Angola: Towards peace and democracy (2002-2007)
Updated May 2008
With the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002 UNITA found itself in a difficult position. It was internationally isolated and UN sanctions were becoming increasingly effective. It had lost much ground on the battle field and it had split twice. Its charismatic leader, Savimbi, was dead and its vice-president died shortly thereafter. Thus when the government made a unilateral truce and offered to resume negotiations the UNITA generals seized the opportunity. In April 4, 2002 an agreement, the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, was signed. In October UNITA declared itself a democratic party, by August its armed wing was disbanded. In December 2002 UN sanctions against UNITA were lifted and the organisation was reunited under, Isaias Samakuva, who was elected leader in June 2003 (Timelines of History 2007).
While peace had come to Angola proper, the war in Cabinda between the government and the various factions of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) continued. The enclave supplied more than half the oil revenue, or a quarter of Angola's export earnings; it was therefore critical to Angola's financial well-being. Cabinda was colonized by the Portuguese in 1885 and until 1956 was administered as a separate territory from Angola. In 1974 FLEC was permitted to establish itself in the territory, but aspirations for independence were thwarted in 1975 when the MPLA occupied the territory. As a result a third of the population lives in exile, mainly in the neighbouring Congos; from there a low intensity guerrilla war against Angolan occupation was waged by FLEC. When the Angolan civil war ended the government used the breathing space to attempt to crush FLEC (GlobalSecurity.org 2006).
In 2002 the government increased troop levels in the enclave to 30 000 soldiers and in October launched a massive assault that was marked by allegations of human rights abuses. According to GlobalSecurity.org (2005) Angolan human rights activists released a report that accused government troops of "summary executions, murders, disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture, rape and looting". Despite government successes and a decline in activity by separatist groups, the government came to recognize that a negotiated solution would have to be found if an enduring peace was to be established (Accord 2004, Meijer & Birmingham 2004, GlobalSecurity.org 2006).
In January 2003 exploratory talks between the government and the FLEC-FAC faction began, with the government expressing willingness to grant a measure of autonomy, but not independence, to the territory. An agreement on a ceasefire and general amnesty, Memorandum of Understanding for Peace and Reconciliation in Cabinda Province, was signed between the government and a coalition of FLEC factions, Cabindan Forum for Dialogue, on 1 August 2006 (GlobalSecurity.org 2006; History Central Undated). The agreement provided for a degree of autonomy for the province and the economic security of FLEC troops (History Central Undated). Fighting continued on a lower degree of intensity for a time, since not all of the FLEC factions were party to the deal, but a framework for enduring peace had been established (History Central Undated; Angus Reid Global Monitor 2008).
For the better part of forty years Angola had been the site of a bloody conflict that cost the lives of between 500 000 and a million people, led to the internal displacement of over four million people and the exile of a further 400 000 refugees; the latter primarily in Zambia (46%) and the DRC (42%) (Human Rights Watch 2003a, 5; Angus Reid Global Monitor 2008; UNHCR 2005, 1). By November 2002, while 5 000 UNITA soldiers were integrated into the national army, a further 80 400 UNITA troops and their 300 000 family members awaited resettlement at 41 assembly points throughout the country (Institute for Security Studies 2002). The infrastructure of the country was shattered, the economy crippled, the people reduced to penury and the land rendered unsafe and unusable by millions of land mines scattered across the country. It was these challenges, and that of national reconciliation, that faced the government and people of Angola.
In May 2003 the UN began the repatriation of 150 000 Angolan refugees and by December 2004 three-quarters had returned to Angola, many prior to the formal repatriation effort and without assistance (Accord 2004; Meijer & Birmingham 2004; LWB Undated). By 2005 most of the internally displaced people had returned home, although in 2007 450 000 remained displaced (UNHCR 2005, 1, 2; AfDB/OECD 2007, 119). The returnees faced huge challenges and Human Rights Watch (2005) reported: "Most families have returned to locations with minimal social services, such as health care and education, and few economic opportunities. Few former combatants have received the vocational assistance mandated by the Luena MOU. All returnees face challenges in the agricultural sector - although access to land is widespread, much of that land has lain fallow for years and is difficult to cultivate productively (Human Rights Watch 2005).
The communications and transport infrastructure that had not been destroyed in the war was dilapidated after years of neglect (Human Rights Watch 2003a, 2). Destroyed bridges, roads and railway lines not only hobbled economic recovery, but fragmented the country and isolated the populations of vast swathes of the rural areas (Human Rights Watch 2005). Omnipresent landmines made movement and farming alike hazardous and added to the post-war misery (Human Rights Watch 2005). To raise loans to upgrade infrastructure the Angolan government by passed the Bretton Woods Institutions, with whom relations were strained, and negotiated more deals with China (US$6 billion) and, to a lesser extent, Portugal (US$643 million) and Brazil (US$580 million) (UKTI 2008; Corkin 2007).
The rehabilitation of transport infrastructure focused initially on roads and bridges in Luanda but extended to rail and to main links between the capital and the cities and provinces (AfDB/OECD 2008, 132). In 2007 alone, 1 200 km of roads and 94 bridges were restored and 1 500 km of road is scheduled for repair in 2008 (AfDB/OECD 2008, 132). The rail line between Luanda and Namibe has been completed and the line from Luanda to Malanje will be repaired by the end of 2008, as will the line from Namibe to Menongue (AfDB/OECD 2007, 110; AfDB/OECD 2008, 132). The need for demining has delayed work on the Benguela railway line (Lobito to Lubumbashi) until 2010 (AfDB/OECD 2008, 132). The rapid growth of the economy has strained existing infrastructure, resulting in plans to expand electricity output but 42% in 2007/8, build a new international airport for Luanda and upgrade the city's port and create a deep-water harbour (AfDB/OECD 2007, 116; AfDB/OECD 2008, 132).
In the post-war period the economy has recovered rapidly and the government has managed to establish macro-economic stability (UKTI 2008). The hyperinflation that characterised the final years of the war (300% in 1999, 325% inflation rate in 2000) was steadily brought under control (141% inflation rate in 2001; 98% 2003; 43.5% in 2004) to increasingly manageable levels (23% in 2005, 12% in 2006 and 11.8% in 2007) (UKTI 2008, LWB Undated; AfDB/OECD 2007, 113; AfDB/OECD 2008, 123). Fuelled by a rapid expansion in output and the rising price of oil the economy has posted impressive real growth rates, 15.3% in 2002, 4.9% in 2003, 20.6% in 2005, 18.6% in 2006 and an estimated 19.8% in 2007 (LWB Undated; AfDB/OECD 2007, 107; AfDB/OECD 2008, 123). As a result of the high growth rates, unemployment has declined from 39.8% in 2002 to 25.2% in 2006 and a projected 3 million additional jobs were to be created in 2007 and 2008 (AfDB/OECD 2008, 133). However, high inflation rates have eroded purchasing power and real wages have declined (AfDB/OECD 2008, 133).
High oil revenues have enabled a steady reduction in public foreign debt from 99 % of GDP at the end of 2001 to 53.6% at end 2004, 39.5% at end 2005 and 15.6% at end 2007 (AfDB/OECD 2007, 114; AfDB/OECD 2008, 129).
In January 2001 Angola joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and received a production quota of 1.9 million barrels per day (Energy Information Administration 2008). The economy's high dependence on oil is a matter for concern. In 2005 oil was responsible for more than 56% of GDP and 94% of exports, in 2007 57.1% of GDP, about 90% of exports and 75% of state revenue (AfDB/OECD 2007, 108; AfDB/OECD 2008, 124; UKTI 2008). Diamond mining is the second largest contributor to the economy, contributing about 5% to export earnings in 2005 with huge unexploited reserves believed to exist (AfDB/OECD 2007, 109). Production increased rapidly, by 16.2% in 2005 and 30.9% in 2006, but fell by 3% in the first half of 2007 due to heavy rains that disrupted production (AfDB/OECD 2007, 109; AfDB/OECD 2008, 125). In November 2005 a beneficiation industry was started to add value through cutting and polishing stones (AfDB/OECD 2007, 109; AfDB/OECD 2008, 125).
Economic growth and post-war reconstruction has fuelled a construction boom, with the sector posting growth rates of 17 per cent growth in 2005, 30% in 2006 and 4.9% in the first half of 2007 (AfDB/OECD 2007, 110; AfDB/OECD 2008, 126). Agricultural recovery has been slow, averaging 13.3% between 2000 and 2004, hampered by lack of infrastructure, landmines and low productivity (AfDB/OECD 2007, 109, 110). Poor growing conditions led to a bad harvest in 2005/6 but growth rebounded to 9.3% in 2006/7 as mine clearance restored land to cultivation (AfDB/OECD 2008, 125). Although the sector is the economy's major employer it contributed only 8.6% to GDP in 2005 (AfDB/OECD 2007, 109, 110). Manufacturing, destroyed by the war, has grown rapidly (67.4% between 2000 and 2004 period, 24.9% in 2005 and 30.7% in 2006), but remains a small component of the overall economy (AfDB/OECD 2007, 110; AfDB/OECD 2008, 125).
Everywhere whatever social infrastructure there had been, such as schools, hospitals, clinics and other public facilities, lay in ruins (Human Rights Watch 2003a, 2). In 2000/1 an estimated 68% of the population was living below the poverty line and 28% in extreme poverty; by 2004 68% was still living below the poverty line (AfDB/OECD 2007, 119; UNHCR 2005, 1). The post-war boom has seen an uneven distribution of income, withy a relatively small proportion of the population benefiting from the new wealth, while high levels of inequality persist. In 1997 the Gini coefficient for Luanda was estimated at 0.62, with a higher rate supposed for the country as a whole and in 2005 it was estimated at 0.64 for the country as a whole, among the highest in the world (de Sousa et al 2001, 4,5; AfDB/OECD 2008, 135). Development indicators of access to services, health and education remained amongst the worst in the world. Life expectancy was estimated at a poor 41.7 years in 2005 (UNDP 2007/8). Infant mortality rose between 2001 and 2004 from 250/1000 live births to 260/1000 before declining to 154/1000 in 2005 (UNDP 2007/8; AfDB/OECD 2008, 133).
Education suffered during the war and a lack of skills hampered economic growth as well as individual economic opportunities and advancement (AfDB/OECD 2008, 133). Adult literacy stood at 67% in 2005, with huge disparities between male (82.9%) and female rates (54.2%) (UNDP 2007/8). In 2002 34% of the urban and 39% of the rural population had accesses to safe water, but by 2004 this had improved to 53% for the country as a whole, while in 2007 59% of the urban and 26% of the rural population had access to sanitation (UNDP 2007/8, AfDB/OECD 2007, 117). Where healthcare and educational services were available they were concentrated in the urban areas and the rural majority were excluded from accessing them (Human Rights Watch 2003a, 2).
Progress has been made on improving social infrastructure. In education, 50 000 teachers were employed between 2002 and 2007, while 112 primary schools and 7 secondary schools were constructed in 2007 alone; net primary school enrolment was 56% and secondary school enrolment rates 12.5 in 2005 (AfDB/OECD 2008, 136). In 2007, also, 4 hospitals and 32 health centres were built, but, reports AfDB/OECD (2008, 136): "Access to both health and education services remains problematic, however, because of high costs and poor quality… only 30-40 per cent of the population had access to health services, 30 per cent to treatment and 40 per cent to vaccination coverage". About 4 million people, most concentrated in Luanda, are without adequate housing and plans to build 120 000 in and 80 000 outside Luanda have been adopted (AfDB/OECD 2008, 135). However, between 2002 and 2006 20 000 poor people were forcibly evicted in Luanda, and their houses destroyed, to make way for development projects (AfDB/OECD 2008, 135).
The disjuncture between the booming economy and influx of oil wealth on the one hand and the failure to translate these into a meaningful improvement in living standards for the majority of Angolans is explained to some extent by the pervasiveness of corruption (Human Rights Watch 2003b). A Human Rights Watch (2003b) estimate suggested that between 1997 and 2002 over US$4.22 billion in state oil revenue went unaccounted for, while the International Monetary Fund said that between 2002 and 2008 a further the US$4 billion went missing (Angus Reid Global Monitor 2008). The consequence is that Transparency International has consistently ranked Angola amongst the most corrupt countries in the world, 151 of 158 countries in 2005, 142 of 163 in 2006 and 147 of 179 in 2007 (Amnesty International 2007).
In early 2004 the government announced that elections would be held in 2006, to provide sufficient time for a new constitution to be drafted, for electoral laws to be adopted, for a census to be conducted and for voters to be registered Opposition parties argued that the adoption of a new constitution should be the work of a new parliament, a position accepted by the government. In August 2005 electoral laws were adopted by the National Assembly covering the electoral process, citizenship and identification, voter registration, election observation and a code of conduct. The National Electoral Commission (CNE) was constituted in the same sitting (Angola Press 2005). To coordinate logistics, an inter-governmental commission was set up (LWB Undated).
Elections did not take place in 2006 as planned, due to the condition of national transport and communications infrastructure, and the registration of voters only commenced towards the end of 2006 and was completed in September 2007 (FCO 2007). Elections were postponed to 2007 and then again, with National Assembly elections scheduled to 5 and 6 September 2008 and presidential elections to 2009 (Columbia Encyclopedia 2008; FCO 2007).
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