Burundi: Third Republic (1987 - 1996)

Updated May 2010

From the outset the military regime led by Pierre Buyoya, that came to power in September 1987, expressed the intention to broaden the popular basis of the government by incorporating Hutus into government (Institute for Security Studies 2005). Buyoya released hundreds of political prisoners and relaxed the persecution of the Church (Bentley & Southall 2005, 44; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153). However, Buyoya failed to move quickly, for he first attempted to mollify hard-liners within the ruling elite, and disappointed Hutu expectations led to renewed uprisings in the north on the Rwandan border in August 1988 (Institute for Security Studies 2005; Oketch & Polzer 2002, 98). The Hutu uprising led to massacres of Tutsis by Hutus, perhaps 500 Tutsi civilians were killed and then of Hutus by the army; some 20 000 were killed and 60 000 fled to Rwanda (Institute for Security Studies 2005; Oketch & Polzer 2002, 98, 99).

Under intense international pressure Buyoya suspended the 1981 Constitution and created the post of Prime Minister which he gave to Adrien Sibomana, a Hutu of the Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) that had been founded in 1986 (Kimber 1996; Bentley & Southall 2005, 44). Hutus were incorporated into a unity government a timetable was set for a transition to civilian rule (Kimber 1996; Bentley & Southall 2005, 44). The government's cautious steps in the reform process provoked several coup attempts by Tutsi hardliners who feared that power was slipping from their hands (Bentley & Southall 2005, 44; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153). Civil unrest did not abate either, for there was significant violence and unrest in November 1991 and April 1992; the latter was blamed on the Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), founded among Hutu refugees in the DRC in 1980 (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153). Nevertheless, the reform process was pressed on. The issue of ethnic factionalism was openly debated and a Charter of National Unity adopted in February 1991, followed by a new Constitution, which was endorsed in a national referendum in March 1992, though it was rejected by PALIPEHUTU (see 1992 Constitutional referendum results for details; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153; Oketch & Polzer 2002, 99).

On the 1 June 1993 elections were held in terms of the new constitution and FRODEBU leader Melchior Ndadaye defeated Buyoya in the presidential race, winning 65.7% of the vote to Buyoya's 32.9%; a royalist candidate came in a distant third (see 1993 Presidential election results for details). PALIPEHUTU remained banned and did take part in the election (Bentley & Southall 2005, 45). FRODEBU also won the subsequent National Assembly elections on 29 June taking 65 of the 81 seats with 72.6% of the vote, while Buyoya's Unite pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) won the other 16 with 19.8% of the vote; the four other contesting parties failed to win the minimum 5% needed for representation (see 1993 National Assembly election results for details). An UPRONA member, Sylvie Kinigi (a Tutsi woman), was made Prime Minister and a multi-ethnic government of national unity was formed (Bentley & Southall 2005, 45; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153).

The prospect of a democratically elected government led by Hutus that might strip the Bururi-Tutsi elite of its power and wealth, however, led to discontent within the army and an abortive coup attempts were made by military officers in late June and early July 1993, even before President Ndadaye assumed office (Bentley & Southall 2005, 45; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153). President Ndadaye pursued a policy of reconciliation, appointing Tutsi army officers to key command posts, legalising PALIPEHUTU and establishing a Council of National Unity to advise on ethnic matters (Bentley & Southall 2005, 49). He attempted to address the overwhelming dominance of Tutsis in the civil service by recruiting FRODEBU supporters into service and laid plans for an extensive reform of the security forces, heightening the fears of the military (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153). He also attempted to address the economic crisis generated by the regime of President Bagaza by embarking on an IMF formulated Structural Adjustment Programme. This required steep price rises for basic goods, a devaluation of the currency and the privatization of parastatals which led to widespread hardship and alienated the Hutu masses at a time when Ndadaye most needed their support to check the army (Kimber 1996).

In a coup attempt launched by pro-Bagaza paratroopers on 21 October 1993 Ndadaye and a number of prominent Hutu state officials were executed (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153; Bentley & Southall 2005, 50). In the violence that followed before the coup collapsed under the weight of internal and international pressure on the military, and even after Kinigi was able to restore formal government control over the country by 28 October 1993, over 25 000 (perhaps as many as 50 000) people, both Hutu and Tutsi in almost equal numbers, perished and a million, mainly Hutus, fled the country (Mthembu-Salter 2002; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 154; Bentley & Southall 2005, 50). In November 1993, in a measure that reflected the fragility of FRODEBU's grip on power, the Organisation of African Unity finally acceded to its requests for support and deployed 180 troops to protect the members of government (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 154).

After bitter debate, and by overriding the rulings of the Tutsi dominated Constitutional Court, the National Assembly amended the Constitution in early January 1994 to enable it to elect Cyprien Ntaryamira as President (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153; Bentley & Southall 2005, 50, 51). By the end of February fighting between Hutu and Tutsi militias had resulted in each carving out strongholds in the country and subsequent clashes between the army and Hutu militias led to divisions within FRODEBU between those supporting Ntaryamira's policy of disarming all militias and others, led by Léonard Nyangoma, opposed to operations against Hutu militias without first removing Tutsi extremists from the army (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 154). These events so weakened the hand of Ntaryamira that he was forced to accept a government that was 40% Tutsi and that included those that had orchestrated the violence into which the country had been plunged and key security positions were likewise abdicated: "In effect, these various developments had overturned the proto-democratic order established by the 1993 election and restored the Tutsi elite to power" (Bentley & Southall 2005, 52).

Endless political compromises, renewed communal violence (spurred by the violent incursions of armed Hutu militia from the DRC and retaliatory operations by the army ordered by Ntibantunganya, but that were vented indiscriminately on Hutu civilians) led to the breakaway of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) from FRODEBU in March 1994 (Bentley & Southall 2005, 52, 56; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153). In turn radicalised movements within the Tutsi elite emerged, as UPRONA began to splinter, such as that of ex-president Bagaza who launched the Parti pour le redressement national (PARENA) in May 1994 (Bentley & Southall 2005, 53; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153, 154).

On 6 April 1994 a plane carrying Ntaryamira and Rwandan President Habyarimana was shot down, signalling the beginning of the genocide in Rwanda (Institute for Security Studies 2005, Mthembu-Salter 2002). Under the leadership of Léonard Nyangoma the CNDD established a military wing in August 1994, the Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD), and began to wage a guerrilla war against the army (Bentley & Southall 2005, 53; Mthembu-Salter 2008, 153). The situation was exacerbated by an influx of 200 000 Hutu refugees from Rwanda in the second half of 1994 and ethnic violence and the murder of politicians and public officials became endemic (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 154). UPRONA exploited the disarray of the FRODEBU government of Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, the deteriorating security situation and FRODEBU's dependence on the Tutsi dominated army to prevent the horrors occurring in Rwanda, to extract disproportionate representation in exchange for their support; all this was enshrined in a September/Pctober 1994 deal brokered by the UN (Mthembu-Salter 2002; Bentley & Southall 2005, 52).

The situation continued to deteriorate in 1995, as the army, Tutsi militias and Hutu rebel groups engaged in military operations and committed atrocities against civilians, so that by February 1996 the country was on the edge of full scale civil war (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 154). Regional initiatives, sponsored by the UN failed to make headway in negotiations between the various parties or to stem the violence in the country and the security situation continued to deteriorate (Mthembu-Salter 2008, 154). In 1996, alarmed by the spiralling conflict on his doorstep, and armed with a mandate from the UN and the OAU, President Nyerere of Tanzania attempted to pressure the government to accept a regional peace keeping force (Bentley & Southall 2005, 57). This the army would not accept and it resumed power on 25 July 1996, Ntibantunganya was forced into exile, and Buyoya resumed power (Bentley & Southall 2005, 56-58).

References

BENTLEY, K & SOUTHALL, R 2005 An African peace process: Mandela, South Africa-Burundi, Cape Town, HSRC Press.

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES 2005 "Burundi: Political System and history", [www] http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Burundi/Politics.html (offline 10 Mar 2010).

KIMBER, C 1996 "Coming to terms with barbarism in Rwanda and Burundi" IN International Socialism 73, December, [www] http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj73/kimber.htm [opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010)

MTHEMBU-SALTER, G 2002 "Self-Determination Regional Conflict Profile: Burundi" IN Self determination in focus, Foreign Policy In Focus, [www] http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/burundi_body.html (offline 9 Apr 2010).

MTHEMBU-SALTER, G 2008 "Burundi: Recent History" IN Frame, I (ed) Africa South of the Sahara 2008, London and New York, Routledge.

OKETCH, JS & POLZER, T 2002 "Conflict and Coffee in Burundi" IN Lind, J & Sturman, K (eds) Scarcity and Surfeit: The ecology of Africa's conflicts, Institute for Security Studies, [www] http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/ScarcitySurfeit/Chapter3.pdf [PDF document, opens new window] (accessed 10 Mar 2010).