Lesotho: Lesotho set fair to good for May election

Roger Southall, Executive Director, Democracy and Governance, Human Science Research Council, Pretoria, May 22, 2002.

After the dubious poll in Zambia and the more recent electoral disgrace in Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and Thabo Mbeki's push for NEPAD badly need a democratic success. Surprisingly, the present indications are that they are likely to get one from a most unlikely source - Lesotho, the scene of extensive post-election mayhem in 1998 which resulted in South Africa's military intervention and the subsequent burning down of the Capital, Maseru, by furious members of the defeated opposition. However, after three years of difficult negotiations between the country's feuding political parties, which have been pushed along by SADC, and careful preparation for a new contest by Lesotho's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the prospects for an efficient and fairly conducted election (which is scheduled for May 25), and one whose results will not be able to be credibly challenged, seem remarkably bright.

The historical background to the forthcoming contest is remarkably discouraging. The result of the pre-independence elections in 1965, won narrowly by Leabua Jonathan's conservative Basotho National Party (BNP), was challenged by Ntsu Mokhehle's radically-inclined Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). Then, when the BNP lost the next elections in 1970, Jonathan suspended the constitution and ruled dictatorially until 1986, when he was overthrown by a South African backed-military coup. When, in turn, the country returned to civilian rule via democratising elections in 1993 which saw the BCP win every single one of the 65 seats up for grabs, the BNP repudiated the result, despite universal approval by foreign and domestic electoral monitors that the election had been free and fair. Unable to comprehend that the vagaries of the first-past-the-post electoral system rather than electoral corruption were responsible for their failure to win a single seat, and equally unable to face the depth of its unpopularity after the long years of its authoritarian rule, the BNP colluded with the then King and the military to have the BCP government dismissed in mid-1994. This brought about SADC's first major intervention into the country's affairs, for strong-arm-twisting by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana secured the rapid return of Mokhehle to power. But it did nothing to promote trust between the BCP, the principal embodiment of the anti-colonial tradition, the monarchy, the BNP (backed by the majority of the chiefs), and the military (which, although having overthrown the BNP in 1986, was overwhelmingly sympathetic to its cause). Hence it was that the scene was set for fireworks when the country returned to the polls in 1998.

By then the situation had become even more complicated by the fragmentation of the BCP. By the late 1990s a battle for the succession to the leadership of the aged and ailing Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, was in full swing. It culminated in his loss of control of the party machinery. Yet he retained the support of the majority of BCP members of parliament. He therefore outmanoeuvred his opponents by declaring the formation of a new political party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), which instantly assumed the reins of government, leaving the BCP as an extremely disgruntled opposition. When the political parties faced the electorate in 1998, the big question was how the BCP vote would split: would it stay with the historically nationalist party, or would it go with the nationalist legend, Mokhehle?

The voters gave an unequivocal answer: 60% of them voted for the LCD (although now led by Pakalitha Mosisili, Mokhehle's anointed heir) and 10% stayed with the BCP. Meanwhile, the BNP took nearly 25% of the vote, with smaller parties cleaning up the rest. Yet again the first-past-the-post electoral system intervened to produce an imbalanced result. Because these proportions of votes were replicated in most of the individual constituencies, the LCD won fully 79 out of the now 80 seats on offer. Again the result was overwhelmingly endorsed by electoral monitors, but as in 1993, the BNP cried 'foul". But this time it was joined by the BCP, which in the months after the election joined with its historic enemy in lobbying the media and the King for the result to be overturned. The eventual outcome was paralysis of the capital and government by opposition supporters (notably by the BNP Youth League), and the build-up of momentum for a further military coup. Hence it was that the LCD, unable to control the BNP-inclined military and police, issued a call for help to SADC. The response was the South African-led intervention in September 1998, whose immensely controversial nature was severely compounded by SANDF incompetence and dismally flawed intelligence. Maseru burned as a result.