Angola: Lusaka agreement and its aftermath (continued)
Extracted from: "Angola" IN Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa (2002), edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David Pottie, EISA, 22-24, 26.
Despite the fragility of the peace process, the UN had (since the inauguration of the GURN) been scaling down its presence in Angola. UNAVEM III was replaced by the UN Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) with substantially less staff. MONUA's staff of about 1 000 was even further reduced after UNITA's supposed demobilization in March 1998. However, further sanctions were imposed on UNITA by the Security Council in July that year, after it had become evident that UNITA was breaching the Lusaka Protocols. MONUA's limited mandate and resources was inable to prevent violence accompanying the transfer to the government of areas and towns controlled by UNITA. Another setback for the peace process was the death of UN Special Envoy Beye in an aircraft accident in Côte d'Ivoire, in June 1998. He was subsequently succeeded by Issa Dialo, a Guinean diplomat.
While UNITA was making it as difficult as possible for the government to bring the entire country under its control. President dos Santos broke relations with UNITA as a negotiating partner in an attempt to promote division within UNITA's ranks. On 1 September 1998 the president dismissed the UNITA members of the government. This strategy bore results when three of the UNITA ministers, six UNITA deputy ministers and some 15 UNITA members of the National Assembly grouped themselves into a "peace faction" of UNITA, named UNITA-Renovada (also known as Democratic UNITA or UNITA-D).
The nine former ministers and deputy ministers, associated with UNITA-D, were subsequently reinstated. The government's propaganda machine called on all and sundry to note that the breakaway group, who renounced violence as a solution to the conflict, was the only negotiation partner now recognised by the government. However, more realistic observers of the Angolan scene were sceptical of this group's chances to gain majority support among the ordinary UNITA supporters, especially in view of the dissenters' unimpressive leadership. There were nevertheless indications that within the ranks of the majority of UNITA members in the National Assembly, mostly loyal to Savimbi, there were also those that were at last becoming disenchanted with their leader's predilection for war.
With fighting raging in parts of the country and aircraft carrying UN observers being shot down, there was no doubt, by the end of 1998, that the faltering peace process had once again grounded to a halt. In January 1999 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended the complete withdrawal of the UN Observer Mission (MONUA) from Angola by 20 March. However, the UN's humanitarian assistance would continue. It was estimated that the UN spent about US $1.5 billion, including relief and development aid, to support the peace process. By now Angola had been devastated by 38 years of almost continuous war.
Prospects for peace in the war-torn country looked better with the announcement of the death of veteral rebel leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi. He was gunned down in February 2002 following an ambush with the government's military. International efforts to bring an end to Africa's longest-running civil war were escalated on February 24th following confirmation of his death. The government, however, maintained military pressure on the armed units of UNITA amidst calls for a ceasefire declaration.
The news was recieved jubilantly in the capital city, Luanda, and even African leaders from around the continent agreed that it was an opportunity to bring final lasting peace to the civil war in Angola, a war that claimed the lives of 500 000 and displaced millions of poverty stricken people.