Angola: Oil and diamonds and the prospects for recovery (continued)
Multi-party elections could also help make the government more accountable, but only if UNITA succeeds in transforming itself from a rebel army to a competitive political party. Since Savimbi's death, UNITA general and close Savimbi associate, General Gato has been interim leader of the party, and his public statements have portrayed UNITA as ready and willing to contribute constructively (allAfrica 2002). Angolans have every reason to be suspicious after decades of war, and a recent UN report claims that important UNITA officers continue to benefit personally from the sale of diamonds, and do not appear committed to the peace process (Pearce 2002). But UNITA leadership has at least shown enough control over its factions to avoid any outbreaks of violence since the ceasefire in April. With the return of control of diamond exports to the government, UNITA will have to find other reliable sources of funding if it is to compete effectively with the MPLA in elections.
The constitution adopted prior to the 1992 elections mandated that local government officials would be elected by local constituencies according to a law to be adopted by the new parliament. With the return to war, the new law was never adopted, and local government officials are now appointed by the central government. Officials are chosen by President dos Santos and are accountable only to him. A peace settlement that includes an emphasis on locally-elected government officials could create a new layer of government more accountable to constituents, more focused on local community needs, and without direct access to the corrupting influence of oil revenues. Malaquias (2000, 23)argues for an emphasis on new, representative local government institutions, stressing the historical corruption and illegitimacy of the Angolan state.
Despite its war-ravaged economy and corrupt government, Angola enjoys a high profile in international affairs. In October, Angola began its term as chair of SADC, and in January it will begin a two-year term on the United Nations Security Council (Kramer 2002). It remains to be seen whether the strategic importance of Angola's oil exports will lead international actors to assist constructively in Angola's transition. High government revenues mean that Angola will most likely be expected to pay for its own transition to peace. The UN has had great difficulty raising the funds it requires to manage what it calls a "humanitarian tragedy" among Angolan refugees (Kramer 2002), and in September of 2002 the United States informed the government that it would soon reduce or eliminate the current $100 billion in annual aid (Kessler 2002).
In order to implement a successful transition to peace and democracy, the government will have to re-direct significant resources now devoted to military expenses and funds unaccounted for (estimated by Global Witness at $1 billion) toward support of the transition. If it does not, Angola will experience further chaos. If the government remains unaccountable to broad social interests, and if resource-dependence related problems of corruption and economic mismanagement continue as before, peace will bring limited improvements to the standard of living of ordinary Angolans.
References
ALLAFRICA 2002 "Interview with UNITA interim leader Paulo Lukamba, (General Gato)", June 18, 19.
IRIN 2002 Civil society demands a say in peace process [opens new window], September 25.
KESSLER, G 2002 "Powell Warns of Reduction In Aid to Oil-Rich Angola" IN Washington Post, 15 September.
KRAMER, R 2002 "Peace in Angola Spurs US Interest in Economy and Governance, allAfrica.com, November 18.
MALAQUIAS, A 2000 "Ethnicity and Conflict: Prospects for Reconciliation" IN Angola's War Economy - The Role of Oil and Diamonds, Cilliers, J & Dietrick, C, Institute for Security Studies.
PEARCE, J, 2002, BBC November 20.
