Mozambique: Pragmatism, reform and the quest for peace (1987-1994)

Updated February 2008

President Joaquim Chissano accelerated the reform process begun by his predecessor, Samora Machel. In January 1987, even before he assumed the Presidency in February, the government launched an International Monetary Fund backed structural adjustment plan (the Economic Rehabilitation Program) with wide-ranging reforms aimed at moving away from a state-controlled centralized economy towards a free-market system (Cravinho & George 2007; IIASA 2001; Accord 1997). This involved a devaluation of the currency, a reduction in the deficit before borrowing through fiscal discipline and higher taxes, tighter control of the money supply and the linking of wage rises to productivity increases as well as the deregulation of target prices and measures to increase production through the stimulation of exports and import substitution (Cravinho & George 2007). The economy responded to these measures, with growth averaging 5.4% between 1987 and 1989 while inflation fell from 160% in 1987 to 35% in 1991 (Cravinho & George 2007). The United Nations provided Mozambique with some US$330 million in emergency assistance (Accord 1997).

It was becoming increasingly evident that the civil war would not be ended by the military victory of one side over the other and that a stale-mate had developed (Accord 1997). Thus victories in February 1987 in the north by FRELIMO were balanced by increases in RENAMO operations in the south (Cravinho 2007, 797). The Nkomati Accord, already a dead letter, was put to rest by South African military raids on African National Congress (ANC) bases in Maputo (Cravinho 2007, 797). Some success was obtained by the Frontline States in persuading Malawi to end RENAMO incursion from bases on its territory and a massive RENAMO offensive down the Zambezi Valley to cut the country in two and establish RENAMO control over the north was reversed through a counter-offensive in 1988 supported by Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe, by this stage, had 10 000 troops in Mozambique. Rupiya 1998; Accord 1997).

However, the military conflict pushed hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighbouring countries and there was great loss of civilian life in Gaza and Inhambane provinces, in massacres blamed on RENAMO (Rupiya 1998; Lodge et al 2002, 196). Atrocity were committed by both sides and evidence began to emerge of bandit gangs, controlled by neither side, ravaging the countryside and terrorising the rural people (Lodge et al 2002, 197). According to Young (1991):

Between 1986 and mid-1988, some 100 000 civilians are believed to have been murdered by RENAMO, and about 1 million others fled to neighboring countries. Foreign relief organizations estimate that a total of 3.2 million people are now [in 1991] totally dependent on food aid, while about the same number require some assistance.

Warming relations with religious groups, and especially the Christian Churches, enabled religious leaders to extend public calls for a peaceful conclusion to the civil war that was ravaging the country (Rupiya 1998; Lodge et al 2002, 197). Chissano, while publicly distancing himself from these initiatives, saw the religious leaders as a possible conduit through which dialogue with RENAMO could be established and expressed this to privately to a Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) delegation in late 1987 (Accord 1997; Sengulane & Goncalves 1998). The CCM involved the Catholic Church in their efforts, and between January and March 1988 meetings were held with RENAMO in New York and, with the assistance of the Kenyan government solicited by Kenyan diplomat Bethuel Kiplagat, also with Afonso Dhlakama in May (Sengulane & Goncalves 1998; Accord 1997; Lodge et al 2002, 197).

The lack of trust between FRELIMO and RENAMO was deepened in April 1988 when the US State Department commissioned Gersony Report implicated RENAMO in the killing of 100 000 Mozambican civilians (Accord 1997; Young 1991). In the same month members of the Mozambican secret service assassinated RENAMO's secretary-general Evo Fernandes in Lisbon (Accord 1997). President Moi of Kenya dispatched Bethuel Kiplagat as an envoy to Chissano to explore how Kenya could assist with the peace process and with overcoming the mutual suspicion that existed between the two parties (Accord 1997). Chissano, however, continued to refuse recognition to RENAMO, while the churches (without his consent) continued to explore dialogue with RENAMO with Kenyan assistance (Accord 1997). The churchmen became convinced that only through negotiations with RENAMO's internal wing could lead to a meaningful peace dialogue and reported as much to Chissano (Accord 1997). FRELIMO, late in 1988, returned all the land nationalized in the 1970s to the churches (Accord 1997). Meanwhile meetings between the Mozambican and South African governments in September/October 1988 led to South Africa honouring its undertakings to withdraw aid from RENAMO and to assist in th peace process (Accord 1997; Rupiya 1998).

By the end of 1988 it was becoming clear to FRELIMO and RENAMO that the war had reached a stale-mate and that peace could only come from the two sides reaching some sort of settlement (Rupiya 1998). The government, in November 1988, mandated the churchmen to explore the possibility of direct dialogue between the parties, rasing the prospect of amnesty for RENAMO members; in February 1989 the Christian leaders returned from Kenya and were able to report to Chissano that RENAMO was willing to begin negotiations for peace (Rupiya 1998; Accord 1997; Sengulane & Goncalves 1998).

Until this point RENAMO had articulated no clear ideological position other than opposition to the socialism of FRELIMO and a desire for a free-market economy so that its First Party Congress, held inside Mozambique in June 1989, was forced to grapple with this issue and also that of transforming itself from a rebel army into a political party with a coherent programme (Accord 1997; Rupiya 1998). Moreover, if peace was to provide RENAMO with better prospects than war then it would have to be provided with financial assistance and security for its members (Rupiya 1998; Crawfurd 2002; Lodge et al 2002, 197). FRELIMO, for its part, completed its abandonment of socialism by formally renouncing Marxist-Leninism at its Fifth Party Congress in June 1998 and ceased to be a vanguard party; it also issued '12 Principles for Dialogue' which laid out the pre-conditions that would have to be met for direct talks with Renamo to take place (Accord 1997; Rupiya 1998; Cravinho 2007, 797; Lodge et al 2002, 197). In talks with church leaders in mid-1989, facilitated by Kenya and Zimbabwe, RENAMO laid out preconditions of their own for negotiations in a '16 point declaration'; though a gap existed between the two positions (chiefly FRELIMO's refusal to recognize RENAMO and its demand for for a cease-fire to precede talks), the principle of dialogue between them had been established (Rupiya 1998; Crawfurd 2002; Sengulane & Goncalves 1998).

In December 1989 Nairobi was the site of a flurry of diplomatic activity as the Kenyan government met with the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and separately with representatives of FRELIMO and RENAMO, while from there the US State Department presented a seven-point proposal for peace, that while rejected by both parties, was eventually to form the basis for direct talks between them (Accord 1997). In early 1990 the Mozambique government issued a draft constitution for discussion providing for a multi-party democracy, in the hope of holding democratic elections in 1991 (Accord 1997). At this point the international situation for both parties was changing; South Africa under President de Klerk ended all support for RENAMO, while Russia, in the throws of economic and political turmoil ended support for FRELIMO in the early 1990s (Lodge et al 2002, 197; Young 1991). Pressure mounted on both parties from other African countries adversely affected by the continuing conflict, especially Zimbabwe and Malawi, while movements to peace in Angola and South Africa added impetus (Sengulane & Goncalves 1998; ISS Undated). Donor countries too, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, threw their weight behind the calls for negotiations and peace (Sengulane & Goncalves 1998).

The cumulative pressure led in March 1990 to Chissano extending recognition to RENAMO and demands for a cease-fire as a precondition for talks were abandoned; direct talks between the two parties started in July 1990 at the head office of Santo Egidio (a Catholic lay community) in Rome (Sengulane & Goncalves 1998; Rupiya 1998). As Sengulane & Goncalves (1998) observe: "The talks in Rome were long and difficult"; the parties could not initially even agree on an agenda, for FRELIMO to discuss an immediate cease-fire while RENAMO wished to prioritise security and the constitution, but continual pressure was applied by all external actors to keep discussions going, while the churches mounted a peace campaign within Mozambique (Sengulane & Goncalves 1998; Accord 1997). In December a partial cease-fire agreement was reached that allowed for the reopening of the Beira and Limpopo corridors, though within months both sides had violated the agreement (Rupiya 1998; Cravinho 2007, 797).

In the meanwhile, in late 1990, FRELIMO initiated reforms that included dropping Marxist-Leninist nomenclature (the People's Republic of Mozambique became the Republic of Mozambique and the People's Assembly became the Assembly of the Republic for instance), the adoption of a democratic constitution with a bill of rights, the legalisation of political parties, embracing a free-market economy and a commitment to the further privatisation of state corporations - not surprisingly these changes were rejected by RENAMO as unilateral (Cravinho 2007, 797; Stanford Undated; Crawfurd 2002; Accord 1997). Nevertheless the war continued and a prolonged and devastating drought (1990-1992) set in so that the situation tah people found themselves in continued to deteriorate (Young 1991; Rupiya 1998). While RENAMO was able to deny the government access to the rural population over vast tracts (by 1991 it controlled about 10% of the territory), it made no effort to set up an alternative government or to provide services to the people but, on the contrary, continued high levels of forced labour extraction and the reduction of women and girls to sexual slavery (Young 1991). Though government installations were attacked economic infrastructure and civilians remained RENAMO's main targets and as famine set in (as a result of the drought) RENAMO prevented food relief efforts from reaching the people (Young 1991; Columbia Encyclopedia 2007).

In September 1991 the talks broke down and the RENAMO delegation withdrew, but by October negotiations were resumed and by November the parties had accorded one another mutual recognition, agreed on the need for United Nations to monitor the implementation of the peace accord and to ensure that the parties complied with it, the authority of the government to supervise the conduct of the elections and the right of RENAMO to function as a party once a general agreement had been reached (Accord 1997; Cravinho 2007, 798). By March 1992 agreement on an electoral system, that include a proportional representation, had been reached (Cravinho 2007, 798). In July 1992, in the face of the gathering crisis occasioned by the drought the parties agreed to open up infrastructure for humanitarian relief (Accord 1997; Rupiya 1998).

In August, dissatisfied with the slow pace progress in the face of the humanitarian catastrophe that was unfolding on the ground, Chissano and Dhlakama met face to face and on finally 4 October 1992 a General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed (Cravinho & George 2007, 798; Accord 1997; Sengulane & Goncalves 1998). The GPA included a general cease-fire, the use of the UN to monitor and guarantee the agreement, the withdrawal of troops to assembly points, the creation of a new national Defence Force drawing equally from both parties and the demobilization of other troops (Cravinho & George 2007, 798). A commission, drawn from FRELEMO, RENAMO and the UN, would oversee the process (Cravinho & George 2007, 798; Crawfurd 2002). Later in the month the UN Security Council approved the creation of a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) with a strength of 6800 people (though eventually 7500 troops were deployed) to perform the functions agreed on by Frelimo and RENAMO and to supervise the return home of between five and six million refugees (Rupiya 1998; Cravinho & George 2007, 798).

In the meanwhile the government had moved forward with the implementation of its economic liberalization policy and had, in March 1992, launched a three-year development plan that included further privatization of public owned firms in the agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors so that by 1999 more than 1000 enterprises had passed over into private ownership (Cravinho & George 2007, 802). In 1993 a post-war reconstruction plan was adopted, with donors pledging to provide US $520 million in assistance, aimed at boosting tourism and rebuilding infrastructure (Cravinho & George 2007, 810; Accord 1997). The war had left the country with severe balance of payments difficulties and a huge public debt, but donors responded positively to the peace process and began over the next few years to ease repayment terms and to write debt off. The first step in this direction was taken by the United States which wrote off US$180 of debt in March 1993 (Cravinho & George 2007, 810, 811).

The first democratic elections were scheduled for October 1993, but the transition process took a good deal longer than was foreseen, for while the cease-fire was implemented almost immediately the demobilisation process was delayed as a result of mistrust between the parties and the delayed deployment of UN forces (Rupiya 1998; Accord 1997; Cravinho & George 2007, 798,). In due course Zimbabwean and Malawian troop were withdrawn (Accord 1997). While the UN initially tolerated delays in demobilization by RENAMO, in July 1993 its position hardened as the deployment of UN forces reached full strength and in October the UN reached agreement with RENAMO on key issues that RENAMO advanced to justify its failure to demobilize, including the demobilization process itself and the law governing the elections (Rupiya 1998). RENAMOs complaint that it lacked the funds to transform itself into a fully functioning political party was addressed by the setting up of a UN trust fund (Accord 1997). In April 1994 UNITA finally began demobilizing its troops (Cravinho & George 2007, 798, 799). By December 1994 the process of resettling three million internally displaced people and 1.7 million refugees was completed (Cravinho & George 2007, 798, 799). For more detail on the transition see Preparation for elections.

The long awaited elections were finally conducted in a peaceful environment on 27-29 October 1994 and were certified as free and fair by the UN on 14 November (Rupiya 1998). For more detail on the run-up to the election see Multiparty elections of October 1994. Nearly 80% of the electorate cast their ballots in the presidential election for one of 12 candidates. Chissano of FRELIMO won 53% of the vote to that of RENAMO's Dhlakama who won 34%, while none of the other 10 candidates were able to muster even 3% (For more detail see 1994 Presidential election results . In the concurrent Assembly of the Republic election FRELIMO won 44% of the vote, and was allocated 52% of the seats, RENAMO received 38% of the vote and was allocated 45% of the seats while the Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDEMO) received 5% of the vote and was allocated 4% of the seats. None of the 11 other parties and coalitions that contested the election attained the 5% of the vote threshold required by the Constitution to gain representation in the Assembly of the Republic (for more detail see 1994 Assembly of the Republic results.

The performance of the two main parties in the Assembly of the Republic elections varied considerably from province to province. FRELIMO obtained an absolute majority of the vote in the southern provinces of Maputo City, Maputo Province, Gaza and Imhambane; indeed in the first three provinces it won well over three-quarters of the vote and in Imhambane just under 60%. In the far north it won an absolute majority in Cabo Delgado (58%) and took Niassa by a plurality (46%). In the central provinces where it was beaten by RENAMO it still fared well, obtaining just over 30% in Zambezia, Tete and Nampula and 27% in Manica; only in Sofala did it do very poorly, managing a meagre 14% of the votes cast. RENAMO, for its part, won an absolute majority in the central provinces of Sofala (76%), Manica (58%), Zambezia (52%) and came very close to majorities in Tete (49%) and Nampula (48%). In the northern provinces it drew a substantial slice of the vote Niassa (33%), Cabo Delgado (23%) but in the southern provinces it performed very poorly (Imhambane, 13%; Maputo City, 9%; Maputo Province, 7% and Gaza, 3%). The combined vote for the smaller parties nowhere exceeded 28% and in Sofala fell below 10% (see 1994 Assembly of the Republic results by province for more detail).

References

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