Lesotho: Challenges of a developing democracy (continued)
In the early nineties, Lesotho embarked on a new constitution-making process, but so fragile was that process that weak institutions were unable to defend democracy. This generated increased political instability during 1993-1994, caused primarily by army mutinies, and mutinies in the police and prisons services. For example, in August 1994, King Letsie III, in collaboration with some members of the military, staged a coup, suspended parliament and appointed a ruling council. Between 1995 and 1996 again there were isolated incidents of violence and instability.
In 1997, the fragility of the weak constitutional monarchy was exposed with a deep split in the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) leadership. Dr Nstu Mokhehle established the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), which then gained the support of two-thirds of parliament. The BCP was relegated to opposition status.
In May 1998, multi-party elections were held, with a landslide victory for the LCD. Pakalitha Mosisili became the new Prime Minister. The Langa Commission was appointed by SADC to investigate the electoral process. However, because of uncertainties, including those caused by a delay in the outcome and findings of the Commission, protests intensified. Democracy again proved too frail to defend itself against intervention.
During August 1998 there were violent demonstrations outside the palace and unprecedented levels of violence ensued, with a virtual coup d'etat taking place, causing immense financial damage to this 'least developed country'. A mutiny by junior members of the armed services forced the beleaguered Lesotho government to send an S.O.S. to SADC, which responded by launching Operation Boleas, led by South African and Botswanan troops.
The electoral process in Lesotho: 1998-2002
Not only Lesotho, but the entire southern African region got a major scare from the volatile events of 1998. Regional players - both state and non-state - acted with the necessary urgency. Following diplomatic efforts by a number of SADC countries - South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, later joined by Namibia - and interventions by a cohort of donors and NGOs, on 2 October 1998 the different political parties in Lesotho agreed to hold new general elections within 15-18 months. An interim political authority (IPA), consisting of two members from each of the twelve political parties that contested the May 1998 election, was established and legitimised through Act No. 16 of 1998, passed on 16 November 1998, to oversee the process towards elections.
Due to tensions and a serious political impasse between the incumbent Lesotho government and the IPA from February 2001, external actors, including the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), UNDP and the Commonwealth, pushed for what EISA called 'consensus-building mechanisms' and processes to establish the rules of the game around two major obstacles, the electoral model and the method of voter registration. This resulted in the 'Harmony Pact'. The external actors worked with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in recommending a suitable voter registration method. A combination method encompassing both fingerprinting and indelible ink technologies was endorsed.
On 28 February 2001 the consensus-building efforts bore some fruit, with both Houses of Parliament agreeing on an Electoral Bill, which stipulated a seat allocation of 80 constituency-based members for the National Assembly, supplemented by 40 members elected by proportional representation. Again, in collaboration with the above-mentioned external actors, significant progress was made and the Bill was passed into law in January 2002.