What can the region learn from the 2002 Lesotho National Assembly elections?

Denis Kadima, Senior Program Manager at Washington DC-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).
He was the Elections Advisor for the SADC Parliamentary Forum Election Observer Mission to Lesotho in May 2002, June 19, 2002

The Kingdom of Lesotho held legislative elections on 25 May 2002. While these elections did not draw much attention in the international community, they attracted a great deal of interest in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. This regional interest in the small kingdom can first be explained by the fact that SADC troops intervened in Lesotho after the collapse of law and order following the dispute over the electoral outcome in 1998. These events encouraged Basotho politicians to design inclusive political and electoral processes and frameworks in order to avoid a recurrence of the 1998 situation. It was therefore important for the region to closely monitor electoral developments in the mountain kingdom.

The second reason that explains the region's interest in the Lesotho elections is that the region could not afford to have a third consecutive controversial national election, following the fiasco in Zambia in December 2001 and in Zimbabwe in March 2002. This would tarnish the image of the SADC region. Similarly, a failure of the Lesotho elections would weaken the central argument advanced by African leaders, that through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the continent commits itself to democracy and good governance, and that any deviation from this commitment would be dealt with effectively by Africans themselves.

Thus, several governments and regional organisations sent election observer missions to Lesotho, to demonstrate the interest of the region in these general elections, instil confidence in the electoral process and encourage high levels of voter participation. The SADC Parliamentary Forum was the first election observer mission to arrive in Lesotho and had the largest observer group, with 25 observers and 20 support staff. In addition, SADC parliamentarians got involved in the observation of the electoral process at an early stage, when it deployed a six-member mission in August 2001, to participate in the observation of the election at a pre-electoral phase.

Contrary to the 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe, where virtually all international and regional multi-national observer missions were divided and thus were unable to reach a consensus as to whether the elections were legitimate, credible, free, fair, and a reflection of the will of the people, the assessment of the Lesotho 2002 election was quite straightforward.

The success of the electoral process was attributed to several innovations. First, the role of the Interim Political Authority (IPA), a body composed of representatives of all the political parties that participated in the May 1998 elections, was seen as key in ensuring a level playing field, from the establishment of an inclusive electoral system to the introduction of mechanisms for ensuring fair access to the state-owned media by all parties during the campaign period.

The Lesotho elections were characterised by transparency in each step of the electoral process. Political parties and candidates were given the opportunity to attend meetings periodically and regularly with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and to discuss and agree on how to proceed on relevant matters. The establishment of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system was also seen as crucial in the success of the 2002 elections. This electoral system is designed in such way that out of the 120 seats in the National Assembly, 80 are filled through the first-past-the-post system. The remaining 40 seats are used to compensate the "best losers" who had won fewer seats in the constituency vote, on a pro rata basis.

The MMP electoral system provides that the more seats a party wins in the constituency election, the less it qualifies for seats in the proportional vote. This also impacted the election of women, in particular. Accordingly, the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), which won 77 of the 78 contested seats in the constituency election, was not entitled to any seat in the proportional representation contest where most of its candidates were female. Conversely, the main opposition parties such as the Basotho National Party (BNP), the Lesotho People's Congress (LPC) and the Basutholand African Congress (BAC) had placed relatively more female candidates in the constituency elections where they stood little chance of winning seats. Was this coincidental or deliberate? I doubt that those political parties ignored their strengths and weaknesses. This resulted in the new Parliament having only nine women out of 118 MPs, or 7.6 percent. This is a major setback for women's representation, as Lesotho thus falls far below SADC's minimum target of 30 percent women in decision-making positions, including parliaments. Party leadership needs to put in place mechanisms that would ensure that women and other under-represented groups, such as the youth, are meaningfully represented in future parliaments.

Nonetheless, the main positive lesson that can be learnt from Lesotho's recent electoral experience is that the 1998 election results, which caused political instability, are comparable to the 2002 results. However, the main difference between the two electoral processes is that, in 2002, there was increased transparency, openness and inclusiveness, which resulted in the legitimacy, the credibility and the acceptability of the election outcome by all. Lesotho thus offers an emulating experience for the SADC region and beyond.