Mozambique: Pragmatism, reform and the quest for peace (1987-1994)

Updated February 2008

President Joaquim Chissano accelerated the reform process begun by his predecessor, Samora Machel. In January 1987, even before he assumed the Presidency in February, the government launched an International Monetary Fund backed structural adjustment plan (the Economic Rehabilitation Program) with wide-ranging reforms aimed at moving away from a state-controlled centralized economy towards a free-market system (Cravinho & George 2007; IIASA 2001; Accord 1997). This involved a devaluation of the currency, a reduction in the deficit before borrowing through fiscal discipline and higher taxes, tighter control of the money supply and the linking of wage rises to productivity increases as well as the deregulation of target prices and measures to increase production through the stimulation of exports and import substitution (Cravinho & George 2007). The economy responded to these measures, with growth averaging 5.4% between 1987 and 1989 while inflation fell from 160% in 1987 to 35% in 1991 (Cravinho & George 2007). The United Nations provided Mozambique with some US$330 million in emergency assistance (Accord 1997).

It was becoming increasingly evident that the civil war would not be ended by the military victory of one side over the other and that a stale-mate had developed (Accord 1997). Thus victories in February 1987 in the north by FRELIMO were balanced by increases in RENAMO operations in the south (Cravinho 2007, 797). The Nkomati Accord, already a dead letter, was put to rest by South African military raids on African National Congress (ANC) bases in Maputo (Cravinho 2007, 797). Some success was obtained by the Frontline States in persuading Malawi to end RENAMO incursion from bases on its territory and a massive RENAMO offensive down the Zambezi Valley to cut the country in two and establish RENAMO control over the north was reversed through a counter-offensive in 1988 supported by Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe, by this stage, had 10 000 troops in Mozambique. Rupiya 1998; Accord 1997).

However, the military conflict pushed hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighbouring countries and there was great loss of civilian life in Gaza and Inhambane provinces, in massacres blamed on RENAMO (Rupiya 1998; Lodge et al 2002, 196). Atrocity were committed by both sides and evidence began to emerge of bandit gangs, controlled by neither side, ravaging the countryside and terrorising the rural people (Lodge et al 2002, 197). According to Young (1991):

Between 1986 and mid-1988, some 100 000 civilians are believed to have been murdered by RENAMO, and about 1 million others fled to neighboring countries. Foreign relief organizations estimate that a total of 3.2 million people are now [in 1991] totally dependent on food aid, while about the same number require some assistance.

Warming relations with religious groups, and especially the Christian Churches, enabled religious leaders to extend public calls for a peaceful conclusion to the civil war that was ravaging the country (Rupiya 1998; Lodge et al 2002, 197). Chissano, while publicly distancing himself from these initiatives, saw the religious leaders as a possible conduit through which dialogue with RENAMO could be established and expressed this to privately to a Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) delegation in late 1987 (Accord 1997; Sengulane & Goncalves 1998). The CCM involved the Catholic Church in their efforts, and between January and March 1988 meetings were held with RENAMO in New York and, with the assistance of the Kenyan government solicited by Kenyan diplomat Bethuel Kiplagat, also with Afonso Dhlakama in May (Sengulane & Goncalves 1998; Accord 1997; Lodge et al 2002, 197).

The lack of trust between FRELIMO and RENAMO was deepened in April 1988 when the US State Department commissioned Gersony Report implicated RENAMO in the killing of 100 000 Mozambican civilians (Accord 1997; Young 1991). In the same month members of the Mozambican secret service assassinated RENAMO's secretary-general Evo Fernandes in Lisbon (Accord 1997). President Moi of Kenya dispatched Bethuel Kiplagat as an envoy to Chissano to explore how Kenya could assist with the peace process and with overcoming the mutual suspicion that existed between the two parties (Accord 1997). Chissano, however, continued to refuse recognition to RENAMO, while the churches (without his consent) continued to explore dialogue with RENAMO with Kenyan assistance (Accord 1997). The churchmen became convinced that only through negotiations with RENAMO's internal wing could lead to a meaningful peace dialogue and reported as much to Chissano (Accord 1997). FRELIMO, late in 1988, returned all the land nationalized in the 1970s to the churches (Accord 1997). Meanwhile meetings between the Mozambican and South African governments in September/October 1988 led to South Africa honouring its undertakings to withdraw aid from RENAMO and to assist in th peace process (Accord 1997; Rupiya 1998).

References

ACCORD 1997 "Mozambique: Chronology", [www] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/chronology.php [opens new window] (accessed 25 Jan 2008).

CRAVINHO, JG 2007 "Mozambique: Recent History" IN Frame, I (ed) Africa South of the Sahara 2008, Europa Publications, 796-801.

CRAVINHO, JG & GEORGE, E 2007 "Mozambique: Economy" IN Frame, I (ed) Africa South of the Sahara 2008, Europa Publications, 802-811.

CRAWFURD, J 2002 "Mozambique Timeline", [www] http://crawfurd.dk/africa/mozambique_timeline.htm [opens new window] (accessed 25 Jan 2008).

LODGE, T, KADIMA, D & POTTIE, D (eds) 2002 Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa, EISA.

RUPIYA, M 1998 "Historical context: war and peace in Mozambique" IN Accord, [www] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/historical-context.php [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).

SENGULANE, DS & GONCALVES, JP 1998 "A Calling for Peace: Christian Leaders and the Quest for Reconciliation in Mozambique" IN Accord, [www] http://web.archive.org/web/20020419161151/www.c-r.org/accord/acc_moz/sengulane.htm [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).

YOUNG, LS 1991 "Mozambique's Sixteen-Year Bloody Civil War", [www] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/YLS.htm [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).