2002 Elections puts Lesotho on track for democratic consolidation (continued)

Disputes between the LCD and the opposition parties decreed that the timetable soon proved impossible, yet eventually agreement was reached upon the adoption of a new electoral system. Following the imbalanced results of the elections of 1993 and 1998, which had seen one party sweep the constituencies and leave a substantial minority of the population unrepresented in the National Assembly, there was widespread agreement that the first-past-the-post electoral system was at severe fault and was serving to exacerbate conflict between the political parties. It was consequently agreed that the forthcoming election (finally scheduled for May 2002) would be contested under a new system in which the voters would have the choice of casting two votes: one for a candidate of their choice in one of the 80 existing constituency seats, competed for under first-past-the post, and one for a party in a contest for 40 seats, which would be allocated according to proportional representation whose purpose would be to compensate parties who suffered disproportionately in the constituency elections. The '80 + 40' MMP model was therefore designed to ensure the inclusion of opposition representatives in parliament. The wisdom of the change in system was to be demonstrated by the election result - for once again the LCD swept the constituencies, and with 77 out of the 78 seats, was substantially over-represented. Hence it was that when the final calculations were done, it received no PR seats in compensation, and all 40 such seats were allocated to parties of opposition.

Despite their securing representation under PR, the leading opposition parties, notably the BNP (led by former military ruler General Justin Lekhanya), were initially reluctant to accept the result, refusing to believe - despite unanimous agreement by electoral monitoring teams that the election was free and fair - that they had again been so thoroughly trounced in the constituency contests. However, it was here that the MMP model did its work. Threats by General Lekhanya that the BNP would boycott the new parliament were rapidly undercut - not only by South African and international pressure - but by the determination of newly elected opposition parliamentarians to take their seats in the Assembly, and to secure the salaries and perks which go with the job. Rather than criticizing from outside, the opposition parties now have the opportunity to oppose the government from within the boundaries of the formal political system.

There should be no great surprise that the LCD should have won such a handsome victory, despite the threat represented by the breakaway of the LPC - led by former Deputy Prime Minister Maope - in 1997. The LCD has appropriated the inheritance of the radical anti-colonial tradition of the original BCP, which was founded by Ntsu Mokhehle in the 1950s. Because he was excluded from power until 1993, he never had the opportunity to squander that inheritance in the way that his contemporaries, such as Nkrumah and Kaunda, had done so in their own countries.

Subsequently, after 1993, his BCP government was to be greatly troubled by the refusal of disloyal security forces to allow it to govern. Eventually, after the ill and ageing Mokhehle had confounded his internal party opponents by forming the LCD, he had anointed Mosisili as his successor. Following the SADC intervention, Mosisili took full advantage of the LCD's new freedom not only to restructure the security forces, but to re-build Maseru and other towns, undertake an extensive road building programme throughout the country, make primary education free, encourage investment (notably into an expanding textile industry) and to undertake the high profile prosecution of a high official accused of taking bribes from giant multinational corporations allegedly seeking favour in allocation of contracts for work on the massive Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme. Yet perhaps most importantly of all, the LCD's tenure of office under Mosisili has come to be associated with a cessation of political violence. If under the BNP and the military ordinary people did not feel free to sleep safely in their beds, and if under the BCP after 1993 civility was threatened by the security forces, post-1998 Lesotho under the LCD has seen a substantial improvement in political peace and security - with the major threat to the welfare of ordinary citizens now threatened mainly by non-political violence in the terms of armed stock theft in the mountains. Lesotho 2002 points to the truth of the old adage: oppositions don't win elections, governments lose them. The LCD was proud of its record, and was utterly confident of its victory.

The major threat to the LCD lies not amongst the opposition parties, which broadly speaking remain divided and disorganized, but from within. In 1993, the BCP, then the embodiment of the radical Congress tradition, secured 75% of the popular vote. In 1998, the LCD, whilst demonstrating that it had appropriated that tradition from the BCP, took 65% of the vote. In 2002, after another internal split, it has taken just 55% of the popular vote. Lesotho's politics have always been riven by factionalism, and the danger to the LCD is that personal rivalries could lead to a further divide which could render its domination of the polity vulnerable. How Mosisili manages to contain such a threat remains to be seen. For the moment, however, the LCD can bask in a victory freely and fairly obtained under rules and conditions which promise Lesotho greater prospects for peace, democracy and stability than at any time since independence in 1966.