacked the experience enjoyed by FRELIMO members (ISS Undated: Accord 1997; Rupiya 1998). Conflict within FRELIMO between the leadership of the party on the one side and the government and MPs on the other also emerged over economic policy in mid-1996, for the Central Committee criticised the prioritisation of inflation and privatisation over income growth and poverty reduction (ISS Undated; Accord 1997).

On the international front, in 1995 Mozambique was admitted to the Commonwealth countries, even though the country had never been a British colony and in 1996 became a founding member of the Lusophone community (ISS Undated; Crawfurd 2002). The decision to join the International Islamic Conference, along with the proclamation of important Muslim festivals as public holidays, provoked a storm of protest from Christian communities and revealed underlying religious tensions (ISS Undated).

RENAMO's distrust of the government was further strengthened when local government elections scheduled for 1997 where postponed to June 1998 and led to many conflicts between it and FRELIMO; the parties disagreed, amongst other things, over whether they should be held simultaneously or piece-meal (Accord 1997; ISS Undated). In the end the elections were boycotted by a number of parties, including RENAMO, who suspected fraud in the registration process, contributing to a voter turnout of only 14.5% and to FRELIMO gaining control of all 33 municipalities (Accord 1997; Cravinho & George 2007, 798; ISS Undated).

On 3-5 December 1999 the country underwent its second round of presidential and Assembly of the Republic democratic elections; for more detail see Towards the 1999 elections and December 1999 Elections. RENAMO formed an electoral pact with a coalition of small political parties, the Electoral Union, to fight the elections. President Chissano of FRELIMO obtained 52.3% of the vote, similar to what he had polled in 1994, while his opponent Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO managed to rally the opposition around him and improved his performance from 33% of the vote to 47.7% (see Presidential results for more detail). The Assembly of the Republic election saw FRELIMO obtain 48.6% and 53% of the seats, increasing share of votes and seats slightly, while RENAMO and its allies won 38.8% of the vote 47% of the seats, likewise increasing its share of the vote and seats. None of the other 12 parties and coalitions, including the Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDEMO) which had been represented in the previous parliament, passed the 5% vote threshold requited for representation in the Assembly of the Republic (see Assembly of the Republic national results for more details). The regional trends observed in 1994 remained, with some fluctuations.

RENAMO rejected the results, claiming that the count of the votes had been fraudulently manipulated, but the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the count and RENAMO members took up their seats in the Assembly of the Republic (ISS Undated). Indeed, the catastrophic cyclones and floods that followed in February and March 2000 had a sobering impact on political parties as widespread loss of life, displacement of people, destruction of infrastructure and the consequent impact on economic growth claimed their attention (ISS Undated; Cravinho 2007, 799; Crawfurd 2002). The Paris Club of debtors responded to the crisis by deferring debt repayment for a year, while the in April the IMF granted US$600 million in relief; Mozambique's total debt was reduced to US$7052 million by end of 2000 and the debt servicing ratio fell to 11.7% of exports (Cravinho & George 2007, 802, 811; Africa Recovery 2000).

Nevertheless, conflict and unrest quickly reemerged. In May an attack was made on a police station in Nampala province, allegedly by RENAMO members, and relations between RENAMO and the government deteriorated, with Dhlakama threatening to take up arms and RENAMO members suggested the partition of the country (Cravinho 2007, 799; ISS Undated). Talks to defuse the conflict collapsed in November and December 2000 when RENAMO protests against the elections degenerated into riots resulting in 124 deaths, arrests and further 83 deaths in detention; they resumed, however, in December, but broke down again in April (Crawfurd 2002; Cravinho 2007, 799-800).

In June 2000 the Mozal aluminium smelter, a joint project between BHP Billiton, Mitsubishi, the South African Industrial Development Corporation and the Mozambique Government, began production and between 2001 - 2003 resulted in Mozambican exports almost tripling, bringing in much need foreign exchange and state revenue while reducing the trade deficit (Cravinho & George 2007, 810). The project did little to address unemployment, and only 800 fulltime positions were created (Fauvet 2000, 12). The economy was deal further blows when in March 2001 Mozambique was subject to flooding once more and in 2002 when severe drought required the import of cereals to provide for some half a million people requiring food aid (Crawfurd 2002; Cravinho & George 2007, 802, 805). Localised droughts were experienced in the south in 2003 and again in 2005 (Cravinho & George 2007, 805).

In November 2002 the trial of those accused of assassinating investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso two years previously presented testimony that President Chissano's son, Nyimpine, had paid for the murder to cut short Cardoso's investigation into Nyimpine's involvement with international crime syndicates involved in fraud, drug smuggling and money laundering (Global Integrity Undated; Cravinho 2007, 800). In June 2006 Nyimpine Chissano was charged with the murder and brought to trial, but died in February 2008 before the matter came to a conclusion (Global Integrity Undated). The suggestion of corruption in the upper echelons of the FRELIMO leadership galvanised the Assembly of the Republic into unanimously passing anti-corruption legislation in October 2003 (Global Integrity Undated).

The second round of municipal elections was held in November 2003, with RENAMO participating this time. FRELIMO consolidated and extended its dominance in the urban areas in a poll marked by a low voter turnout of 24% (Carter Center 2004, 29). It won the mayorships of 28 municipalities and absolute majorities in 29 of the councils, doing well even in areas that RENAMO had won in the 1999 national elections (Carter Center 2004, 25; European Union 2003, 13). RENAMO won the mayorships of five municipalities and the majority of the seats in four councils (Carter Center 2004, 25; European Union 2003, 13). The results were accepted by RENAMO and the rulings of the newly formed Constitutional Council were respected (Carter Center 2004, 32; European Union 2003, 13). Though there was disquiet at the way in which votes were tabulated, a parallel counting conducted by Civil Society Organisations, through a joint Electoral Observatory, quelled fears of fraud and contributed to acceptance of the results (Carter Center 2004, 30, 31; see also European Union 2003, 14-16).

Chissano stepped down at the end of his second elective term as president and FRELIMO's secretary-general, Armando Guebuzza, stood as the party's candidate for the presidency in the election held 1-2 December 2004 (Crawfurd 2002; Cravinho 2007, 800). Guebuzza performed better than any previous candidate, obtaining 64% of the vote to Dhlakama of RENAMO's 32%; none of the other three candidates managed 3% of the vote (see Presidential results for details). In the concurrent Assembly of the Republic election FRELIMO won an unprecedented 62% of the vote and 64% of the seats while the Renamo-União Eleitoral coalition's share plunged to 30% of the vote and 36% of the seats; none of the other 18 parties and coalitions managed to secure the 5% of the vote necessary of representation in parliament (see Assembly of the Republic national results for details). Women representatives formed a satisfactory 34.8% of the members of the Assembly of the Republic. On a provincial level the FRELIMO vote overtook that of RENAMO for the first time in Niassa, Nampula and Tete, while the parties performed equally well in Manica which RENAMO had previously dominated; this left only Zambezia and Sofala provinces as RENAMO strongholds (see 2004 Assembly of the Republic seats by province for details). Part of FRELIMO's success may be attributed to the low turnout, around 36%.

Once more observers expressed disquiet at the way that the tabulation of votes was conducted and the final results announced also proved to be problematic (Cravinho 2007, 800; see, for example, EISA Regional Observer Mission Mozambique Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, 1-2 December 2004 [PDF document], 38-40, 44). The EISA report stated (page 47): "Although there is general consensus that the election results are a reflection of the will of those who voted, there can be no doubt that the election was riddled with enough administrative shortcomings to cast doubt on the commitment of the electoral bodies to the conduct of truly credible and legitimate elections". RENAMO objected and called for the results to be nullified and for the election to be re-run, but their petition to the Constitutional Council was rejected on a technicality, though the Constitutional Council expressed its dissatisfaction with the way the elections were conducted in strong and emphatic terms (EISA Regional Observer Mission Mozambique Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, 1-2 December 2004 [PDF document], 44, 45, 48). A statistical analysis conducted by Joe Hanlon and Sean Fox (2006, 1), found that although the final outcome was not affected, "The concordance between specific complaints and the statistical evidence suggests that ballot box stuffing, improper ballot nullification, and (intentional) organisational failure took place".

References

ACCORD 1997 "Mozambique: Chronology", [www] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/chronology.php [opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).

AFRICA RECOVERY 2000,14(3), October, 17, [www] http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/143debmz.htm [opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).

CARTER CENTER 2004 Final Report: Observing the 2003 Mozambique Municipal Elections, [www] http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1645.pdf [PDF document, opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).

CRAVINHO, JG 2007 "Mozambique: Recent History" IN Frame, I (ed) Africa South of the Sahara 2008, Europa Publications, 796-801.

CRAVINHO, JG & GEORGE, E 2007 "Mozambique: Economy" IN Frame, I (ed) Africa South of the Sahara 2008, Europa Publications, 802-811.

CRAWFURD, J 2002 "Mozambique Timeline", [www] http://crawfurd.dk/africa/mozambique_timeline.htm [opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).

EUROPEAN UNION 2003 Mozambique Municipal Elections 19 November 2003 : EU Election Observation Mission Final Report, [www] http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/election-moza_final-report.pdf [PDF document, opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).

FAUVET, P 2000 "Mozambique: growth with poverty", Africa Recovery, 14(3), October, 12, [www] http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/143moz1.htm [opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).

GLOBAL INTEGRITY UNDATED "Mozambique Timeline", [www] http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/MOZAMBIQUE/timeline.cfm [opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).

HANLON, J & FOX S 2006 "Identifying Fraud In Democratic Elections: A Case Study Of The 2004 Presidential Elections In Mozambique", crisis states research centre, [www] http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp8.2.pdf [PDF document, opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (IIASA) 2001 "Country Briefs: Mozambique - Chronology of History" IN Botswana's future, Mozambique's Future, Namibia's Future: Modeling Population and Sustainable development Challenges in the Era of HIV/AIDS [www] http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pde/briefs/mz-history.html [opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (ISS) UNDATED "Mozambique: History and Politics", [www] http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/Mozambique/Politics.html (offline 11 Mar 2010).

RUPIYA, M 1998 "Historical context: war and peace in Mozambique" IN Accord, [www] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/historical-context.php [opens new window] (accessed 11 Mar 2010).