Burundi: Transitional Government (2001 - 2005)

Updated April 2010

In November 2001 the power sharing arrangements of the Arusha accord were implemented and a transitional multi-party government was inaugurated with Unite pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) leader Pierre Buyoya as President and Domitien Ndayizeye of the Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) as Vice President for the first 18 months (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005). The understanding reached was that on 1 May 2003 Ndayizeye would become President and an UPRONA nominee would become Vice President (Bentley & Southall 2005, 91). To facilitate the safe return of opposition from exile a South African protection force was put into place, though this function was transformed into an AU Mission in April 2003 and then into a UN Mission in June 2004 (Institute for Security Studies 2005; Bentley & Southall 2005, 123, 95). Among the challenges facing the government were bringing to an end the civil war continued to rage and intensified fighting threatened to destroy the fragile transitional arrangements in place and derail the transition to democracy, reforming the Tutsi minority dominated army to make it more representative of the population, to curb its political power and subordinate it to the civil authorities and to bring the country's divided and quarrelsome political parties to agreement on a permanent democratic constitutional arrangement.

On its assumption of power the multi-party government was confronted by four Hutu rebel groups that were engaged in military operations against it. The Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) had split into two factions, the larger under the leadership of Agathon Rwasa and the other headed Alain Mugabarabona (later renamed FNL-ICANZO), while Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) was divided between a large faction led by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza and smaller under Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (later renamed the Kaze-FDD. Bentley & Southall 2005, 84, footnote 24, 92; Hatungimana et al 2007, 20; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 158). Under the mediation of South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma all four of these groups were engaged in a sustained effort to bring about negotiation that would ultimately lead to their inclusion in the peace process; however, only in August 2002 were talks between the government, the two CNDD-FDD factions and the smaller FNL- Mugabarabona faction convened, which led to a ceasefire agreement with FNL-Mugabarabona and the CNDD-FDD faction led by Ndayikengurukiye, leaving the two larger and more active rebel groups still outside the peace process (Bentley & Southall 2005, 93; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 158). An agreement made in December 2002 with Nkurunziza's faction of the CNDD-FDD was shipwrecked by intensified fighting between it and the army (Bentley & Southall 2005, 93, 96; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 159).

The government survived the first eighteen months, and on 1 May 2003, in accordance with the provisions of Arusha, the presidency rotated to Ndayizeye and Alfonse Kadege was nominated by UPRONA as Vice-President (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005; Bentley & Southall 2005, 98). Continual efforts were made by regional leaders to draw Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD into the peace process, and to engage Rwasa's FNL in negotiations, but these efforts were made difficult by military offences by both rebel groups, particularly by Rwasa's more active forces (Bentley & Southall 2005, 101). After prolonged negotiations, a deal was finally reached between Ndayizeye and Nkurunziza on 8 October 2003, a ceasefire came into effect in December, the major faction of the CNDD-FDD was brought into the government and its troops were eventually integrated into the national army (Institute for Security Studies 2005; Bentley & Southall 2005, 102-106). This left only the FNL of Rwasa, outside the peace process, which signalled its rejection of the October deal with mortar attacks on the capital and attacks on military bases in various places; the FNL offensive was met (Bentley & Southall 2005, 116, 117; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 159). Direct contact between Ndayizeye and Rwasa was established in January 2004 this initiated a lengthy process that only bore fruit in 2006 (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 159; Hatungimana et al 2007, 20).

On 6 August and agreement was signed by the various parties that laid out the principles that were eventually incorporated into a final Constitution for the post-transitional period (Reyntjens 2006, 119; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 159, 160). In September 2004 the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was created (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 160). At this point it was evident that the logistics of the constitutional referendum set for October would not be managed by the INEC in the short time available to it. In any case there was not yet agreement amongst the parties on all the details of the constitution to be put to the voters (Institute for Security Studies 2005). When it became apparent that elections would not take place in October 2004 as planned the life of the transitional government was extended to April 2005, and later still to August 2005 (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 160). In November 2004 Kadege was sacked as Vice President and replaced by Frederic Ngenzebuhoro also of UPRONA, and UPRONA ended a lengthy boycott of the new draft constitution (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 160). Shortly thereafter the process of disarmament and demobilization of 55&Nbsp;000 soldiers and rebels was begun on 2 December 2004, leaving the new integrated national army eventually with 30 000 members (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 160).

A range of agreements on security force issues culminated in the Global Ceasefire agreement on 15 November 2003 in terms of which a Joint Ceasefire Commission was established to oversee the implementation of ceasefire agreements, the cantonment of the various military forces and the reformation of the military (Alusala 2005, 3, 4). In January 2004 the army and Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD formed an integrated high command that produced an operational plan to implement disarmament, demobilisation and forces integration process and a Technical Forces Plan in June to govern the reformation of the army (Alusala 2005, 4, 5; Reyntjens 2006, 120). The processes was underpinned and enabled by the transformation of the African Union Mission into a UN Mission (Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi, ONUB) in May 2004 and the deployment of additional troops in June (Alusala 2005, 5; Reyntjens 2006, 120). In January 2005 the legislation to create a new national army incorporating all the rebel and government forces was put in place (Institute for Security Studies 2005). Despite concerted efforts, Rwasa's FNL still remained outside the process and continued with military operations, though the intensity of fighting declined and was largely restricted to Bujumbura rural (Institute for Security Studies 2005; Reyntjens 2006, 120). The improved security situation, and Tanzanian dissaffection with it's role as host to about half an million Burundian refugees, led to 145 000 people returning home in 2004/5 (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 161).

In March the referendum on the Constitution (see Constitution for details of the Constitution) was held and it was endorsed by 92% of the electorate with a 92% voter turnout (see 2005 Constitutional referendum results for details). The FNL observed a truce during the conduct of the referendum, and later undertook to do the same in the election period that followed, but attacks did occur in Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza provinces (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 160). The Constitution provided for a sharing of executive power between a President (who would in all likelihood be Hutu) and two Vice presidents, one from a Hutu and the other from a Tutsi political party and members of government would be 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi, while 30% of these would be women; the portfolios of Defence and Police would be held by ministers of different ethnicities (Reyntjens 2006, 119, 120; see Constitution). Similarly the National Assembly was to be composed of 60% Hutus and 40% Tutsis (again 30% of these were to be women) and three co-opted Twa members. The Senate, army and police were to be composed of half Hutu and half Tutsi members (three Twa members were to be co-opted to the Senate). In late April 2005 the Electoral Code (Loi portant code electoral 2005, Loi no 1/015 du avril 20) was passed by Parliament (Salter 2008, 160).

Although the National Assembly election had been postponed to April 2005, but it was postponed again to 4 July for logistical reasons, and were preceded by Communal elections on 3 June (see Communal election results 2005). In the 4 July 2005 National Assembly election the CNDD-FDD won 59 of the 100 seats with 58% of the vote and Pierre Nkurunziza, its leader, was elected President by Parliament on 19 August 2005 (see Parliamentary and presidential results 2005 for details). Some 30% of the CNDD-FDD members elected were Tutsis (Reyntjens 2006, 125). FRODEBU obtained 22% of the vote and 24 seats and was followed by UPRONA with 7% of the vote and 10 seats. Two smaller parties, the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) and Mouvement pour la Réhabilitation du Citoyen-Rurenzangemero (MRC-Rurenzangemero) obtained 5 and 2 seats respectively. Since the results produced a balance in the National Assembly of 35% Tutsi and 25% women, in terms of the Constitution the INEC co-opted and additional 18 MPs to create the ethnic and gender balance required, as well as three Twa members (Reyntjens 2006, 126, 127; Salter 2008, 160). On 28 July the Communal councillors elected the members of the Senate, which resulted in the election of 30 CNDD members, 3 FRODEBU members and the CNDD one; 9 women and 3 Twa members were co-opted by the INEC (Reyntjens 2006, 128).

References

ALUSALA, N 2005 "Disarmament and the transition in Burundi: how soon?", ISS Paper, no 97, January, 1-16.

BENTLEY, K & SOUTHALL, R 2005 An African peace process: Mandela, South Africa-Burundi, Cape Town, HSRC Press.

HATUNGIMANA, A, THERON, J & POPIC, A 2007 "Peace Agreements in Burundi: Assessing the Impact", Conflict Trends, 3, 19-24.

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES 2005 "Burundi: Political System and history", [www] http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Burundi/Politics.html (offline 10 Mar 2010).

MTHEMBU-SALTER, G 2008 "Burundi: Recent History" IN Frame, I (ed) Africa South of the Sahara 2008, London and New York, Routledge.

RELIEF WEB 2005 "Burundi's electoral board releases details of election timetable", [www] http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SODA-6BS4ME?OpenDocument (offline 10 Mar 2010).

REYNTJENS, F 2006 "Briefing: Burundi: A peaceful transition after a decade of war?" African Affairs, 105(418), 117-135.

UK FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 2005 "Country profiles: Burundi", [www] http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1020337957293 [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).