Angola: Oil and diamonds and the prospects for recovery (continued)

Except during brief price shocks in 1998 and '99, oil revenue has allowed the government to avoid seeking assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and it has therefore avoided the economic restructuring and forced conservative macroeconomic policies that have characterized the interventions of the international financial institutions in other African economies. An effective and accountable government might have enabled Angola to benefit from this freedom, and produced an economic policy directly suited to the country's needs. In fact, freedom has allowed the MPLA government to pursue incoherent policies. In their attempts to initiate a transition in Angola from a Marxist-Leninist, state-controlled economy to a free market economy since the late 1980's, the Angolan government has adopted nine separate economic programs, and low salaries and constant reversals have created a demoralized civil service (Hodges 2001, 104).

Oil wealth has also contributed to the concentration of the power of the Angolan state in the hands of President Eduardo dos Santos. Large amounts of government revenue, including portions of the exploration fees paid by Western oil companies, are routed into off-budget bank accounts controlled by the president. In 1996, President dos Santos founded the Eduardo dos Santos foundation, a semi-private organization that claims to be involved in humanitarian causes. The organization is supplied with state oil funds. Messiant has argued that it amounts to "privatization of the state" (Messiant 2001, 287), the transfer of the resources and responsibilities of the Angolan state to Eduardo dos Santos as a private individual.

Future prospects

The combination of war, oppressive single-party government, and the revenues derived from oil exports have historically left the MPLA government almost completely unconstrained by accountability to the interests of most of Angolan society. With the likely end of the war, the Angolan government may now begin to face accountability in the form of a more active civil society and, eventually, a credible challenge in multiparty elections. But control of the proceeds of oil revenue continues to offer the MPLA government significant freedom from accountability to broad social interests, and export revenue is likely to increase significantly as the control of diamond exports returns to the government. In addition, the economic distortion and state corruption linked to dependence on resource export revenue will likely continue to burden Angola even if it manages a transition to peaceful political competition.

There are reasons for hope. First, the top leadership of both parties may be changing. Savimbi's death opens the doors for new leadership in UNITA, and creates the possibility that new leaders will feel more obligated to the welfare of ordinary Angolans than Savimbi has proven himself to be over the last 30 years. President dos Santos said in August of 2001 that he will not run for another term as president. Angolans and international observers have been skeptical of his claims, particularly since government officials, UNITA officials, and international observers all argue that Angola is unlikely to be prepared for successful multiparty elections before 2004. A long waiting period gives dos Santos plenty of time to change his mind, and some observers have argued that dos Santos' promise will give the government incentive to hold off on movement toward elections (IRIN 2001). But, if genuine, dos Santos' exit could provide a window of opportunity to redirect resources currently tied up in patronage networks to more productive uses, and to reverse the "privatization of the state".

There are also hints that Angolan civil society is beginning to recover. Prior to 1992, the one-party state did not allow freedom of association or expression, stunting the development of civil society. During the brief peace in 1992, democratic reforms opened opportunities for the growth of civil society associations, but a return to war blunted their development and their influence. In September of 2002, however, Angolan churches and civil society organizations held a conference on "The Agenda for Peace and Reconciliation in the Republic of Angola", presenting a demand that they be permitted a bigger role in the peace process. The conference also questioned the legitimacy of the MPLA government (IRIN 2002). One way that Angolan civil society could increase government accountability is to direct attention at the sources of export revenue: while the MPLA might not seem to mind having a reputation for corruption and mismanagement, Western oil companies might be somewhat more sensitive to criticism. Chevron, for example, invests an estimated US$1 billion per year in Angolan oil (Munslow 1999, 551).

References

ALLAFRICA 2002 "Interview with UNITA interim leader Paulo Lukamba, (General Gato)", June 18, 19.

HODGES, T 2001 Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism, Indiana University Press.

IRIN 2001 "Dos Santos to bow out", August 24.

IRIN 2002 Civil society demands a say in peace process [opens new window], September 25.

MESSIANT, C 2001 "The Eduardo dos Santas Foundation: or, how Angola's Regime is taking over Civil Society", IN African Affairs, April, 100(399).

MUNSLOW, B 1999 Third World Quarterly, June, 209(3).