Lesotho: Split in the ruling party and its aftermath

Extracted from: "Lesotho" IN Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa (2002), edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David Pottie, EISA, 94-96.

Growing dissatisfaction within the BCP with the aging Mokhehle's faltering leadership and lack of direction (he was in ill health) led to his dismissal as party leader at a party conference in February 1997. This decision was set aside by a court order and Mokhehle continued as party leader, until June, when he broke with the BCP, forming the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). As 41 of the 64 BCP members in the national assembly eventually followed Mokhehle into the new party they constituted a majority and became the ruling party, with Mokhehle thus remaining prime minister. Despite vehement protest by the 23 members who had remained with the BCP, now led by Molapo Qhobela the former deputy leader, they ultimately had no option but to accept the situation. (The BCP had demanded that a new general election be held.) However, the kingdom was no longer a one-party-dominant state as it now had a substantial official opposition in parliament.

In February 1998 Mokhehle retired as party leader and Deputy Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili (also deputy leader of the LCD) was elected to succeed him. At the general election on 23 May 1998 Lesotho's voters once again caused surprise as most of them voted for the LCD candidates in all but one of the 79 contested constituencies (see 1998 National Assembly election results for details). (The election in one constituency was postponed following the death of one of the candidates on the eve of the election.) Consequently, the LCD continued as the government under Mosisili. The opposition parties, including what was left of the BCP, rejected the election results, accusing the government of fraud in at least 19 constituencies.

The disputes were taken to court, but while the judicial process was taking its course, opposition leaders and supporters began to disrupt the capital through initially peaceful, but increasingly more aggressive demonstrations. They prevented parliament from meeting and eventually paralyzed the civil service. The LCD government refused to yield to demands that it should step down in favour of a national unity government which would supervise a new election. Moreover, the government's predicament exposed the rift in the armed forces, with substantial numbers of soldiers openly supporting the opposition. Junior officers, in particular, saw an opportunity to resolve their grievances by, as it later transpired, preparing for a military takeover.

A commission consisting of legal experts, headed by South African constitutional court judge Pius Langa, audited the election documents. The Commission found that the material was in such a state of disarray that it was unable to conclude whether the actual results were correct or rigged.

Meanwhile, in Lesotho army indiscipline had turned into mutiny. The defence force commander and other senior officers fled to South Africa.

The contents of the Langa Report, released in Lesotho on 17 September, added fuel to fire. A delegation of the contact group, headed by South African Sydney Mufamadi, tried in vain to bring together the LCD and the opposition parties to negotiate the way forward. At the same time the LCD government was feared that a military coup was imminent and Prime Minister Mosisili urgently requested military assistance from the contact group. Mufamadi said publicly that coups d'etat were not tolerated within the SADC grouping. On 22 September an SADC military force, consisting of about 800 South African and 200 Botswanan troops, entered Lesotho. The military planners obviously underestimated the fierce resistance to be encountered on the part of the mutineers and the reaction of elements among the civilian population who looted shops, especially those owned by South Africans, and set them alight.

However, the situation was brought under control within a fortnight, with the dissident soldiers being disarmed. The loss of life in the armed conflict and the devastation of Maseru by some of its residents contributed to greater willingness among the opposing parties to negotiate. During October the government and the opposition agreed that a new general election would be held within 15 to 18 months and that an all-party structure was to be responsible for a review of the electoral system and the preparations for the election and its supervision.