Mozambique: One-party rule, socialism and civil war (1975-1986)

Updated February 2008

The sudden and precipitous withdrawal of the Portuguese and the independence of Mozambique under a one-party Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government ushered in a period of immense difficulty for the new state (Crawfurd 2002). Racial violence and riots in the capital and elsewhere marked the transition; independence on 25 June 1975 saw a massive emigration of white settlers (who destroyed whatever property they could not take with them) along with their skills and their capital, so that the country was plunged into economic and administrative crisis from its birth (Columbia Encyclopedia 2007; Rupiya 1998; Crawfurd 2002). By 1977 the white population had declined from 200 000 to 30 000 people and FRELIMO was forced to deploy inexperienced cadres with little training to attempt to prop up the collapsing administration (Stanford Undated; Rupiya 1998; Crawfurd 2002).

The legacy left by the Portuguese was a poor one; there was little in the way of infrastructure and what there was had been created to extract resources and fight the war against FRELIMO; healthcare or education facilities were sparse and more than 90% of the population was illiterate (Rupiya 1998; Crawfurd 2002; IIASA 2001). FRELIMO acted vigorously to attempt to stabilise the situation by implementing a range of classic Marxist-Leninist measures such as nationalizing commerce, finance and industry and abolishing private land ownership (Columbia Encyclopedia 2007; Crawfurd 2002). Local committee were set up through out the country to oversee the resumption of production and farming, while the state took ownership and control over private (including religious owned) housing, schools and medical facilities (Crawfurd 2002; Rupiya 1998).

These measures were accompanied by a ruthless suppression of dissent within and without FRELIMO and a clamp down on religious groups, while opponents were sent to brutal reeducation camps (Rupiya 1998). The Catholic Church was in particular viewed with suspicion, not only because it was viewed as the hand-maiden of Portuguese colonialism, but also because it was the largest single institution not directly under state control; churches were closed, clergy expelled and property seized (Sengulane & Goncalves 1998). Along with the clamp down went a centralization of power; the National Service for Public Security was set up with widespread powers that enabled the secret police force to monitor and detain those believed to be acting against the state, while "Dynamising Committees" set up in the rural areas, where the bulk of the population lived, displaced traditional authorities and acted as local organs of control and repression (Rupiya 1998; Lodge et al 2002, 195).

The formation of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) was precipitated by the Mozambique government's decision to participate in international sanctions against the rebel British colony of Rhodesia by closing the border with it in March 1976, and to provide bases and material support to the Zimbabwean African National Union fighting for independence (Crawfurd 2002; Lodge et al 2002, 194). Rhodesia, heavily dependent on the Beira-Harare corridor, retaliated initially with direct attacks across the border and later by the creation of, and provision of support for, (RENAMO) under the leadership of André Matzangaisa (Lodge et al 2002, 194; ISS Undated). RENAMO was constituted initially from black and white members of the Portuguese army that had fled to Rhodesia and Mozambian exiles from various countries, but later included FRELIMO dissidents and opponents (Lodge et al 2002, 193-194; Crawfurd 2002). RENAMO had little ideological cohesion and lacked a political programme, being little more than a coalition of anti-socialist and ant-FRELIMO forces (Crawfurd 2002). The Mozambican army was, however, able to contain these incursions, for initially RENAMO had little support internally (Lodge et al 2002, 194; Rupiya 1998).

FRELIMO's Third Party Congress in February 1977 formalised the Stalinist direction that the party had been moving in. It transformed itself from a popular mass-based movement into an elitist authoritarian vanguard party and a democratic centralist electoral system was adopted on the lines of the of the Russian Soviets, with members of lower order assemblies electing delegates to higher level assemblies and the entire nomination and election process tightly under FRELIMO control (Rupiya 1998; Lodge et al 2002, 194-195). Mass labour, women's, youth and media organisations were set up to support FRELIMO's mobilisation of members of society (Rupiya 1998; Lodge et al 2002, 195). In this way discipline was tightened up within FRELIMO and FRELIMO's control over social organisations and the organs of state consolidated (Lodge et al 2002, 195). As a result of this "left-wards" swing, the FRELIMO government found itself increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and the COMINTERN block diplomatically, economically and militarily (Rupiya 1998; Crawfurd 2002). Thus in 1977 the Congress of the United States used human rights violations as a pretext for placing restrictions on development aid, while support from Europe came mainly from the Nordic countries (Young 1991; Crawfurd 2002).

References

CRAWFURD, J 2002 "Mozambique Timeline", [www] http://crawfurd.dk/africa/mozambique_timeline.htm [opens new window] (accessed 25 Jan 2008).

COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2007, "Mozambique: History", Sixth Edition, [www] http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Mozambiq.html [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (IIASA) 2001 "Country Briefs: Mozambique - Chronology of History" IN Botswana's future, Mozambique's Future, Namibia's Future: Modeling Population and Sustainable development Challenges in the Era of HIV/AIDS [www] http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pde/briefs/mz-history.html [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (ISS) UNDATED "Mozambique: History and Politics", [www] http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/Mozambique/Politics.html [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).

LODGE, T, KADIMA, D & POTTIE, D (eds) 2002 Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa, EISA.

RUPIYA, M 1998 "Historical context: war and peace in Mozambique" IN Accord, [www] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/historical-context.php [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).

STANFORD, E UNDATED "Culture of MOZAMBIQUE", [www] http://www.everyculture.com/Ma-Ni/Mozambique.html [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).

SENGULANE, DS & GONCALVES, JP 1998 "A Calling for Peace: Christian Leaders and the Quest for Reconciliation in Mozambique" IN Accord, [www] http://web.archive.org/web/20020419161151/www.c-r.org/accord/acc_moz/sengulane.htm [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).

YOUNG, LS 1991 "Mozambique's Sixteen-Year Bloody Civil War", [www] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/YLS.htm [opens new window] (accessed 18 Jan 2008).