DRC: Third Republic: 1990 - 1997

Updated June 2005

The state, as it is commonly understood, had ceased to exist in the Congo and had been replaced by a complex and ever shifting array of personal relations of patronage centred on Mobutu himself. This entire network was sustained by the continual flow of jobs, business concessions and government contracts and gifts of money and other assets from Mobutu personally to the key strongmen who cemented his control (Library of Congress 1997, Reno 1997).

As the formal economy of the country progressively wound down and the economic life of the country, such as it was, went underground to escape the extractions of the government, so internal resources for patronage dried up. The virtual disintegration of the state left those nominally in its employ, the soldiers and civil servants, to secure their own income. Under conditions of economic collapse they could only do so by emulating Mobutu and setting up, on a smaller scale, corrupt networks of extraction and patronage, so doing for the economy on a local level what Mobutu had done on a national level, and his subordinates had done on a provincial level.

By the end of the Cold War the goose that had laid the golden eggs had been killed, cooked and eaten. The ever diminishing flow of patronage progressively loosened the ties that bound subordinates to Mobutu and increased the numbers of those outside the web of wealth and power who sought his downfall. The exigencies of the Cold War had ensured Mobutu of foreign resources and troops necessary to prop up this decaying order. The flow of aid and resources augmented the ever diminishing internal flows and extended the life of the patronage network that had bolstered Mobutu's power.

As the army, paid little or nothing at all, degenerated into a mafia-style protection racket; it became increasingly and visibly incapable of suppressing armed rebellion. American military aid, mercenary expertise and the occasional influx of foreign troops to suppress this or that rebellion were essential for the continued existence of the régime. As William Reno (1997) points out, the end of the Cold War threatened the end for Mobutu himself:

Yet from at least 1990, Mobutu discovered that the contradiction between the exercise and consolidation of political power, on the one hand, and economic inefficiency, on the other, rapidly decreased his capacity to reward loyalty among associates. Changes associated with the end of the Cold War aggravated this.

With the end of the Cold War the Congo lost its strategic significance in the center of the African continent and Mobutu was no longer able to exploit West-East tensions to secure support from the Western powers. Moreover, in late 1989 and early 1990, international criticism of Mobutu intensified in the face of growing evidence of human rights abuses and a gutted economy. The foreign aid dried up overnight and offers of troop support were withdrawn. After almost three decades of mismanagement and kleptocracy, Mobutu was compelled to introduce political reforms to placate his foreign backers and disarm his opponents.

In this context the proclamation of the Third Republic was, in essence, a holding maneuver by Mobutu. As it turned out it was successful and the life of his rule was prolonged by a further seven years.

References

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 1997 "The durability of the patrimonial state" IN Country Studies, [www] http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+zr0046) [opens new window] (accessed 22 Oct 2007).

RENO, W 1997 "Sovereignty and personal rule in Zaïre" IN African Studies Quarterly 1(3), [www] http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/3/4.htm [opens new window] (accessed 22 Oct 2007).