Burundi: Fourth Republic (1996 - 2001)

Updated April 2010

The government of Pierre Buyoya and Unite pour le Progrès National (UPRONA), brought to power by a military coup on 25 July 1996, found itself internationally isolated and subjected to economic and military sanctions as regional leaders imposed a total trade blockade on 31 July and donors froze humanitarian aid (Bentley & Southall 2005, 58, 59; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 155). This, combined with the raging civil war, combined to worsen the economy of the country and weaken the finances of the state even as military expenditure by the state escalated (Mthembu-Salter 2002; Dimond 1998, 2, 4; Oketch & Polzer 2002, 107). War and economic sanctions came on top of a long term process that threatened the economic viability, social development and political stability, namely high and sustained population growth alongside a technologically stagnant agriculturally based subsistence economy on which 90% of the population was dependent: Between 1950 and 1990 the population grew from about 2 million to about 6 million people, resulting in sub-division of land into ever smaller plots and deterioration of soil through over utilisation so that the capacity of the land to support its population became ever more precarious(Dimond 1998, 10, 16).

The economy was highly dependent on coffee production, which supplied 80% of export earnings in the early 1990s, which as a result of violence and the switch to food production led on average annual decline of 5% after 1993; between 1994 and 1998 production fell from 41 000 to 17 000 tons as resistance on the part of Hutus to Tutsi dominance took the form of uprooting coffee trees (Dimond 1998, 16; Oketch & Polzer 2002, 129, 141). Sanctions resulted in massive inflation, which soared to a 36% average for 1996 and resulted in the coast of living almost doubling between July 1996 and July 1997 (Dimond 1998, 16). The proportion of people living below the poverty line increased from 35% to 58% between 1990 and 1997 in the rural areas and from 33% to 66% between 1992 and 1996 in the urban areas (Dimond 1998, 16). Quality of life plummeted between 1993 and 1996 as communal violence and war destroyed educational, health water and sanitation infrastructure (Dimond 1998, 12-15). Vaccination coverage dropped from 83% to 54%, primary school attendance deteriorated from 70% to 53% and infant mortality rose sharply from 110/1000 live births to 136/000; the hunger weakened population deprived of potable water and adequate sanitation fell prey to endemic diseases as malaria, respiratory infections and diarrhoea incidences increased (Dimond 1998, 3, 15).

The major Hutu military organisations ranged against the UPRONA government and the Tutsi controlled army were the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD), together with its armed wing Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD), Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU) with its armed wing Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) and the Front pour la libération nationale (FROLINA), who drew their recruits primarily from the refugee camps in the DRC and Tanzania (Oketch & Polzer 2002, 101, 102, 112). Altogether about 700 000 people fled the country and, since these were mainly Hutus, the numbers of the guerrilla forces operating against the government were swelled (Kimber 1996; Oketch & Polzer 2002, 102). The army meanwhile resorted to the classic counter-insurgency tactic of moving villagers into "protected camps" to isolate the population from the influence of the guerrillas and to deprive the latter of the provisions required for continuing the fight, which swelled the number of internally displaced people to 800 000 at one time (Oketch & Polzer 2002, 102).

Thus some 600 000 people were internally displaced by 1998, living under appalling conditions, and in 1998 some 345 000 people were dependent on food aid (Dimond 1998, 2, 3, 13). Thus about a fifth of Burundi's population was internally or externally displaced (Dimond 1998, 4). These forced removals and the appalling living conditions in the camps were resented by the primarily Hutu peasants who bore their brunt (Mthembu-Salter 2002; Oketch & Polzer 2002, 102). This massive population displacement further impacted on coffee and food production, worsening the economic and social situation (Oketch & Polzer 2002, 105-106). The overthrow of Mobuto Sese Seko in May 1997 removed the DRC as one of the primary bases of operation and sources of finance from the Hutu rebels and most of the 500 000 refugees there were forced to return to Burundi (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 156, 162). Incursion from Tanzanian refugee camps continued and widespread clashes between the army and Hutu insurgents occurred in July and August 1997 (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 156; Institute for Security Studies 2005). Eventually the government was able to regain control of 12 of the 17 provinces, but the other five remained theatres of war between the government and its opponents, particularly rural Bujumbura and Makamba provinces (Dimond 1998, 4; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 156).

Buyoya attempted ward off international pressure and reverse economic sanctions by engaging the internal wing of the ousted Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) in negotiations which resulted in a new power sharing agreement in May 1998 (Mthembu-Salter 2002). An interim Constitution was adopted in June which legitimated Buyoya's rule, FRODEBU members were included in the government, the National Assembly was expanded to incorporate opposition parties and a three-year transition to civilian rule was announced (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 156; Bentley & Southall 2005, 58). The external wing of FRODEBU rejected the agreement and continued their struggle, while the war continued to rage and deaths in the "protected camps" mounted (Institute for Security Studies 2005; Bentley & Southall 2005, 60). Since these measures did not lead to a lifting of sanctions, Buyoya finally agreed to multiparty talks mediated by Tanzania's ex-president Julius Nyerere, which convened in Arusha (Tanzania) in June 1998 (Bentley & Southall 2005, 61). These included most of the parties involved in the conflict and, when the talks were judged to have yielded sufficient fruit, economic sanctions were lifted in January 1999 (Mthembu-Salter 2002; Bentley & Southall 2005, 67).

However the Hutu rebel groups began to fracture, making agreement on a settlement more difficult (Institute for Security Studies 2005). Most significantly, the FDD broke away from CNDD on 8 May 1998 (as the CNDD-FDD) under the leadership of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, while the FNL broke away from PALIPEHUTU in 1999 and these groups, excluded from the process, continued the war (Bentley & Southall 2005, 64; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 156). By 1999 the "protected camps" were closed as a government concession to Hutu militias at the Arusha talks and to international pressure (Mthembu-Salter 2002, Oketch & Polzer 2002, 102). Periodic large scale incursion in the south and massive counterinsurgency operations by the army continued throughout 1998 to 2000, resulting in a heavy death toll amongst civilians, and in late 1999 200 000 civilians in rural Bujumbura were once more forcibly removed to "protected camps" (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 156, 157). In December 1999 South Africa's ex-president Nelson Mandela assumed the role of mediator, and building on the successes of Nyerere (who had died on 14 October) and strong support from the USA and the EU, he adopted a forceful approach to bring the various parties to agreement (Bentley & Southall 2005, 71; Reyntjens 2005, 118). A failed coup attempt by from within the military in May 2000 demonstrated again how uncertain the government's support within the military was (Bentley & Southall 2005, 76).

Eventually on 28 August 2000 the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement was signed by 13 of the 19 parties, but the six outstanding Tutsi hard-line parties were pressured into agreement on 20 September; two major rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD and the FNL, still remained outside the peace process and could not be persuaded to agree to even a cease fire, but instead intensified military operations (Bentley & Southall 2005, 79-80; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 157). To create incentives for the parties to implement the agreement a conference of donors and international organisations and institutions was convened in Paris in December 2000 at which US$440 million was pledged for the reconstruction and development of Burundi, conditional on the formation of the transitional government (Bentley & Southall 2005, 81-82). In February 2001 the Forces Nationales pour la Libération (FNL) invaded Bujumbura and only in March did the army regain control of the whole of the capital (Mthembu-Salter 2002). Meanwhile disaffection with the peace process amongst Tutsis expressed itself in two attempted coups in that year (Mthembu-Salter 2002). Ongoing attempts to bring the FNL and CNDD-FDD into the peace process were complicated by factionalism within both groups. On 23 Feb 2001 the FNL split into two factions, one under the leadership of Agathon Rwasa (the larger of the two) and the other under Kossan Kabura (who was later succeeded by Alain Mugabarabona) which later became the FNL-ICANZO (Bentley & Southall 2005, 84, footnote 24; Hatungimana et al 2007, 20; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 158). In October 2001 the CNDD-FDD broke into two factions, one headed by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza (the larger of the two) and the other led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, which later became the Kaze-FDD (Bentley & Southall 2005, 92; Hatungimana et al 2007, 20; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 158).

Translating the provisions of the agreement into concrete forms and steps took some time. In July 2001 it was agreed that the transitional government would have a life of 36 months and would be headed by Boyoya for the first half and by FRODEBU leader Domitien Ndaizeye in the final 18 months, work on the integration of armed forces would begin immediately and an African Union military force would be deployed (Reyntjens 2005, 118; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 158). On 28 October the Transitional Constitution was promulgated, South Africa troops began to arrive on the 30th and on 1 November 2001 Boyoya was inaugurated as head of the multi-party transitional government with Ndaizeye as Vice President (Reyntjens 2005, 118; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 158). The transitional National Assembly was constituted on 4 January 2001 and included nominees by the signatories of the Arusha agreement that were not hitherto represented, while the transitional Senate began its work in the following month (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 158). The four rebel factions remained intransigent and launched new offensives in late November (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 158). Between 1993 and 2002 an estimated 200 000 to 250 000 people perished in the conflict and even then the conflict was not at an end (Oketch & Polzer 2002, 100).

References

BENTLEY, K & SOUTHALL, R 2005 An African peace process: Mandela, South Africa-Burundi, Cape Town, HSRC Press.

DIMOND, M 1998 Choosing hope: the case for constructive engagement in Burundi, United Nations Resident Coordinator System in Buru, Bujumbura, Burundi.

HATUNGIMANA, A, THERON, J & POPIC, A 2007 "Peace Agreements in Burundi: Assessing the Impact", Conflict Trends, 3, 19-24.

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES 2005 "Burundi: Political System and history", [www] http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Burundi/Politics.html (offline 10 Mar 2010).

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MTHEMBU-SALTER, G 2008 "Burundi: Recent History" IN Frame, I (ed) Africa South of the Sahara 2008, London and New York, Routledge.

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OKETCH, JS & POLZER, T 2002 "Conflict and Coffee in Burundi" IN Lind, J & Sturman, K (eds) Scarcity and Surfeit: The ecology of Africa's conflicts, Institute for Security Studies, [www] http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/ScarcitySurfeit/Chapter3.pdf [PDF document, opens new window] (accessed 14 Apr 2010).

REYNTJENS, F 2005 "Briefing: Burundi: A peaceful transition after a decade of war?", African Affairs, 105(418),, 117-135.