Lesotho: Lesotho set fair to good for May election (continued)

The fourth, and extremely important reason why 1998 should turn out differently form 2002 is that the government has been enabled, by SADC backing, to undertake a significant restructuring of the security forces, most notably the army. It was precisely the antipathy of the security forces to elected BCP governments which lay at the root of the perennial crises which Lesotho endured after 1993. However, whatever else it may have done, the SADC military presence after 1998 enabled the LCD government to restructure the security forces by a combination of prosecution in the courts of past military indiscipline, paid retrenchments and re-training. Importantly, too, by becoming involved in SADC military structures and ventures, young professional army officers - now recruited from university and sent abroad for technical training - are enabled to see a career ahead of them that extends beyond Lesotho to the region as a whole. The BNP will no longer be able to look to the army to overturn any election result.

The final reason why the 2002 election should work to stabilise rather than destabilise Lesotho is that the LCD government has proved relatively successful. It cannot claim all the credit, for the environment in which it has worked has been relatively benign. Unlike the post 1974 BNP government, it has not been at perpetual odds with South Africa and unlike its pre-1997 BCP predecessor, it has not been directly challenged by the military. This goes a long way to explain the decline of political killings and an improved human rights situation (even if, for instance, the conditions in Lesotho's prisons remain shocking). Immense challenges to stability do remain, not least the continuing threat of armed robbery by stock thieves in the mountains. Yet the country is at greater peace than before, and this has allowed space for the LCD to attempt significant socio-economic improvements, pride of place amongst which must be the highly popular introduction of free primary school education. Long term economic prospects for Lesotho remain grim, but the LCD - which appears to have captured the support of the majority of the country's middle class professionals - displays a greater air of competence than any of its predecessors.

Yet nothing in Lesotho is guaranteed. Despite the electoral and other reforms, the political situation remains fragile, as demonstrated by a split within the LCD in late 2001 which saw the departure from the government of the then Deputy Prime Minister, Kelebone Maope, and his formation the Lesotho People's Congress (LCP), which immediately recruited some 27 of the LCD's sitting MPs. Yet subsequent indications are that the LPC is lacking support on the ground, and whilst it has made strenuous efforts to seize the mantle of Mokhehle (who died in January 1999), it has its work cut out to challenge the LCD, which not only has the considerable advantages of incumbency, but has a considerably stronger claim to the Mokhehle legacy. Meanwhile, the rump BCP has itself split and spawned a further party, the Basutoland African Congress (BAC), which will also be fighting for the vote which is traditionally aligned to the domestic Congress tradition. The principal beneficiary of this factionalism within its historically enemy camp will be the BNP, which has some reasonable hope of securing victories in constituencies where Congress tradition votes are split between the LCD, LPC, BPC and BAC. A warning note is also sounded by the BNP leader, ex-General Justin Lekhanya, who continues to argue the likelihood of the importation into the results of 'ghost votes' in favour of the LCD.

This continuing political fragility points to the major need for the forthcoming election to be heavily monitored by both international and domestic agencies. Because Lesotho has rather gone off their radar screen, and because it is such a small country, traditional suppliers of monitors like the EU are remaining rather shy of committing themselves to backing up their support of the election with a significant physical presence. Yet the need is immense. Southern Africa simply cannot afford another major electoral crisis, and bluntly, after the experience in Zimbabwe, where the manifestly fraudulent result was endorsed by various electoral monitoring bodies from the region, an electoral monitoring effort dominated by SA and SADC could well lack credibility. Bodies like the Commonwealth, the EU, and the Carter Center are therefore badly need to give the election in Lesotho, whatever the outcome, proper legitimacy.

The international donors continuously preach democracy. Now is their chance to back that sentiment with proper support - for an election whose symbolic importance eclipses Lesotho's otherwise limited political significance.