Angola: Lusaka agreement and its aftermath

Extracted from: "Angola" IN Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa (2002), edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David Pottie, EISA, 22-24, 26.

Beye [the head of the Second UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)] succeeded in bringing together the Angolan government and UNITA [União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola] for talks in November 1993. It nevertheless took another year of negotiations before a ceasefire was concluded, on 15 November 1994. The political agreement, known as the Lusaka Protocols, was signed in Lusaka on 20 November. Ominously, Savimbi did not attend the signing ceremony and left it to UNITA's secretary-general. In terms of the Protocols a new start would be made with the demobilization of UNITA soldiers and the integration of some 26 000 of them into the national army (FAA). The Joint Political and Military Commission (CCPM) was to be revived, though henceforth it would be headed by an impartial chairperson, UN Special Envoy Beye would head it. In addition, UNAVEM II was strengthened by an additional 7 000 or so armed troops (the "blue berets") and was now referred to as UNAVEM III.

As was previously the case, UNAVEM's tour of duty had to be extended regularly, because the assembling, disarming and demobilizing of UNITA troops proceeded at a snail's pace. Moreover, there were political issues, not finalised by the Lusaka Protocols, that had to be discussed by the government and UNITA. Most important was the concept of national unity government that had been revived by President dos Santos. His government was prepared to offer Savimbi one of two still-to-be-created posts of vice-president and to appoint a few other UNITA leaders to the cabinet and to posts at the provincial and local administration levels. Although UNITA had won more than a third of the vote in 1992, the MPLA [Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola] government was unwilling to give UNITA more than four full ministerial posts in a cabinet of 28 ministers. Moreover, the government would not hear of appointing UNITA governors to the provinces forming the Ovimbundu heartland.

UNITA demonstrated a willingness to be a junior partner in the national unity government, but refused to let its leader serve under dos Santos in a post that would apparently not carry executive responsibilities. It declined the vice-presidency, but accepted four ministerial posts, seven posts for deputy ministers, three provincial governorships, seven posts for deputy governors and six ambassadorships. Savimbi eventually settled for the specially created post of leader of the principal opposition, though it was doubtful whether he ever intended to function in this capacity. Savimbi was not present in Luanda when on 11 April 1997, more than 28 months after the signing of the Lusaka Protocols, the so-called Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was inaugurated.

There were still many thousands of UNITA soldiers who had not been demobilized and it took almost another year before UNITA, in March 1998, issued a statement that its armed force had been demobilized. This had impeded the functioning of the GURN because UNITA had been "banned" by the government since it was illegal for political parties to have armies. In order to get the GURN going the government legalised UNITA, hoping that its participation in government would speed up the movement's transformation into a conventional opposition party. Nevertheless, the government, UNAVEM and the Observer Countries knew that UNITA had not demobilised completely and that there were many thousands more troops in the field than what UNITA was willing to admit.